What Forty Years Should Teach

Reviews in The Economis Journal reveal the unwillingness of economists hostile to the market to acknowledge the failure of collectivist policies. Professor Schwartz here replies to Keith Middlemas.     

Répercussions de la Pension Protection Act de 2006 sur la valeur boursière

Les auteurs étudient les répercussions de la Pension Protection Act de 2006 (PPA 2006) sur la valeur boursière des actions. La PPA 2006 contient deux dispositions principales : 1) les entreprises doivent assurer la capitalisation intégrale de leur régime de retraite en sept ans (alors qu’une période de trente ans leur était auparavant accordée pour capitaliser 90 pour cent de leur passif au titre du régime) et 2) elles peuvent se prévaloir d’une déduction fiscale à l’égard des cotisations à concurrence de 150 pour cent du passif au titre du régime (alors que le plafond de la déduction était antérieurement de 100 pour cent). Une fois contrôlés l’incidence de la norme SFAS 158, les possibilités de croissance, le coût du financement externe et les autres informations publiées au cours de la période d’échantillonnage, les auteurs examinent les rendements anormaux des entreprises ayant un régime de retraite, à proximité des dates marquantes du processus législatif ayant menéà l’adoption de la PPA 2006. Premièrement, ils observent un rendement anormal moyen négatif de – 4,20 pour la période au cours de laquelle la PPA 2006 a fait l’objet d’un premier vote au Congrès. La capitalisation boursière de l’entreprise moyenne (médiane) de l’échantillon a enregistré un déclin de 310 millions de dollars (60 millions de dollars). Deuxièmement, les auteurs constatent que les répercussions sur la valeur boursière sont plus négatives dans le cas des entreprises présentant des passifs non capitalisés plus importants au titre du régime et devant faire face à des dépenses en immobilisations plus substantielles, alors que les entreprises dont les taux d’imposition marginaux sont plus élevés enregistrent des répercussions positives. Troisièmement, les auteurs ne relèvent aucun élément permettant d’affirmer que les répercussions sur la valeur boursière varient selon les différentes catégories de risque définies par la PPA 2006. Enfin, ils recensent un nombre appréciable de cas de blocage du régime au cours de la période soumise à l’étude. Les résultats sont plus marqués encore lorsque ces entreprises sont retirées de l’échantillon.     

Market Sidedness: Insights into Motives for Trade Initiation

We infer motives for trade initiation from market sidedness. We define trading as more two-sided (one-sided) if the correlation between the number of buyer- and seller-initiated trades increases (decreases), and assess changes in sidedness (relative to a control sample) around events that identify trade initiators. Consistent with asymmetric information, trading is more one-sided before merger news. Consistent with belief heterogeneity, trading is more two-sided before earnings and macro announcements with greater dispersion in analyst forecasts, and after news with larger announcement surprises. We examine the codeterminacy of sidedness, bid-ask spread, volatility, number of trades, and order imbalance.     

LYON Taming

A Liquid Yield Option Note (LYON) is a zero coupon, convertible, callable, puttable bond. This paper presents a simple contingent claims pricing model for valuing LYONS and uses the model to analyze a specific LYON issue.     

Board 3.0: What the Private‐Equity Governance Model Can Offer Public Companies∗

The authors view board structures as an adaptive institution that responds to the key challenges faced by public companies: helping management solve the problems of production and organization of large‐scale enterprise; limiting managerial agency costs; serving as a delegated monitor of the firm's compliance obligations; and responding to the governance environment of changing shareholder ownership patterns. U.S. company board structures are shown to have evolved over time, often through discontinuous lurches, as particular functions have waxed and waned in importance. This article is part of a larger project that traces two iterations of the public company board, what the authors call Board 1.0 (the “advisory board”) and Board 2.0 (the “monitoring board”). The authors argue in particular that Board 2.0, as embedded in both current practice and regulation, now fails the functional fit test for many companies. First, it does not scale to match the dramatic increase in the size and complexity of many modern public corporations. Second, at a time of reconcentrated ownership achieved through institutional investors and increased activism, it does not have the expertise and commitment needed to resolve the tension between managerial or market myopia, or “short‐termism,” and managerial “hyperopia.” This article holds out an optional alternative, Board 3.0, which would bring to the public company board some strategies used by private equity firms for their portfolio company boards. Such “Portco” boards consist of directors who are “thickly informed,” “heavily resourced,” and “intensely interested.” Bringing such “empowered directors” to public company boards could facilitate evolution of the public company board model in response to dramatic changes in the corporate business environment. The authors also suggest possible routes for implementing Board 3.0, including the enlisting of PE firms as “relational investors” that would have both capacity and incentives to engineer changes in board structure.     

PROSPECTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM CONSTITUTION

Cost-benefit reasons account for the adoption of the pre-World War I gold standard and the Bretton Woods system–the closest approximations to a constitution for the international monetary system that the world has experienced. Past rule-based international monetary proposals that were rejected were judged not to serve national interests. Current proposals do not deal with policymakers' and governments' self-interest in preserving their existing power to choose domestic objectives and to adopt policies to achieve those objectives.     

COMPATIBILITY INCENTIVES OF A LARGE NETWORK FACING MULTIPLE RIVALS*

Under network effects, we analyze when a firm with the largest market share of installed‐base customers prefers incompatibility with smaller rivals that are themselves compatible. With incompatibility, consumers realize that intra‐network competition makes the rivals' network more aggressive than a single‐firm network in adding customers. Consequently, under incompatibility the unique equilibrium can entail tipping away from the largest firm whatever its market share. The largest firm is more likely to prefer incompatibility as its share rises (above fifty per cent is necessary) or the potential to add consumers falls; the number of rivals and strength of network effects have ambiguous implications.