Should countries block foreign takeovers of R&D champions and promote greenfield entry?

Abstract In R&D intensive industries, governments promote greenfield foreign investments, while being sceptical towards foreign acquisitions of domestic high‐quality firms. We develop a theoretical model that shows that foreign acquisitions are conducive to high‐quality targets because of strategic effects on the sales price. However, foreign firms ‘cherry pick’ high‐quality targets to expand R&D rather than to downsize. Otherwise, rivals expand R&D, making the acquisition unprofitable. Thus, our model predicts that acquired affiliates invest more in R&D than greenfield affiliates. Using affiliate data, we find evidence that acquired affiliates have a higher level of sequential R&D intensity than greenfield affiliates.     

Do time limits in the sickness insurance system increase return to work?

This article analyzes the effect of stricter enforcement of the eligibility criteria in the Swedish sickness insurance (SI) system. In 2008, time-restricted assessments of the individual’s working capacity on the 91st and 181st sick day was introduced. Taking advantage of the quasi-experimental feature of the intervention, I find a large and significant increased exit rate around the 181-day assessment. The impact is the result of longer spells outside SI-benefits, indicating that the stricter rules create disincentives to report sick.     

Information Cascades in the Labor Market

A model of herding behavior in the labor market is presented where employers receive signals with limited precision about the workers types, and can observe previous employers decisions. Both the employer and the worker can influence the signal probabilities. In particular, the employer tries to increase the precision of the signal about the workers type whereas the worker wants to get a good signal, independent of her type. In a two-period model, we derive conditions for an equilibrium in which only down-cascades occur, i.e., the second employer does not hire a worker with a bad history even if he receives a favorable private signal about the workers type, but he follows his own signal if the workers history is good.     

Evaluating Projects and Assessing Sustainable Development in Imperfect Economies

We are interested in three related questions:(1) How should accounting prices be estimated?(2) How should we evaluate policy change in animperfect economy? (3) How can we check whetherintergenerational well-being will be sustainedalong a projected economic programme? We do notpresume that the economy is convex, nor do weassume that the government optimizes on behalfof its citizens. We show that the same set ofaccounting prices should be used both forpolicy evaluation and for assessing whether ornot intergenerational welfare along a giveneconomic path will be sustained. We also showthat a comprehensive measure of wealth,computed in terms of the accounting prices, canbe used as an index for problems (2) and (3)above. The remainder of the paper is concernedwith rules for estimating the accounting pricesof several specific environmental naturalresources, transacted in a few well knowneconomic institutions.     

Firms,public good provision and institutional uncertainty: Evidence from Russia

Enterprises in post-socialist and transition economies often participate in providing infrastructure and social services to the surrounding community which in the Russian legal setting should be local authorities’ responsibility. We propose that this bundling of social and infrastructure goods provision with firm's core operations is a fully rational choice in an uncertain institutional environment. A unique survey data suggest that this manifests itself through more reliable infrastructure, stronger employee attachment to the firm and, most interestingly, through better relations with the authorities. Relationship with authorities is a two-way game where the firm gains from the arrangement but on the other faces sanctions if it decided to depart from it. Firm's participation in the arrangement is clearly enhanced by inherited fixed capital assets from the Soviet era.     

Combining “real effort” with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task

We introduce the “ball-catching task”, a novel computerized task, which combines a tangible action (“catching balls”) with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production function, which permits quantitative predictions on effort provision. In an experiment with piece-rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production, gift exchange and tournament, using the task. All of the results are closely in line with the stylized facts from experiments using purely induced values. We conclude that the ball-catching task combines the advantages of real effort tasks with the use of induced values, which is useful for theory-testing purposes as well as for applications.     

The probability of a “gross” violation of an efficient markets variance inequality

This note considers the small sample bias of the empirical variances of observed and ex-post-rational prices of financial assets, and shows that this can be much more severe than has previously been thought.     

Deregulating Network Industries: Dealing with Price-quality Tradeoffs

This paper examines the effects of introducing competition into monopolized network industries on prices and infrastructure quality. Analyzing a model with reduced-form demand, we first show that deregulating an integrated monopoly cannot simultaneously decrease the retail price and increase infrastructure quality. Second, we derive conditions under which reducing both retail price and infrastructure quality relative to the integrated monopoly outcome increases welfare. Third, we argue that restructuring and setting very low access charges may yield welfare losses, as infrastructure investment is undermined. We provide an extensive analysis of the linear demand model and discuss policy implications.