Production and financial linkages in inter-firm networks: structural variety, risk-sharing and resilience

The paper analyzes how (production and financial) inter-firm networks can affect firms’ default probabilities and observed default rates. A simple theoretical model of shock transfer is built to investigate some stylized facts on how firm-idiosyncratic shocks are allocated in the network, and how this allocation changes firm default probabilities. The model shows that the network works as a perfect “risk-pooling” mechanism, when it is both strongly connected and symmetric. But the “risk-sharing” does not necessarily reduce default rates, unless the shock firms face is lower on average than their financial capacity. Conceived as cases of symmetric inter-firm networks, industrial districts might have a comparative disadvantage in front of heavy crises.     

Modelling Intra-Group Relationships

Within a group of companies, a model is given for management of the relationships between the parent company and its subsidiaries. This is particularly relevant for groups originating from mergers and takeovers, because firms acquired often differ substantially in organizational structure from each other and from the parent company. The model provides a means of harmonizing the organizational structures of parent company and subsidiaries, so as to provide a complete coverage of necessary activities without duplication, and a means of identifying which activities should, in economic terms, be centralized by the parent company, and which should be delegated to the subsidiary. Finally, there is an empirical application of the model to one of the principal Italian banking groups.     

Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to Rural Development Analysis: The Case of Agricultural Intensification in Lebanon

While peripheral rural regions in Lebanon face typical problems of lagging development and economic marginalisation, they have not been regarded as a priority for policy‐makers. Local extensionists have encouraged technological innovation as a means of improving farmers’ livelihoods, and this has led to increasing input use and an intensification of agricultural production. This paper applies contrasting quantitative and qualitative methodologies to analyse the effects of such changes at the level of the overall economy of Lebanon and also to explore the impacts on rural households. A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model simulates shocks in which agricultural output increases due to different types of intensification. The results are contrasted at local level through the use of qualitative case study analysis carried out in the Hermel district of northeast Lebanon. Quantitative simulations indicate that, while agricultural intensification has a positive effect overall on the Lebanese economy, the effects on rural households and the income of farmers are negative. The case‐study interviews demonstrate that, at local level, agricultural trade liberalisation, increased agricultural output and greater volatility of commodity prices have resulted in farmers opting for lower input use and more secure market forms of production.     

Input-Output for Management Control: The Case of GlaxoSmithKline

In this paper, we present an application of input-output analysis to management control and strategic planning for a pharmaceutical company. The model highlights the complex system of relationships between the different strategic business areas of the company and provides a tool for forecasting the dynamics of production, profits and internally shared services.     

“Very Nice” trivial equilibria in strategic market games

Following Shapley [Theory of Measurement of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976], we study the problem of the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in which each trading post is either active or “legitimately” inactive, and we call it a Shapley NE. We consider an example of an exchange economy, borrowed from Cordella and Gabszewicz [Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 162–169], which satisfies the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik [J. Econ. Theory 17 (1978) 1–20], and we show that the trivial equilibrium, the unique NE of the associated strategic market game, is not “very nice,” in the sense that it is not “legitimately” trivial. This result has the more general implication that, under the Dubey and Shubik's assumptions, a Shapley NE may fail to exist.     

Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-Bid Auction

One of the main elements of the recent reform of electricity trading in the United Kingdom is the change from a uniform price auction in the wholesale market to discriminatory pricing. We analyze this change under two polar market structures (perfectly competitive and monopolistic supply), with demand uncertainty. We find that under perfect competition there is a trade-off between efficiency and consumer surplus between the two auction rules. We also establish that a move from uniform to discriminatory pricing under monopoly conditions has a negative impact on profits and output (weakly), a positive impact on consumer surplus, and ambiguous implications for welfare and average prices.     

Contracting inside an organization: An experimental study

In this paper we propose and test a contracting mechanism, Multi-Contract Cost Sharing (MCCS), for use in the management of a sequence of projects. The mechanism is intended for situations where (1) the contractor knows more about the true costs of various projects than does the contracting agency (adverse selection), and (2) unobservable effort on the part of the contractor may lead to cost reductions (moral hazard). The proposed process is evaluated in an experimental environment that includes the essential economic features of the NASA process for the acquisition of Space Science Strategy missions. The environment is complex and the optimal mechanism is unknown. The design of the MCCS mechanism is based on the optimal contract for a simpler related environment. We compare the performance of the proposed process to theoretical benchmarks and to an implementation of the current NASA ‘cost cap’ procurement process. The data indicate that the proposed MCCS process generates significantly higher value per dollar spent than using cost caps, because it allocates resources more efficiently among projects and provides greater incentives to engage in cost-reducing innovations. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C72, C92, D82, L32