Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities

Given self-protection from an undesirable environmental externality, we examine, under several conditions, the efficiency properties of cooperative and noncooperative behavior. We demonstrate that if self-protection can transfer the externality to another agent, then noncooperative behavior will lead to overprotection. If self-protection filters or dilutes the externality, then noncooperation leads to underprotection. In addition, overprotection will worsen if an agent with more relative power is allowed a first-mover advantage or if the damage function is elastic and transferability is uncertain. Finally, a reduction in uncertainty about transferability will accentuate overprotection if the damage function is inelastic. Our results suggest that coordination of protection activities among agents will enhance the overall gains from environmental policy in the European Single Internal Market of 1992. Coordination minimizes the costs of environmental protection, thereby reducing the public credibility of its foes.     

Common Currencies vs. Monetary Independence

We study the optimal monetary policy in a two-country open-economy model under two monetary arrangements: (a) multiple currencies controlled by independent policy makers; (b) common currencies with a centralized policy maker.
Our findings suggest that: (i) monetary policy competition leads to higher long-term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses; (ii) the inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies; (iii) the welfare losses from higher long-term inflation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to shocks.     

Trades and Quotes: A Bivariate Point Process

This article formulates a bivariate point process to jointlyanalyze trade and quote arrivals. In microstructure models,trades may reveal private information that is then incorporatedinto new price quotes. This article examines the speed of thisinformation flow and the circumstances that govern it. A jointlikelihood function for trade and quote arrivals is specifiedin a way that recognizes that an intervening trade sometimescensors the time between a trade and the subsequent quote. Modelsof trades and quotes are estimated for eight stocks using Tradeand Quote database (TAQ) data. The essential finding for thearrival of price quotes is that information flow variables,such as high trade arrival rates, large volume per trade, andwide bid–ask spreads, all predict more rapid price revisions.This means prices respond more quickly to trades when informationis flowing so that the price impacts of trades and ultimatelythe volatility of prices are high in such circumstances.     

Are differences in firm size transitory or permanent?

An Erratum for this article has been published in Journal of Applied Econometrics 18(2) 2003, 249 Previous empirical work on corporate growth rates using cross‐section or short‐panel econometric techniques suggests that growth rates are random but that some degree of mean reversion exists. This means that size differences between firms are transitory. Another, more natural way to explore the long‐run distribution of firm sizes is to examine data on the growth of particular firms over long periods of time. Using a sample of 147 UK firms observed continually for more than 30 years, our conclusions are that growth rates are highly variable over time and that differences in growth rates between firms do not persist for very long. Further, firms show no tendency to converge to either a common size or to a pattern of stable size differences over time. These results are compared and contrasted with standard approaches that suggest that firms reach and maintain stable positions in a skewed size distribution. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From certainty to uncertainty: Thought, theory and action in a postmodern world

The progress of human thought in recent centuries has brought not only new knowledge but also new (and sometimes disturbing) questions that tug at the foundations of knowledge itself. The opening years of the twentieth century were marked by optimistic expectations of ever-increasing certainty and scientific and technological progress. Yet the century turned out to be an age of growing cracks in the facade of classical certainty, as relativity, quantum physics and chaos theory each deepened our understanding of the universe yet raised fundamental challenges to ideas about knowledge. Today, although reductionist and mechanistic ways of thinking still prevail in much contemporary thinking about economics, global security and environmental problems, we can nevertheless contemplate an “end of objectivity” in which we realize that we do not stand outside of the systems we study.     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.