Capital Structure, Macroeconomic Variables & Stock Returns. Evidence from Greece

This paper aims to investigate the impact that the capital structure of a firm has on its stock price performance. We apply regression analysis at a sample consisting of Greek listed non-financial companies over the period 1998-2009, both at the full sample level and at four leverage deciles. In doing so, we test if leverage is priced as a risk factor by constructing a leverage factor. The main contribution of our work is that we diversify capital structure studies by broadening the limited work that has been accomplished on the base of leverage as an explanatory variable of returns. Our findings show that the leverage risk factor contains significant information content and that it adds a considerable portion in the explanation of stock returns.     

The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design

Summary. In a Bayesian model of group decision-making, dependence among the agents' types has been shown to have a beneficial effect on the design of incentive compatible mechanisms that achieve the efficient choice associated with complete information. This effect is shown here to depend as much upon the use of large monetary transfers among the agents as it does upon dependence: if the transfers are bounded in magnitude, then nonexistence in the case of independence of an efficient, incentive compatible, ex ante budget-balanced and interim individually rational mechanism is robust to the introduction of a small amount of dependence among types. This robustness result supports the use of the simplifying assumption of independence in mechanism design. Received: October 28, 1996; revised version: May 28, 1997     

Identifying export opportunities for Greece

A decision support model (DSM) is presented and implemented in order to identify probable and realistic export opportunities for Greece. The aim of the model is to select those combinations of products and countries of destination (markets) that are attractive based on widely recognized criteria (such as country risk indicators, macroeconomic data, market shares, accessibility of destination country, degree of market concentration, etc.). The DSM consists of a filtering process during which the less attractive export opportunities are successively eliminated in order to focus on those markets that have the desired characteristics. International trade data at the HS six-digit level up to 2011 where used. The results indicate that there exist significant export opportunities for Greece. Export opportunities are listed and categorized according to criteria such as the market characteristics of the destination country and Greece’s market share.     

Bidding off the wall in common value auctions

This paper examines the practice of phantom bidding in common value auctions with asymmetric information. Unlike in private value auctions it is very difficult to profit from phantom bidding even if the auctioneer observes the number of interested bidders. We find that the auctioneer is worse off submitting low bids or mixing between his participation strategies. Phantom bidding can generate higher revenues if a single bidder with a high value estimate is likely to be present at the auction. Systematic observation of an isolated high estimate requires negative correlation across bidders’ information that is atypical in a common value environment.     

Payoff equivalence between Bayesian and ex post individually rational dominant strategy mechanisms

Summary. An efficient, interim individually rational, ex post budget balanced Bayesian mechanism is shown to be payoff equivalent to an ex post individually rational and ex ante budget balanced dominant strategy mechanism. This result simplifies the search for mechanisms that implement efficient allocation rules by pointing to a class of Groves mechanisms. It eliminates the strict requirement of common knowledge of priors and can be applied to many problems of incomplete information. Received: October 22 1996; revised version: November 25, 1997     

The Impact of Timing on Bidding Behavior in Procurement Auctions of Contracts with Private Costs

We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts that are known to have primarily private costs. Using a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique that was proposed by Racine and Li (J Econom 119(1):99–130, 2004) we find that bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats that are related to synergies and the level of bidder participation.     

Gender and ethnic differences in factors that influence food intake

Abstract The objective of this research was to ascertain the gender-and ethnic-related factors that influence what one eats. This survey was conducted using a validated, pilot-tested questionnaire in 11 states and the District of Columbia, which were participating in the W-182 Western Regional Research project. The results indicated that the factors that influence what one eats differ by gender and ethnicity. Men were very much influenced by likes and dislikes, and by their spouse or significant other. Women were influenced by likes and dislikes, and health. Food likes/dislikes and concerns about health and weight were among the leading four factors for all ethnic groups. Food likes/dislikes were the top factor influencing what is eaten by 51% or more of Asians, Pacific Islanders, Caucasians and Hispanics. Concern about health was the top factor for 62% and 58%, respectively, of African Americans and Native Americans.     

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An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions

This paper explores differences in the bidding patterns of entrants and incumbents in road construction auctions. We find that entrants bid more aggressively and win auctions with significantly lower bids than incumbents. The differences in their bidding patterns are consistent with a model of auctions in which the distribution of an entrant's costs exhibits greater dispersion than that of an incumbent's and relations of stochastic dominance in the distributions do not persist for the entire range of estimated costs. We also find that more efficient firms bid, on average, more aggressively and firms with greater backlogs bid less aggressively.