The tax-foundation theory of fiat money

Throughout modern history governments have tried to promote the general acceptance of their unbacked paper currencies. One of the most common devices has been legal tender laws that have assured the acceptance of these currencies as tax payments. Economic theory has largely ignored this mechanism, except for the static models of Starr (Econometrica 42:45?C54, 1974; Econ Theory 21:455?C474, 2003). I provide the first dynamic model of this mechanism, thus showing explicitly the medium of exchange role of money, accounting for expectations about the government??s survival, and enabling more realistic taxation systems. I show that a stable government can promote its currency by refusing to accept other objects in tax payments. While this mechanism has similarities to convertibility, it differs from it on a critical aspect: with this mechanism the government can often keep its favorite money in circulation even while increasing its quantity and thus causing it to decrease in value. This opens the door for a successful inflationary policy.     

A Dynamic Double-Trigger Model of Multifamily Mortgage Default

This study advances the commercial mortgage literature by providing theory and methods for incorporating both equity and cash-flow considerations in default models. We use local market conditions to compute a (joint) probability that default is in-the-money, based on both equity and cash-flow considerations. Statistical analysis is performed using data on multifamily mortgages originated in the 1980s and early 1990s. Simulations based on statistical modeling show advantages of the probabilistic double-trigger approach over other measures of equity and cash flow.     

Music,music videos,and wear out

Repeated exposure to a music video was found to forestall wear out relative to repetitive exposure to the music only. Susceptibility to wear out in the case of the music video was further reduced by eliminating the closure associated with the story told by the video. The level of positive cognitive responses was posited as a mediator to help explain the observed results. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

The Politics of Russian Enterprise Reform: Insiders, Local Governments, and the Obstacles to Restructuring

Russia and other countries in the Commonwealth of IndependentStates that have implemented voucher privatization programshave to account for the puzzling behavior of insiders—manager-owners—who,in stripping assets from the firms they own, appear to be stealingfrom one pocket to fill the other. This article suggests thatasset stripping and the absence of restructuring result frominteractions between insiders and subnational governments ina particular property rights regime, in which the ability torealize value is limited by uncertainty and illiquidity. Asthe central institutions that govern the Russian economy haveceded their powers to the provinces, regional and local governmentshave imposed a variety of distortions on enterprises to protectlocal employment. To disentangle these vicious circles of control, this articlesconsiders three sets of institutional changes:; adjustmentsto the system of fiscal federalism by which subnational governmentswould be allowed to retain tax revenues generated locally; legalimprovements in the protection of property rights; and the provisionof mechanisms for restructuring and ownership transformationin insider-dominated firms. The aim of these reforms would beto change the incentives that local governments, owners, andinvestors face; to convince subnational governments that a moresustainable way of protecting employment lies in protectinglocal investment; to raise the cost of theft and corruptionby insiders and local officials; and to allow investors to acquirecontrolling stakes in viable firms.