Endogenous market structures and contract theory: Delegation, principal-agent contracts, screening, franchising and tying

I study the role of unilateral strategic contracts for firms active in markets with price competition and endogenous entry. Traditional results change substantially when the market structure is endogenous rather than exogenous. They concern (1) contracts of managerial delegation to non-profit maximizers, (2) incentive principal-agent contracts in the presence of moral hazard on cost-reducing activities, (3) screening contracts in case of asymmetric information on the productivity of the managers, (4) vertical contracts of franchising in case of hold-up problems and (5) tying contracts by monopolists competing also in secondary markets. Firms use always these contracts to strengthen price competition and manage to obtain positive profits in spite of free entry.     

Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?

While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration policy across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobbying expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important.     

Fifty is the New Forty: EU Merger Policy Permits Higher Market Shares After the 2004 Reform

I analyze empirically all of the European Commission’s decisions regarding “unilateral effects” aspects of horizontal mergers before and after the 2004 reform, which introduced the “significant impediment to effective competition” test in merger policy. I find that, after the reform, the Commission did not change its stance toward mergers to monopoly or quasi-monopoly (almost always challenged) and mergers in un-concentrated markets (almost never). The new test produced more frequent challenges when the combined entity is not the largest firm, but these cases remain rare. The Commission’s stance toward mergers that fall between these polar opposites appears to have been tougher pre-reform ceteris paribus.     

Consistent inference in fixed-effects stochastic frontier models

The classical stochastic frontier panel data models provide no mechanism to disentangle individual time invariant unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency. Greene (2005a, b) proposed the so-called “true” fixed-effects specification that distinguishes these two latent components. However, due to the incidental parameters problem, his maximum likelihood estimator may lead to biased variance estimates. We propose two alternative estimators that achieve consistency for $n\to \infty$ with fixed $T$. Furthermore, we extend the Chen et al. (2014) results providing a feasible estimator when the inefficiency is heteroskedastic and follows a first-order autoregressive process. We investigate the behavior of the proposed estimators through Monte Carlo simulations showing good finite sample properties, especially in small samples. An application to hospitals’ technical efficiency illustrates the usefulness of the new approach.     

When quality signals talk: Evidence from the Turin hotel industry

This study analyzes the relationship between quality signals and price setting through the application of hedonic price functions. The model proposals also include variables relating to land use policies and tourism development strategies. A simultaneous equation model endogenously estimates quality signals. This method is appropriate for analyzing emerging urban destinations, as characterized by the presence of an expanding hotel industry. The results are based on a dataset of 145 hotels in Turin, Italy. The empirical findings reveal that reputation-based quality signals help explain tariff levels. Price proposals also include a premium for quality assured hotels, defining some limits of the current hotel classification system. The empirical evidence has significant marketing implications for the hospitality industry’s competitiveness, since the results clarify the impact of quality signals on price level.     

Consumer Behavior Toward Eco-Labeled Minimally Processed Fruit Product

The authors proposed an analysis of the determinants of purchase intentions and willingness to pay for minimally processed fruit. For this purpose, on-field research was conducted that involved 589 consumers. A questionnaire, gathered in Italy and based on a Likert scale, was administered to investigate intentions to purchase minimally processed fruit from environmentally sustainable farms, simulating a minimally processed product with an eco-label. Via structural equation modeling, the authors develop propositions representing a theoretical approach in the context of purchasing food products. By analyzing two different types of consciousness (health and green), the deduced managerial implications make it possible to assess that the green consciousness influences the attitude and affects the choices and behaviors of consumers. The potential adoption of an eco-label on this kind of food product could be seen as a useful marketing tool for new markets.     

THE BROTHER‐IN‐LAW EFFECT*

When a firm is forced to pay abnormally high wages, hiring transfers rents. This effectively endows the employer with the ability to grant favors, and he may wish to do so even at some cost to efficient production. We refer to this as the brother‐in‐law effect. This article analyzes its consequences. When the brother‐in‐law effect is due to unionization, decisions regarding both the number and type of workers employed could be inefficient; overemployment could obtain even relative to the workforce that would be employed without unionization. We also identify cases in which nepotism improves efficiency.     

Expropriation risk and discounting

This paper focuses on time preference and individual measures of expropriation risk. We use survey data on Italian households and on the 50+ population in eleven European countries. The surveys provide measures of discount rate and proxies for expropriation due to criminal offenses. We show that impatience increases with expropriation risk.