Historical accidents and the persistence of distributional conflicts

This paper studies a politico-economic dynamic model of endogenous growth where the political conflict focuses on the amount of resources devoted to public education. We show that if people also have the choice between investing or not investing in private human capital, multiple equilibria in growth and income distribution may arise in the long run. An inegalitarian equilibrium may coexist with an egalitarian one, the initial distribution of income completely determining which equilibrium finally is reached. We then discuss the impact of temporary political accidents such as reduced political rights on the dynamics of growth and inequality.     

National Innovation Systems, ‘Real Economies’ and Instituted Processes

The design of institutions, policies and units of analysis are all predicated upon the ways in which we see the world and explain change. Today, as the pace of change quickens due to technological advancement and growing technoeconomic interdependencies in a series of processes generally referred to as globalization, analytic frameworks which emphasize national systems have emerged to provide a unit of analysis through which to explain these changes and growing interactions. These frameworks have the allure of trying to incorporate the ways in which economies, markets and economic agents actually behave – with particular reference to innovation, knowledge, learning and institutions. Our purpose in this paper is to raise some questions about the importance of these frameworks from a policy (managerial) and analytic perspective, to outline some limitations of their utility, and to suggest some useful paths for investigation.     

Promoting innovation and competition with patent policy

Recently the role of institutions on growth, and especially the influence of Intellectual Property Rights, has been integrated into the Schumpeterian Growth Framework. In this contribution, we highlight the possibility using one patent’s characteristic, the patent height, as an instrument for promoting innovation and growth. We introduce this possibility into the Segerstrom (Am Econ Rev 80:1290–1310, 1998)/Li (Am Econ Rev 93:1009–1018, 2003) quality ladders model of growth. The Li (Am Econ Rev 93: 1009–1018, 2003) generalized model overturns Segerstrom (Am Econ Rev 80:1290–1310, 1998) policy implication in terms of the size of innovations having to be taxed or subsidized by relaxing a crucial assumption on the value of the elasticity of substitution between goods. In this paper, we point out the fact that the innovation size requirement has to be considered as a policy instrument, so that it appears extremely important to consider the case when the innovation size has been made endogenous. A patent policy using the novelty requirement as an instrument for innovation policy enables implementation of the social optimum. The consequences of this policy for market structure and economic growth are then discussed. When the level of the patent novelty requirement is initially high, a patent policy that weakens the patent height can reinforce competition and promote innovation.     

Marital Status and Earnings Management

In this note, we examine the effect of CEO marital status on the riskiness of financial reporting. Using multiple proxies, we find that firms headed by a single CEO display a higher degree of earnings management than those headed by a married CEO. The effect is economically significant. Our results persist in an instrumental variable regression, suggesting that our results are not driven by innate heterogeneity in preferences.     

Network potentials

A network payoff function assigns a utility to all participants within a social network. In this paper we investigate network payoff functions that admit an exact network potential or an ordinal network potential. We also investigate exact and ordinal potentials of Myerson’s non-cooperative network formation game based on consent in link formation. We show that the admittance of certain of these network and game-theoretic potentials implies the existence of pairwise stable networks and the convergence of network formation processes. Our main results extend and strengthen the current insights in the literature on game theoretic approaches to social network formation. We thank Matt Jackson and Sudipta Sarangi for extensive discussions on the subject of this paper. Part of this research was done while S. Chakrabarti was at Bonn on a post-doctoral research fellowship. We thank the Department of Economics at the University of Bonn for their hospitality and financial support. Part of this research was done at the Center for Economic Research at Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands. R. P. Gilles financially supported from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), grant # 46-550, is gratefully acknowledged.     

Testing for Localization Using Micro-Geographic Data

To study the detailed location patterns of industries, and particularly the tendency for industries to cluster relative to overall manufacturing, we develop distance-based tests of localization. In contrast to previous studies, our approach allows us to assess the statistical significance of departures from randomness. In addition, we treat space as continuous instead of using an arbitrary collection of geographical units. This avoids problems relating to scale and borders. We apply these tests to an exhaustive U.K. data-set. For four-digit industries, we find that (i) 52% of them are localized at a 5% confidence level, (ii) localization mostly takes place at small scales below 50 km, (iii) the degree of localization is very skewed, and (iv) industries follow broad sectoral patterns with respect to localization. Depending on the industry, smaller establishments can be the main drivers of both localization and dispersion. Three-digit sectors show similar patterns of localization at small scales as well as a tendency to localize at medium scales.     

Employment protection, international specialization, and innovation

We develop a model to analyze the implications of firing costs on incentives for R&D and international specialization. The key idea is that countries with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Consequently, their researchers tend to specialize in ‘secondary innovation’ which improves existing products, rather than ‘primary innovation’ which introduces new products. This is roughly consistent with the observed pattern of R&D in Europe versus the U.S. Employment protection does not necessarily harm the country where it prevails, but typically reduces world welfare and the world number of goods.     

Matching processes in the labour market an econometric study

This paper presents empirical results on matching in the labour market in Marseilles (France). Using a sample of meetings between employers and workers organized by a local employment office, we infer from estimation results that selection among applicants is on the basis of their level of education. The strength of this selection bias is substantially caused by the poor quality of the screening performed by the employment office. Employers appear also to discriminate against the youngest applicants, the long-term unemployed and applicants of North-African extraction. These effects are alleviated when employers face a labour supply constraint in the labour market.