Enablers for end‐user entrepreneurship: An investigation on Italian food bloggers

This article examines unconventional entrepreneurship (accidental or end‐user entrepreneurs) to determine whether the decision‐making phase of the entrepreneurial process is collective. The analysis identified a virtuous circle that links knowledge, innovation, judgment, and decision making to collective interactions built on passion, experience, and sharing. To study food bloggers as unconventional user entrepreneurs, data were collected and analyzed using netnographic analysis. A supplementary online survey of food bloggers and their followers was also performed. Three groups of food bloggers are identified: amusing, functional, and fervent. Only fervent food bloggers, thanks to the virtuous circle built on passion, experience, and sharing as enablers, can be considered accidental or end‐user entrepreneurs.     

Issues in the analysis of co-authorship networks

Scientific collaboration is a complex phenomenon that improves the sharing of competences and the production of new scientific knowledge. Social Network Analysis is often used to describe the scientific collaboration patterns defined by co-authorship relationships. Different phases of the analysis of collaboration are related to: data collection, network boundary setting, relational data matrix definition, data analysis and interpretation of results. The aim of this paper is to point out some issues that arise in these different phases, highlighting: (i) the use of local archives versus international bibliographic databases; (ii) the use of different approaches for setting boundaries in a whole-network; (iii) the definition of a co-authorship data matrix (binary and weighted ties) and (iv) the analysis and the interpretation of network measures for co-authorship data. We discuss the different choices that can be made in these phases within an illustrative example on real data which is referred to scientific collaboration among researchers affiliated to an academic institution. In particular, we compare global and actor-level network measures computed from binary and weighted co-authorship networks in different disciplines.     

Formal and informal external linkages and firms�� innovative strategies. A cross-country comparison

Firms increasingly rely upon external actors for their innovation process. Interaction with these actors may occur formally (i.e. through a collaboration agreement) or informally (i.e. external actors acts as sources of information). We analyze the reasons why firms consider it to be important to develop formal and informal external linkages in the innovation process by looking at the role played by firms’ innovative strategies and by taking into account the possibility that a complementarity or substitutive relationship might exist between formal and informal linkages. Data are from the Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS 3), where we have access to firm level micro-data from Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands and the UK.     

STRATEGIC BUYERS IN A DURABLE GOODS MONOPOLY

In a simple two-period durable goods monopoly model, we study the effect of buyer behaviour on the monopolist's payoff. When the buyer behaves strategically, the monopoly seller gains from not being committed; the usual cost of a no-commitment argument collapses.     

Schumpeterian patterns of innovation and the sources of breakthrough inventions: evidence from a data-set of R&D awards

This paper examines the relationship between Schumpeterian patterns of innovation and the generation of breakthrough inventions. Our data source for breakthrough inventions is the “R&D 100 awards” competition organized each year by the magazine Research & Development. Since 1963, this magazine has been awarding this prize to 100 most technologically significant new products available for sale or licensing in the year preceding the judgment. We use USPTO patent data to measure the relevant dimensions of the technological regime prevailing in each sector and, on this basis, we provide a characterization of each sector in terms of the Schumpeter Mark I/Schumpeter Mark II archetypes. Our main finding is that breakthrough inventions are more likely to emerge in ‘turbulent’ Schumpeter Mark I type of contexts.     

Consistent inference in fixed-effects stochastic frontier models

The classical stochastic frontier panel data models provide no mechanism to disentangle individual time invariant unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency. Greene (2005a, b) proposed the so-called “true” fixed-effects specification that distinguishes these two latent components. However, due to the incidental parameters problem, his maximum likelihood estimator may lead to biased variance estimates. We propose two alternative estimators that achieve consistency for $n\to \infty$ with fixed $T$. Furthermore, we extend the Chen et al. (2014) results providing a feasible estimator when the inefficiency is heteroskedastic and follows a first-order autoregressive process. We investigate the behavior of the proposed estimators through Monte Carlo simulations showing good finite sample properties, especially in small samples. An application to hospitals’ technical efficiency illustrates the usefulness of the new approach.     

Cost of capital and public loan guarantees to small firms

In this paper, we study the determinants of the spread charged by banks under a UK policy intervention scheme, aimed at supporting access to the credit market for small firms through guarantee backed loans. We exploit a unique dataset containing data on 29,266 guarantee backed loans under the UK SFLG scheme over the period 2000 to 2005. Results suggest that lower spreads are offered for loans of larger amounts and higher durations, for service firms, for larger firms, and for those located in the most advanced regions. Higher spreads are applied to high-tech manufacturing firms and to loans issued for working capital purposes. We also find that the presence of other extant debt is associated with a relatively higher spread and that this effect is especially significant for the subset of firms that have reached a maximum debt capacity based on collateralized assets. Further, we also find that the higher the incidence of the publicly guaranteed debt over the total amount of outstanding loans, the lower, on average, the spread. However, an increase in the guaranteed coverage leads to a contraction in the spread only for loans aimed at covering working capital needs rather than investments.     

Monetary Policy in Austria–Hungary, 1876–1913: An Econometric Analysis of the Determinants of the Central Bank’s Discount Rate and the Liquidity Ratio

This paper presents a model to explain the official discount rate of the Central Bank of Austria–Hungary from 1876 to 1913. The discount rate is assumed to depend on the liquidity ratio of the Bank, defined as the ratio of its stock of metals to banknotes issued, and on changes in foreign discount rates. The paper also presents an equation explaining the liquidity ratio. We use “not equally spaced chronologically ordered data” referring to the 50 discount rate changes enacted. The regressions confirm that the liquidity ratio was the main determinant of the discount rate and that Germany (and not Great Britain) played a significant role in determining the Austro–Hungarian discount rate and the liquidity ratios, supporting the view that the classical gold standard was a decentralized multipolar system rather than a system fully dominated by London as suggested by Keynes. The regressions also suggest that, although Austria–Hungary had an inconvertible paper currency (1879–1892) and fluctuating exchange rates (1876–1895) and formally joined the gold standard only in 1902, it “shadowed” the behaviour of gold standard Central Banks with such consistency that the stability of the estimated regressions was relatively unaffected by the frequent institutional changes.

The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision‐Making Process

Empirical work on the relationship between political corruption and the design of public institutions suggests that the structure of judiciaries is an important determinant of corruption. This study develops a simple political economic model to investigate the role of judicial oversight in the policy‐making process for corruption deterrence, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. Our analysis explicitly accounts for the possibility that, while being independent of the political authority, the judiciary itself may be vulnerable to pressure from special interests. We study endogenous policy‐making under complete information and provide general conditions for the existence of deterrence (zero‐bribe) equilibria. In particular we show that preserving the independence of judiciaries in corrupt societies proves crucial to the existence of corruption‐deterrence effects.