A processual analysis of the purchasing and supply organization in transition: the impact of offshoring

Many companies have resorted to offshoring in order to reduce costs and grow their global market presence. Yet it remains unclear what impact the offshoring strategy has on the purchasing and supply organization (PSO) of these companies. In this paper the nature and type of changes offshoring organizations make within the PSO are examined, i.e. how new purchasing and supply management (PSM) structures and practices emerge, are maintained or are discarded as production operations are relocated. The processual perspective is used to analyze empirical data from a rich, in-depth case study within a global engineering company. Results suggest that in line with the law of requisite variety the PSO changes thoroughly when the company relocates its production activities through the captive offshoring mode, but does so in a more disjointed and non-linear manner than the current stage models would suggest. The offshoring process provides momentum for PSO change and influences where and how the change happens. We present five propositions for further research and conclude that offshoring provides managers with opportunities to: (i) change and influence the strategic direction of PSM in their organizations, and (ii) build viable strategies of retaining and managing knowledge and PSM competencies in global operations.     

Bringing Unemployed Back to Work: Effective Active Labor Market Policies

We present a theoretical analysis of different types of active labor market policies in the context of a search-matching model. We find that labor market training is effective in bringing down unemployment while public employment services and subsidized jobs are not effective at all. This theoretical finding is confirmed in an explorative empirical analysis using data from 20 OECD countries.     

Measuring Lifetime Redistribution in Dutch Occupational Pensions

Summary  This paper assesses how the Dutch system of occupational pensions redistributes between and within generations. The approach in this paper deviates from the usual approach by incorporating the full life cycle in the measurements, rather than only the annual effects. In order to quantify redistribution, we use the level of educational attainment, gender and age to classify the pension fund population. For all groups distinguished, we measure in present value terms the average net benefit from participating in occupational pensions. The results indicate a sizable redistribution from males to females and from low educated to higher educated workers. On a lifetime basis, the impact of intergenerational transfers is modest. I am grateful to the two anonymous referees, Ed Westerhout, Casper van Ewijk, Lex Meijdam, Yvonne Adema and Peter Kooiman for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and to Andre Nibbelink for his valuable computational assistance.     

The Forgotten Risk: Financial Incentives

Summary  The number of risks that are taken into account by risk managers has grown over the years, but they still have a blind spot for the danger that remuneration schemes and financial incentives can lead to more risk taking. Such an effect constitutes a regime change, making standard statistical analyses of previous data obsolete. Common remuneration contracts for hedge fund managers and bank traders provoke risk taking and lead to volatile results. The incentive structure of rating agencies sheds doubts on the quality of their judgment. Risk managers should address the behavioral effects of incentive schemes, both inside and outside their firm. Incentive schemes should be corrected in such a way that only long-term results pay off. CEO, ABN-AMRO Bank and former Minister of Finance. These comments were prepared for the occasion of the Jelle Zijlstra Lecture by Martin Hellwig at the VU University, Amsterdam, May 27, 2008, when Gerrit Zalm was CFO of DSB Bank.     

The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem

We employ cooperative bargaining theory and Nash’s ‘rational threats’ idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem. The problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem, in which bargainers must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier. We discuss the importance of both efficiency (bargaining frontier) and fairness (recognition of characteristics of bargainers) in the choice of the appropriate contract. We show that the incremental cost contract, used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem, is of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the South to the production of cooperative surplus. A rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction. Contracts must evince both efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions.     

A note on χ-values

In this note, we generalize the χ^Sh-value for all efficient TU-values     

Complementarity and the Measurement of Individual Risk Tradeoffs: Accounting for Quantity and Quality of Life Effects

This paper considers the factors responsible for differences with age in estimates of the wage compensation an individual requires to accept increased occupational fatality risk. We derive a relationship between the value of a statistical life (VSL) and the degree of complementarity between consumption and labor supplied when health status serves as a potential source of variation in this relationship. Our empirical analysis finds that variations in an individual’s health status or quality of life and anticipated longevity threats lead to significant differences in the estimated wage/risk tradeoffs. We describe how extensions to the specification of hedonic wage models, including measures for quality of life and anticipated longevity threats, help to explain the diversity in past studies examining how the estimated wage–risk tradeoff changes with age.      

Line by line,part by part: collaborative sketching for designing

While sketching has an established role in professional design, its benefits and role in design education are subjects that invite research and opinions. We investigated how undergraduates studying to become design educators and textile teachers used sketching to generate and develop design solutions in a collaborative setting. The students were given an authentic design assignment involving three detailed tasks, one of which was 2D visualisation by sketching. Adopting a micro-analytical approach, we analysed the video-recorded visualisation session to understand how teams used sketching to collaborate and to generate and develop design solutions. To that end, we set three research questions: (1) What ways of collaborative working are reflected in actions of sketching? (2) In what ways do sequences of collaborative sketching contribute to designing? (3) What kinds of collaborative sequences of sketching advance designing? Our analysis identified three collaborative ways of sketching (co-ordinated, collective and disclosed) and confirmed that sketching is an important facilitator of mutual appropriation, adaption and adoption. Next, we identified three ways of contributing to designing, as well as three functions and six capacities for advancing designing. Our analysis shows that sketching can lead to invaluable advances in designing, although each team had its own way of using and benefiting from sketching. We further consider that the teams’ diverse sketching processes and rich content owed, at least in part, to the task structure and imposed constraints. We continue to see sketching as an important design tool, one among many.     

Rent Sharing and the Compensation of Head Coaches in Power Five College Football

The monopoly and monopsony power of intercollegiate sports create significant rents, but previous studies of intercollegiate football coaches’ salaries implicitly assume that coaches are paid their marginal revenue products. In a two-stage estimation, we show that coaches share in these rents. The first stage shows that several common measures of coaches’ productivity do not affect an athletic department’s variable revenue. When we include these measures in the second-stage salary equation, their impact on pay reflects bargaining power, not productivity. We also find that several measures of fixed revenue, which are independent of the coach’s performance, increase the coach’s pay.