The Cost Factor in Patent Systems

The objective of this paper is to assess to what extent the cost of patenting affects the demand for patents. The empirical analysis, which focuses on the patent systems of the USA, Japan, and Europe in 2003, leads to the following methodological and empirical conclusions: (1) for a proper international comparison, the size of the market and the average number of claims included in a patent must be accounted for; (2) when the cost per claim per capita (the 3C-index) is considered, a negative linear relationship appears between the cost of patenting and the number of claims that are filed; (3) after the grant of a patent by the EPO, the translation, validation and transaction costs induced by an effective protection in several European countries witness a highly fragmented and very expensive European market for intellectual property; (4) for a patent designating 13 European countries, the 3C-index is about ten (two) times higher than in the US (Japanese) system (for process and translation costs up to the grant); (5) The European market being more than twice as large as the US market in terms of inhabitants, the 3C-index suggests that there would be a clear justification for higher nominal examination fees at the EPO, that would ensure the pursuit of a rigorous granting process.     

Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation

Recent research on the Condorcet Jury Theorem has proven that informative voting (that is, voting according to one’s signal) is not necessarily rational. With two alternatives, rational voting typically leads to the election of the correct alternative, in spite of the fact that not all voters vote informatively. We prove that with three alternatives, there are cases in which informative voting is rational and yet leads to the election of a wrong alternative.     

Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition

Within the framework of pure redistribution (dividing one unit of a homo- geneous good among identical individuals), the paper analyses the redistribution that arises from Downsian, two-party, electoral competition. It appears that the strategic behavior of vote-maximizing parties leads them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D63, D72.     

Stock markets in transition: the Warsaw experiment1

This paper investigates the development from 1991 to 1994 of the Warsaw Stock Exchange, which opened on April 16th, 1991. An overview is presented focusing first on the deepening of the equity market, with a still limited but increasing number of listed companies, and then on the high trading activity and price dynamics with their impressive outburst in 1993. Three important dimensions are thereafter analyzed: the relevance of organizational and regulatory choices, the degree of market inefficiency and the origin of the discrepancy between IPO prices and first quoted market prices. Concluding remarks concentrate on the market's ability to fulfil its fundamental tasks.     

Heterogeneous Expectations,Short Sales Regulation,and the Risk-Return Relationship

This paper examines, in a Canadian context, the effect of short sales regulation on the risk-return relationship. It shows that, theoretically, the opportunity cost induced by short sales regulation is positively related to the dispersion of agents' beliefs and negatively related to the security's liquidity level. The model is tested over the sixty-month period from January 1985 through December 1989. All the 13,079 observations are pooled into a time series cross-sectional model. The results corroborate that a negative linear relationship links expected risky asset returns and the divergence of agents' beliefs. This negative relationship is consistent with the presence of opportunity costs resulting from short sales regulation when return beliefs are heterogeneous. However, the negative relationship between security returns and dispersion of beliefs is essentially confined to illiquid securities, that is, those monitored by a small number of analysts.     

A particular class of continuous-time stochastic growth models

This paper generalizes to uncertaintly the neoclassical one-sector model by transforming the basic differential equation on the capital labor ratio into a “stochastic” differential equation. The capital-labor ratio and related economic variables become random variables whose probability distributions vary with time, and the paper is focused on the existence of a steady state denfined by the (probabilistic) stationarity of these variables. An application of the results is given for a specific example with a Cobb-Douglas production function and uncertainty on the saving coefficient, the labor-force rate of growth, and the capital depreciation rate.     

Stability analysis of an effluent charge and the ‘polluters pay’ principle

In a pure exchange economy with two private commodities and one collective externality, a non-tâtonnement process is formulated, which yields a rule for adjusting an effluent charge of the Pigovian type from the level zero (at a laissez-faire equilibrium) up to a level that sustains an optimum. Besides convergence (Theorem 3) and monotonous decrease of the externality (Theorem 2) along a continuous path of price equilibria (Theorem 1), the paper analyses the distributional implications of alternative redistribution schemes for the proceeds of the charge. Various interpretations of the ‘polluters pay’ principle are discussed in conjunction with property rights.