美国预算和财政管理改革的演进及对中国的启示

一直以来,美国公共预算和财政管理的改革都是务实的、政治的、演进的,有时也不乏创新性。通过对美国公共预算和财政管理改革的历史进行回顾,可以得出一个理解公共预算和财政管理改革的理论框架,这将有助于理解美国现行预算和财政制度体系。这些改革经验对于包括中国在内的世界各国均具有一定的启示和借鉴意义。     

Finance and growth in Africa: The broken link

While bank liabilities in Sub-Saharan Africa are found to follow (but not lead) economic growth, the link between bank credit and growth is altogether absent.     

Asset prices in a Huggett economy

This paper explores asset pricing in economies where there is no direct insurance against idiosyncratic risks but other assets can be used for self-insurance, subject to exogenously-imposed borrowing limits. We analyze an endowment economy, based on Huggett (1993) [11], both with and without aggregate risk. Our main innovation is that we obtain full analytical tractability by studying the case with “maximally tight” borrowing constraints. We illustrate by looking at riskless bonds, equity, and the term structure of interest rates, and we show that the model can reproduce many features of observed asset prices when idiosyncratic risks are quantitatively reasonable.     

Green marketing strategies: an examination of stakeholders and the opportunities they present

As green marketing strategies become increasingly more important to firms adhering to a triple-bottom line performance evaluation, the present research seeks to better understand the role of “green” as a marketing strategy. Through an integration of the marketing, management, and operations literatures, an investigative framework is generated that identifies the various stakeholders potentially impacted through the environmentally friendly efforts of a firm. Specifically, the inter-connected nature of the core business disciplines of marketing, management (both strategy and human resources), and operations are examined as controllable functions within an organization from which strategies can be enacted to affect a firm’s stakeholders. The prior research in these areas is examined to identify potential research opportunities in marketing while also offering a series of representative research questions that can help guide future research in marketing.     

Managerial style and the strategic choice of executive incentives

This paper analyzes a two-stage duopoly model where owners provide incentives to managers who then select output levels. Unlike the previous Cournot models on the strategic use of incentives (e.g. Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987), managers hold different beliefs about their rivals. Managers and executives are classified by ‘management style’ based on the aggressiveness of their beliefs. It is shown that many of the standard results of the strategic managerial incentive literature no longer hold when executives have differing managerial styles. For example, owners may ‘penalize’ their managers for sales, or they may optimally instruct their managers to maximize profits, in contrast to the standard Cournot findings. Indeed, the model yields a necessary and sufficient condition for compensation contracts to specify pure profit-maximizing behavior when managers have differing managerial styles. Thus, the analysis suggests that when ownership and control are separated, owners must carefully assess the belief structure (management style) of their executives before designing the compensation package.