On the determinants of the implied default barrier

Many structural models specify the default barrier, but few have explored its empirical significance and determinants. The effect of liquidity shortage is not well measured, nor is the effect of strategic default well identified. We use the maximum likelihood (ML) approach to estimate the default barrier model and the Merton-KMV model using market values of equities in a sample of 762 public industrial firms. The estimated barrier is below leverage in our sample. The default probability from the two structural models provides similar in-sample fits, but the default barrier framework achieves better out-of-sample forecasts. Our analysis also focuses on the factors that influence the level of the implied default barrier when leverage is endogenous, and shows that endogenous leverage is not the only determinant of the default barrier as predicted by the standard structural credit model. The implied default threshold is positively related to financing costs, and negatively related to liquidity, asset volatility, and firm size. Three strategic default variables (liquidation costs, renegotiation frictions and equity holders’ bargaining power) increase the implied default barrier level. This evidence supports strategic default models.     

Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution

This note determines a rule to share a surplus gained when two countries or regions agree to coordinate their policies to reduce downstream pollution. An intertemporal decomposition scheme for the total side payment is proposed. This scheme has the following individual rationality property: in each subgame that starts along the cooperative trajectory, one country is guaranteed to receive a higher payoff in the cooperative solution than in the disagreement solution. For this country another notion of individual rationality obtains: this country will at any instant of time during the play of the game receive a higher payoff in the cooperative solution than in the disagreement solution.     

Justice versus fairness in the family business workplace: A socioemotional wealth approach

The organizational justice literature and the family business literature have developed independently, which limits our understanding of fairness and justice in the family business workplace. So far, the concepts of justice and fairness have been used interchangeably in the family business literature, as if objective measures that aim to increase justice in the workplace will automatically translate into fairness perceptions among family business employees. By integrating the organizational justice literature and the family business literature, we first differentiate between the two concepts of justice and fairness and argue that a utilitarian conceptualization of justice may come into direct conflict with fairness perceptions in the family business workplace. Second, we shed light on the importance of incorporating socioemotional goals, particularly those that reveal a bright side of socioemotional wealth, into rules and regulations designed to increase justice in the workplace, which, we argue, contributes to increasing fairness perceptions among employees and to building and maintaining an ethical family business workplace. Theoretical and practical contributions are discussed at the end of the paper.     

The influence of atmospherics general interior variables on shoppers’ emotions and behavior

ABSTRACT

This study applies a systematic categorization of general interior variables (GIV) to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the shopping sensory environment. A survey-based study focusing on the impact of the shopping mall GIV on shopper behavior while considering the mediating role of shoppers’ emotional states is reported. Results indicate a direct impact of positive attitudes towards color schemes, mall lighting, scent and temperature on shopper satisfaction and/or the desire to stay at the mall. Regarding the effect of emotional states, pleasure and arousal mediate the relation between several variables and the studied outcomes. Implications for theory and retailers are discussed.     

Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity?

In many countries elderly workers are subject to a double distortion when they consider prolonging their activity: the payroll tax and a reduction in their pension rights. It is often argued that such a double burden would not be socially desirable. We consider a setting where it would be rejected by both a utilitarian and a Rawlsian social planner. Furthermore, each individual would also reject it as a citizen candidate. We show that the double burden may nevertheless be (second-best) Pareto efficient and can be supported by a particular structure of social weights biased towards the more productive workers. The paper has been presented at the “Atelier Retraites”, Bordeaux, October 2003. We would like to thank the participants and in particular our discussant, Ronan Mahieu, for their remarks. We are also grateful to our two referees who provided detailed and constructive comments and suggestions. Support for this research project has been provided by the European RTN program through the FINRET network     

Liberalizing NAFTA Rules of Origin: A Dynamic CGE Analysis

Most computable general-equilibrium (CGE) studies assessing the welfare impact of moving from a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to a deeper form of integration, for example a customs union (CU), typically proxy the integration as the adoption of a common external tariff toward the rest of the world. However, a CU is also an arrangement that allows for the elimination of FTAs' preferential rules of origin (ROO), which is typically not captured in CGE studies. This paper addresses the issue using a multicountry, multisector dynamic CGE model. Although the removal of distortionary ROO is likely to lower the unit costs of production within North America, it may also deteriorate North American terms of trade with the rest of the world. Thus, the net effect of the removal of NAFTA ROO on welfare is ambiguous and is an empirical issue.     

How to counteract the suppression of exploration in publicly traded corporations

Top management teams frequently overemphasize efforts to exploit the current product portfolio, even in the face of the strong need to step up exploration activities. This mismanagement of the balance between explorative R&D activities and exploitation of the current product portfolio can result in the so‐called success trap, the situation where explorative activities are fully suppressed. The success trap constitutes a serious threat to the long‐term viability of a firm. Recent studies of publicly traded corporations suggest that the suppression of exploration arises from the interplay among the executive team's myopic forces, the board of directors as gatekeeper of the capital market, and the exploitation–exploration investments and their outcomes. In this paper, system dynamics modeling serves to identify and test ways in which top management teams can counteract this suppression process. For instance, we find that when the executive board is suppressing exploration, the board of directors can still prevent the success trap by actively intervening in the exploitation–exploration strategy.     

Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans

Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group individuals with similar expected claims, to compute the corresponding premiums, and thereby to reduce asymmetric information. Permitting risk classification may reduce informational asymmetry-induced adverse selection and improve insurance market efficiency. It may also have undesirable equity consequences and undermine the implicit insurance against reclassification risk, which legislated restrictions on risk classification could provide. We use a canonical insurance market screening model to survey and to extend the risk classification literature. We provide a unified framework for analysing the economic consequences of legalised vs banned risk classification, both in static-information environments and in environments in which additional information can be learned, by either side of the market, through potentially costly tests.