Using the Murphy Model to Provide Short-run Macroeconomic Closure for ORANI

A macro model incorporating rational expectations in financial markets (the Murphy Model–MM) is used to endogenize the macroeconomic environment for a comprehensive general equilibrium model (ORANI). The interface exploits the existence of variables which are endogenous to both models, calibrating on a shock to government spending. Prospective benefits include: (1) to the numerous policy oriented users of ORANI, a facility allowing the macroeconomic environment to be determined by a macrodynamic model such as MM; (2) to these users, reassurance that ORANI's short-run translates in calendar time to about two years; (3) to the clientele of a macro model, the possibility of much more detailed projections.     

Demanding ‘credible commitment’: public reactions to the failures of the early financial revolution1

North and Weingast's notion of ‘credible commitment’ arguably offers a reasonable understanding of the factors that allowed the development of a trusting relationship between the state and its potential creditors over the long term. Yet, they failed to recognize the difficulties that were encountered along the way. This article highlights some of those difficulties and shows that at times when credible commitment was in doubt, supporters of the financial revolution held the government to account through the published media and by direct action. This is important for two reasons. First, the contemporary debate regarding the financial revolution, as it is presented by some historians, may lead us to presume that there would have been little public outcry had the government reneged on its debt. Indeed, we might argue that hostility towards financiers had always made default popular with many segments of the population. Yet, clearly opinion was not quite so one‐sided and the reaction against potential default was considerable. Second, the fact that the public creditors were willing to act to protect themselves shows that credible commitment was not just created from above by the Glorious Revolution and the subsequent development of the institutions of government; it was demanded from below by the people who invested in the financial revolution.     

Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory

A thorough understanding of internal incentive structures is critical to developing a viable theory of the firm, since these incentives determine to a large extent how individuals inside an organization behave. Many common features of organizational incentive systems are not easily explained by traditional economic theory—including egalitarian pay systems in which compensation is largely independent of performance, the overwhelming use of promotion-based incentive systems, the absence of up-front fees for jobs and effective bonding contracts, and the general reluctance of employers to fire, penalize, or give poor performance evaluations to employees. Typical explanations for these practices offered by behaviorists and practitioners are distinctly uneconomic—focusing on notions such as fairness, equity, morale, trust, social responsibility, and culture. The challenge to economists is to provide viable economic explanations for these practices or to integrate these alternative notions into the traditional economic model.     

Local Consumer Information Systems for Services: A Test

This paper reports on a survey of consumers' experiences with local services firms that was conducted by the Montgomery County, Maryland Office of Consumer Affairs and supported by an FTC grant. Over 1,200 individuals evaluated auto repair, heating and air conditioning, home remodeling, roofing, and insulation contracting firms on three dimensions: satisfaction with work performed, price in relation to quality, and strength of recommendation. Results for the heating and air conditioning category were published and widely disseminated.