MONEY AND THE WALRASIAN UTILITY FUNCTION

There is a conflict in Walras' ‘Elements of Pure Economics’between the literary and mathematical treatment of the utilityof money. This paper outlines this conflict and suggests thatthe clear cut treatment of Walras which may be found in muchof the literature is in fact too simplistic to represent Walras'views.     

A Proposed Framework for Monetary Policy

Leave the ERM, cut interest rates and let the pound find its own level⃛ it's the cut and run option. The credibility of our anti-inflationary strategy would be in tatters. And quite soon interest rates would have to go back up again - Norman Lamont, in a speech to the European Policy Forum, July 1992.     

POLITICALLY FEASIBLE, REVENUE SUFFICIENT, AND ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT MUNICIPAL WATER RATES

Water rates are designed to meet multiple objectives, typically resulting in trade-offs among the objectives of economic efficiency, revenue sufficiency, and related revenue stability. Standard theory of natural monopoly is extended here to explain why long-run marginal cost (LMC) can be greater than both average cost and short-run marginal cost (SMC) for municipal water utilities. The distinctions between "benign monopoly rates" and "marginal cost rate design" favor LMC over SMC as the basis for economically efficient rate design. Taking into account conservation investments by consumers, SMC rates are economically inefficient, except during temporary shortages. The City of Los Angeles adopted economically efficient, revenue sufficient, and revenue-stable water rates at the end of a prolonged drought. After the drought ended, Los Angeles (LA) modified the rate design, making the design politically feasible during normal rainfall years. Unique features in the LA rate design determine the allocation of consumer surplus among ratepayers, making the rate design politically feasible by sharing efficiency gains among customer classes. Revenue sufficiency and stability features in the rate design minimize adverse job effects on water utility management, reducing the frequency of rate hearings with an increasing block design. ( JEL L51, L95, Q25, Q51)     

PRESCRIPTIVE PUBLIC CHOICE: APPLICATION TO RESIDENTIAL WATER RATE REFORM

Peltzman's model of price regulation predicts inefficient prices for regulated firms; based on a constraint giving the trade-off between economic profit and the regulated price, the price will be set between a competitive industry price and a monopoly price. This article generalizes the model for application to a wider class of trade-offs, including municipal utilities that are not legally permitted to make a profit. Extending Peltzman's idea of political support functions, this article defines political feasibility relative to economic efficiency. A Pareto superior change with compensation is sufficient but not necessary for political feasibility; the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for political feasibility. The generalization of Peltzman's model of public choice and the concept of political feasibility together explain why Tucson in 1976 and Los Angeles in 1993 adopted efficient water rates during droughts and why, 1 yr later, Tucson rescinded the rates and Los Angeles almost rescinded them. The concept of political feasibility explains why and how, after the drought, the Los Angeles innovations to rate design achieved efficiency and political feasibility, avoiding reversion to the previous, inefficient rates, by separating economic efficiency from political feasibility in both the rate design and the rate reform process. ( JEL D42, D70, H00, L38, L51, L97, Q25, Q28, Q48, Q58)     

Living Wage Policies at the San Francisco Airport: Impacts on Workers and Businesses

This paper evaluates the costs, benefits and related impacts of living wage policies implemented at the San Francisco Airport (SFO). Unlike other living wage ordinances, the policies at SFO cover a large proportion of the low-wage labor force in a distinct labor market. The authors find that about 73 percent of the ground-based non-managerial workers at SFO received substantial wage increases as a direct or indirect result of the policies; the proportion of these workers earning under $10 per hour fell from 55 percent to 5 percent, significantly reducing earnings inequality. Other benefits to workers included enhanced health benefits and an arrest of declines in quality of life indices. The costs of the policies to employers amounted to an average of 0.7 percent of fare revenue, or $1.42 per airline passenger. We observe a series of dynamic adjustments that reduced those costs, including dramatically reduced turnover, improved worker morale and greater work effort. We find some limited evidence of worker-worker substitution, but no evidence of employment decline.     

SOLAR POWER

This paper describes categories of solar technologies and identijies those that are economic. It compares the private costs of power from solar, wind, nuclear, coal, oil, and gas generators. In the southern United States, the private costs of building and generating electricity from new solar and wind power plants are less than the private cost of electricity from a new nuclear power plant. Solar power is more valuable than nuclear power since all solar power is available during peak and mid-peak periods. Half of the power from nuclear generators is off-peak power and therefore is less valuable. Reliability is important in determining the value of wind and nuclear power. Damage from air pollution, when factored into the cost of power from fossil fuels, alters the cost comparison in favor of solar and wind power. Some policies are more effective at encouraging alternative energy technologies that pollute less and improve national security.