Sold Below Value? Why Takeover Offers Can Have Negative Premiums

Many studies have acknowledged the existence of negative offer premiums where the initial bid undercuts the target's preannouncement market price. However, this phenomenon has not been explained. Negative premiums occur frequently and are no measurement error. We demonstrate theoretically and empirically that “hidden earnouts,” where target shareholders participate in the bidder's share of joint synergies, and corrections of overvaluation explain negative premiums. We find that target shareholders profit from the consummation of a takeover even if the announced offer has a negative premium. Our theory generalizes to low positive premiums with predictive power for the bottom 25% of all premiums.     

Organisational design implications of global sourcing: A multiple case study analysis on the application of control mechanisms

Global sourcing has become an intended practice for many multinational corporations. Organisational design implications of global sourcing are rarely considered although they are one of the main facets of a global sourcing strategy. By elaborating on the information processing perspective of contingency theory, we derive explanations for the application of different control mechanisms in the global sourcing context. Our findings from case studies at eight multinational companies suggest that variations in control mechanisms can be explained by two contingencies: (1) corporate organisational structure and (2) the distribution of purchasing expertise among subsidiaries. Based on these case study findings, we formulate ten propositions for future research.     

Introduction: Biotechnology in Comparative Perspective – Regional Concentration and Industry Dynamics

Small Business Economics -     

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Social security, public education and the growth-inequality relationship

We study how the relationship between economic growth and inequality depends upon the levels of funding of two of the largest government programs, public education and social security. We do this in the context of an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous agents where the government collects a tax on labor income to finance these programs. We show that in our model an increase in government spending on social security reduces income inequality and can have a non-monotonic effect on growth. When the initial level of social security funding is low, as is the case in most poor economies, then its increase will enhance growth. When its funding level is high as is typical for developed countries, we show that its further increase can slow down growth while reducing income inequality. These results obtain regardless of whether the increase in social security funding is financed by a tax increase or by cutting the public education budget. We also find that the effects of increasing the level of public education expenditures or the overall size of the government budget (holding the budget composition fixed) are characterized by similar non-monotonic growth-inequality relationships.     

Extinction in common property resource models: an analytically tractable example

We discuss an analytically tractable discrete-time dynamic game in which a finite number of players extract a renewable resource. We characterize a symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game and derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which the resource does not become extinct in equilibrium. This condition requires that the intrinsic growth rate of the resource exceeds a certain threshold value that depends on the number of players and on their time-preference rates.