Corporate financial structure and the funding of private pension plans

One strand of the literature on the employment contract focuses on the role of the contract in the efficient sharing of risk between capitalists and workers. One way capitalists can shift risk to workers is to provide part of workers' remuneration in the form of an unfunded, deferred pension. Since bonds, in the event of bankruptcy or voluntary termination, are typically senior to unfunded pension liabilities, capitalists can also affect their risk by altering the firm's debt-to-equity ratio. These observations suggest that corporate financial structure and the employment contract are interdependent. The paper has two major goals. The first is to take a step towards integrating the theory of corporate financial structure with that of the employment contract. The second is to investigate possible consequences of legislation which regulates the funding of private pensions.     

Dynamic effects of externalities,optimal saving and economic growth

Conclusion Recognizing the fact that provision of mixed public goods can result in both consumption externalities of the Samuelsonian variety as well as production externalities we set out to extend the earlier results of Rao and Kalpagam (1977) on the effect of public goods on economic growth. In so doing, we considered three standard specifications of production externalities and enlarged the concept of consumption displacement. Our basic conclusion is that the results of our earlier paper remain valid under the more general conditions set out in this paper.     

Implicit social preferences in the Norwegian system of indirect taxation

The revelation of implicit social preferences is a fresh field of econometrics. In this paper the theoretical setting is a model of optimal indirect taxation. A parametric preference function is specified, which makes it possible to separate and quantify three different effects. First, it provides a condensed quantitative measure of the degree of income inequality aversion. Second, a set of parameters evaluate external social costs induced by the consumption of certain commodities. Finally, the function allows estimation of implicit equivalent income scales. The authors consider the results as a source of information about an important part of Norwegian tax policy.     

Some fallacies in futures research

Can we study the future “rationally” and “scientifically”? This paper examines the methods now in use and finds the assumptions shaky, the tools faulty, and the implications dangerous. With data as the driver, analysis the watchword, quantification the rule, and model-building the prime preoccupation, futurology rests heavily on two key pillars, the information base and cost/benefit calculations. Because these are shown to rest on quicksand, the elaborate methodological structure based on them totters precariously.     

Forecasting and random processes

On the simple model of a (univariate) random process some general problems of “random logic” are discussed. New random approaches to explorative, normative and systematic (normex) forecasting are developed, and some applications are suggested.     

On the theory of macroeconomic quasi-equilibria

Conclusion It has been shown that for the Classical System a quasi-equilibrium cannot exist, unless we make the ad hoc assumption of inflexible nominal wages⁸. The equilibrium in the classical regime corresponds to the general competitive equilibrium, and of course the validity of Walras' Law cannot be questioned. At the same time, however, it has been shown that to extend these conclusions to the Keynesian system as well is not justified. The Keynesian system has, in general, a quasi-equilibrium. The model constructed in this paper and the resulting conclusions are significant because the model: (a) Incorporates the Keynesian notion of effective demand, which includes the demand for capital goods (investment) as being performed by a group of people distinct from the consumers (and so, answering Negishi's point, there is a prince in Hamlet!), (b) Unlike other models (like the recent paper by Glustoff), it does not rely on nominal wage rigidity to explain unemployment, but instead, again answering Negishi's remark, it explains rather than postulates why real wages do not adjust in the presence of unemployment so as to eliminate it. (c) It verifies the validity of Clower's proposition that in the Keynesian System Walras' Law holds only in equilibrium. (d) It reconsiles Bent Hansen's original quasi-equilibrium model with the Keynesian proposition of an unemployment equilibrium, against the apparent view of Hansen that to do that would require the assumption of a Phillips curve, a view also shared by Arrow and Hahn, and many others.An earlier version of this paper was presented in the December 1974 meeting of the Econometric Society in San Francisco. The author wishes to thank Prof. R. Clower, Prof. B. Hansen, Prof. S. Black, and Dr. G. Winckler for their valuable comments, but he obviously claims any errors for himself.