Services Provision and Temporary Mobility: Freedoms and Regulation in the EU

International posting of workers and mobility of self‐employed service suppliers lie between outright migration and trade in goods: their regulation, for both distributional and market‐correcting purposes, is not as difficult to harmonise as that of labour markets, but personal mobility is more visible and socially intrusive than product market interactions. This paper analyses economic and legal tensions between national regulatory frameworks and international competition in these areas, in both the intra‐EU and global contexts, highlighting how interactions between the external and internal roles of the European Commission may foster efficient integration of markets and policies in this and other fields.     

STRATEGIC BUYERS IN A DURABLE GOODS MONOPOLY

In a simple two-period durable goods monopoly model, we study the effect of buyer behaviour on the monopolist's payoff. When the buyer behaves strategically, the monopoly seller gains from not being committed; the usual cost of a no-commitment argument collapses.     

Equity-settled share-based payments and their (strategic) use under asymmetric information

Share-based payments are of widespread use in today's economy. Consulting firms are increasingly accepting equity compensation for their services (particularly from startups) and many governments provide fiscal incentives to support this choice. Likewise, profit-sharing licensing is an on-trend business practice by innovative firms and patent holders when transferring their technology to interested adopters. This paper unveils strategic considerations according to which an agent/seller designs its optimal policy in regard to the equity share to request in exchange for its service, technology, or trademark. The model assumes a fringe of interested users/customers differentiated by both the support they need from the seller and the value of the underlying relationship; and also holding an informational disadvantage on their own type. Given the seller's cost configuration, equilibrium outcomes entail entering a profit-sharing relationship either with the high-type customers only or with all customers. Yet, in this case, equity-based payment claims are —for rent extraction purposes— common (i.e., not differentiated) across types.     

Hypothesis of Price Formation in Input–Output Tables

The goal of this paper is to check if different theoretical approaches to price formation can be verified in the structure of empirical input–output tables. From a propositive point of view, the hypothesis is made of two different markets (the ‘industrial’ market of intermediate and investment goods; and the ‘commercial’ market of final consumption goods), with two different mechanisms of price formation. The consequences of this hypothesis are outlined as regards deflation procedures. An empirical test of the theories about price formation and of the method of deflation suggested by the two-market hypothesis is made using 1985 Italian input–output tables at 1980 prices.     

Translating sustainable and smart city strategies into performance measurement systems

This paper shows how sustainable and smart strategies can be implemented in cities and how these strategies influence, and are influenced by, performance measurement systems. Drawing upon the Foucauldian notion of governmentality, the authors present the case of Gothenburg in Sweden, where they interviewed the key actors involved in a new sustainability strategy. Translating strategy into performance measurement systems requires collaboration across organizational boundaries and considerations of financial goals and social and human aspects.     

Morale hazard

We interpret workers’ confidence in their own skills as their morale, and investigate the implication of worker overconfidence on the firm's optimal wage-setting policies. In our model, wage contracts both provide incentives and affect worker morale, by revealing private information of the firm about worker skills. We provide conditions for the non-differentiation wage policy to be profit-maximizing. In numerical examples, worker overconfidence is a necessary condition for the firm to prefer no wage differentiation, so as to preserve some workers’ morale; the non-differentiation wage policy itself breeds more worker overconfidence; finally, wage compression is more likely when aggregate productivity is low.     

Evaluating risks-based communities of Mafia companies: a complex networks perspective

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper presents a data-driven complex network approach, to show similarities and differences—in terms of financial risks—between the...     

Striking a balance between ‘Sir’ and ‘Dude’

This postcard reflects on an issue common to many academics, whether they teach accounting, politics or—as in my case—commercial law to business and economics students. Creating an open and effective relationship with students is a balancing act undertaken by educators across the board—and no less by my accounting colleagues down the hall. In teaching commercial law to accounting students, I was recently reminded of the importance and occasional difficulty in maintaining a healthy ‘two-way’ relationship. I trust the following may connect with accounting educators and others who are also trying to achieve the right balance.     

The supply of education quality in a spatial model with asymmetric moving costs

The paper analyses the characteristics of the supply of higher education in different geographical macroareas using a strategic interaction framework. It focuses on universities operating in centralised funding system that autonomously set the quality of education showing that in equilibrium it is inversely related to students’ moving costs across areas. We show that in the presence of asymmetric information about workers’ ability and asymmetric costs of moving, the only PBE consistent with forward induction involves that only high ability workers acquire education and the quality of education is lower in macroareas where the moving costs are higher. Our model predicts that in economies with centralised university funding, educational policies must be regulated according to the specific socioeconomic characteristics of the area. Direct subsidies to universities may be ineffective in improving the quality of education in the less developed areas. When regional disparities are not too big, efficiency gains may be obtained by reducing moving costs.