Minimum Wages and Collective Bargaining: What Types of Pay Bargaining Can Foster Positive Pay Equity Outcomes?

Using data from interviews and collective agreements in five European countries, this article analyses the relationship between collective bargaining and the minimum wage. In a context of changing minimum wage policy and competing government objectives, the findings illuminate how pay bargaining strategies of trade unions and employers shape the pay equity effects of minimum wage policy. Two general forms are identified: direct responses to a changing national minimum wage, and responses to the absence or weakness of a national minimum wage. The article explains how particular intersections of minimum wage policy and collective bargaining, together with country and sector contingencies, shape the form of pay bargaining and pay equity outcomes.     

Administrative tradition and management reforms: a comparison of agency chief executive accountability in four Continental Rechtsstaat countries

This article investigates perceived accountability patterns of national agencies’ chief executives in four countries with a Rechtsstaat tradition and tests theoretical expectations about potential tensions between managerial reforms and administrative values using survey data (N = 453). All countries combine old and new forms of accountability requirements, while legal and financial accountability have not been replaced with results accountability. Switzerland and the Netherlands score highest on results accountability, though in combination with legal and financial accountability, which are dominant in Germany and Austria. Nation-specific characteristics seem more important for core values of public administration than generic characteristics of the Rechtsstaat model.     

Die Nachfrage im Monopolgebiet

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Ein empirischer Test der Annahme der permanenten Einkommenshypothese von Milton Friedman

Summary We apply the Variate-Difference-Method to yearly Austrian data from 1956 to 1975 to test the permanent-income-hypothesis byM. Fiedman.First we determe the degree of the polynomial, which is sufficient to eliminate the trend (i.e. the permanent part) from time series of disposable income. Then the permanent income variable is constructed in two alternative ways: first, as a polynomial in time and second bySheppard's smoothing formulae. Transitory consumption is identified with the residuals of the consumption function. A correlation analysis shows that, transitory income and consumption are correlated, if permanent income is determined by a trend polynomial, while this is not the case ifSheppard's smoothing formulae is used to estimate permanent income.Consumption functions are specified for total consumption, durables and non-durables and eleven sub-groups of total private consumption. The results indicate that autocorrelation can considerably be reduced by usingSheppard's smoothing formulae.     

Proportional Odds Models with High‐Dimensional Data Structure

The proportional odds model is the most widely used model when the response has ordered categories. In the case of high‐dimensional predictor structure, the common maximum likelihood approach typically fails when all predictors are included. A boosting technique pomBoost is proposed to fit the model by implicitly selecting the influential predictors. The approach distinguishes between metric and categorical predictors. In the case of categorical predictors, where each predictor relates to a set of parameters, the objective is to select simultaneously all the associated parameters. In addition, the approach distinguishes between nominal and ordinal predictors. In the case of ordinal predictors, the proposed technique uses the ordering of the ordinal predictors by penalizing the difference between the parameters of adjacent categories. The technique has also a provision to consider some mandatory predictors (if any) that must be part of the final sparse model. The performance of the proposed boosting algorithm is evaluated in a simulation study and applications with respect to mean squared error and prediction error. Hit rates and false alarm rates are used to judge the performance of pomBoost for selection of the relevant predictors.     

Kommentar zu Beiers Beitrag

Ohne ZusammenfassungGerhard Scherhorn ist Professor für Konsumtheorie und Verbraucherpolitik an der Universität Hohenheim, Postfach 106, D-7000 Stuttgart 70.     

Willingness to Pay and the Cost of Commitment: An Empirical Specification and Test

In a static setting, willingness to pay for an environmental improvement is equal to compensating variation. In a dynamic setting, however, willingness to pay may also contain a commitment cost. In this paper we incorporate the dynamic nature of the value formation process into a stated preference study designed to test whether there is an important dynamic component (commitment cost) in stated preference values. The results clearly indicate that stated preference values can contain commitment costs and that these can be quite large: respondents offered the opportunity to delay their purchasing decisions until more information became available were willing to pay significantly less for improved water quality than those facing a now-or-never decision. These results have important consequences for the design and interpretation of stated preference data.