Urban Crime and Labor Mobility

Two municipalities within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) determine the level of local law enforcement. Enforcement reduces and diverts crime. The former confers a spillover benefit; the latter a spillover cost. When labor is mobile, welfare necessarily declines: if enforcement is too high (low) under labor immobility, it is raised (reduced) further under mobility. If municipalities have different enforcement costs, mobility reduces welfare for the high‐cost municipality and for the MSA, but the effect is ambiguous on the low‐cost municipality. Finally, when residents choose between productive and criminal activities, enforcement is more likely to be overprovided.     

An international comparison of the determinants of retail gross margins

In this paper we compare the results of applying a new economic framework for the analysis of retail gross margins to 1982 interindustry retail data for France, Germany, and the U.S. Use of the same theoretical framework and econometric methodology separately for each of the three bodies of data yields robust empirical regularities with respect to functional form and the role of distribution services in explaining retail gross margins. An interesting feature of these results is that they arise despite substantial differences in classification and in the retail environment of the three countries.We thank E. Hoffnar and P. MacNeill for excellent research assistance. We acknowledge the financial support of INSEAD's R&D department for project R2135. We also thank the CSC at Maryland for support. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the MIT Northeast Marketing Colloquium, the Simon Graduate School of Management at the University of Rochester, the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago, the Yale School of Organization and Management, the School of Business Administration at the University of Washington, and the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission. We thank the participants in these seminars for their constructive criticisms. We are especially indebted to Peter Rossi of the University of Chicago, who provided us with helpful written comments, and to Herr Krockow of the Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden, who provided us with unpublished data.     

IS THERE A (DOWNWARD SLOPING) DEMAND CURVE FOR VOLUNTEER LABOUR?

ABSTRACT * * I would like to thank the Indiana University Center on Philanthropy and the Irwin Foundation for financial support for my dissertation, which led to many of the ideas contained in this paper, as well as my dissertation advisors at Boston College. I would also like to thank my colleagues at John Carroll University and at the Mandel Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Case Western Reserve University, for their advice and comments on previous versions of this paper. All errors, however, remain my own responsibility.
: Are organizations that use volunteers content to accept all of the volunteer labour offered to them, or do they make some sort of demand-side decision as to how much volunteer labour to use? This paper looks for evidence of such a demand curve for volunteer labour in data collected by the Urban Institute in the early 1980s. Evidence is found that organizations are consistent over time in their use of volunteer labour.     

SOME EVIDENCE ON MEAN REVERSION IN EX ANTE REAL INTEREST RATES

Ex ante real interest rates and their differentials are tested for mean reversion using quarterly data on three-month treasury bill rates and consumer prices for 12 major industrial countries over the period 1972:l-1993:3. The results are strongly supportive of mean reversion, particularly when less conventional tests are employed. The conclusion that can be derived from the empirical evidence is that goods, capital and foreign exchange markets have become highly integrated in the countries under consideration.     

Revealing transactions data to third parties: Implications of privacy regimes for welfare in online markets

We examine the effects of privacy policies regarding transactions (e.g., price/quantity) data on online shopping platforms. Disclosure of transactions data induces consumer signaling behavior that affects merchant pricing decisions and the welfare of platform participants. A profit‐maximizing platform prefers the disclosure policy that maximizes total welfare. Although this policy benefits sophisticated consumers, it harms unsophisticated (myopic) consumers. Consequently, the welfare effects of alternative privacy policies, data breaches, deceptive privacy policies, and opt‐in/opt‐out requirements can differ sharply, depending on the level of consumer sophistication and on other factors such as the prevailing status quo.     

Explicit filters and supply chain design

Due to the complexity of present day supply chains it is important to select the simplest supply chain scheduling decision support system (DSS) which will determine and place orders satisfactorily. We propose to use a generic design framework, termed the explicit filter methodology, to achieve this objective. In doing so we compare the explicit filter approach to the implicit filter approach utilised in previous OR research the latter focusing on minimising a cost function. Although the eventual results may well be similar with both approaches it is much clearer to the designer, both why and how, an ordering system will reduce the Bullwhip effect via the explicit filter approach. The “explicit filter” approach produces a range of DSS designs corresponding to best practice. These may be “mixed and matched” to generate a number of competitive delivery pipelines to suit the specific business scenario.     

Optimal design of trade institutions

We model an economy with social institutions that facilitate trade and induce three types of costs: establishment costs, access costs, and use costs. Use costs are specific transaction costs related to the use of these trade institutions. We assume that a trade institution is economically completely determined by the costs it imposes and by the effects on the trades it facilitates. We extend the Pareto efficiency concept to include various modes of organization of social institutions: the costs and benefits of these organizations are expressed in the trades they facilitate.Within this setting we discuss a valuation equilibrium concept, in which all agents use a common conjectural price system that assigns to every trade institution the price vector that would prevail under it. This feature of the equilibrium is important in securing the second welfare theorem, and is new to the analysis of economies with costly trade. Since the use costs can be nonlinear, there are non-convexities that prevent the second welfare theorem from obtaining in a finite economy, but we show it for large economies.Received: 3 April 2002, Accepted: 30 April 2003, JEL Classification: D59, D70, H49Robert P. Gilles: donewhile visiting the Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands. Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), grant B46-390, is gratefully acknowledged.Dimitrios Diamantaras: Part of this research wasSupport from Temple University via a Fuller research fellowship is gratefully acknowledged.The authors would like to thank Suzanne Scotchmer, Andreu Mas-Colell, Marcus Berliant, Shlomo Weber, Hans Haller, Dhanajay Gokhale, Julian Manning, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and discussions of previous drafts of this paper. A previous version of this paper was circulated as Equilibria of economies with costly trade.     

Preliminary test estimators of the parameters of simple linear model with measurement error

In this paper, we discuss the properties of preliminary test estimators (PTE) of the parameters of simple linear model with measurement error (ME model) when the slope of the linear model is suspected to be zero. Expressions of the bias, MSE and efficiencies are obtained under conditional as well as unconditional situations with known reliability coefficient. Conditional model results are compared to the standard model without measurement error. We also provide the unconditional model analysis in finite samples. Asymptotic theory under local alternatives is developed when the variance of measurement error or the ratio of the variance of the model error relative to the variance of the measurement error is known. Asymptotic expressions of bias and MSE of the estimators along with their efficiencies are obtained. In every case, it is shown that the measurement error tend to increase the variability of the estimators compared to the estimators without measurement error. Graphs and tables are provided to see these results and to determine optimum level of significance for minimum guaranteed efficiency. Received October 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  A. K. Md. E. Saleh is a Distinguished Research Professor and H. M. Kim is a Ph.D. candidate in the School of Mathematics and Statistics, Carleton University, Ottawa. Acknowledgment. The authors gratefully acknowledge the constructive suggestion of the referees to improve the paper. The research is supported by NSERC grant A3088.     

Where is the opportunity without the customer? An integration of marketing activities, the entrepreneurship process, and institutional theory

Marketing and entrepreneurship have long been recognized as two key responsibilities of the firm. Despite their tight integration in practice, marketing and entrepreneurship as domains of scholarly inquiry have largely progressed within their respective disciplinary boundaries with minimal cross-disciplinary fertilization. Furthermore, although firms increasingly undertake their marketing and entrepreneurial activities across diverse settings, academe has provided little insight into how changes in the institutional environment may substantially alter the processes and outcomes of these undertakings. Herein, we integrate research on marketing activities, the entrepreneurship process, and institutional theory in an effort to address this gap. We first discuss market orientation as enhancing a firm??s opportunity recognition and innovation, whereas marketing mix decisions enhance opportunity exploitation. We then examine how entrepreneurship leads to innovation directed toward market orientation and marketing mix activities. Based on this foundation, we examine differences in marketing and entrepreneurship activities across institutional contexts.