Rational expectations in microeconomic models: An overview

This paper is an expository introduction to several topics of current research in the general equilibrium theory of rational expectations. More specifically, we discuss the existence of exact and approximate rational expectations equilibria, the implementation of equilibria, the behavior of learning and smoothing processes by which traders construct expectations from repeated observations of the market, and the lagged use of the information revealed by prices in an intertemporal sequence of markets. The purpose of this discussion is to introduce papers on these topics appearing in the Journal of Economic Theory Symposium on Rational Expectations in Microeconomic Models.     

Promise and peril in implementing pay‐for‐performance

Why would managers abandon pay‐for‐performance plans they initiated with great hopes? Why would employees celebrate this decision? This article explores why managers made their decisions in 12 of 13 pay‐for‐performance “experiments” at Hewlett‐Packard in the mid‐1990s. We find that managers thought the costs of these programs to be higher than the benefits. Alternative managerial practices such as effective leadership, clear objectives, coaching, or training were thought a better investment. Despite the undisputed instrumentality of pay‐for‐performance to motivate, little attention has been given to whether the benefits outweigh the costs or the “fit” of these programs with high‐commitment cultures like Hewlett‐Packard was at the time. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Playing safe in coordination games:: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play

This paper presents results from a series of experiments designed to test the impact on subject behavior of changes in the risk dominance and payoff dominance characteristics of two player coordination games. The main finding is that changes in risk dominance significantly affect play of the subjects, whereas changes in the level of payoff dominance do not. Observed history of play also has an important influence on subject behavior, both when subjects are randomly rematched after each game and when they remain matched with the same individual for a sequence of games.     

Don’t kill the messenger! Whistle-blowing in America — A review with recommendations

Whistle-blowing in America business and industry has increased as interest in ethical business behavior and the cost of unethical behavior have grown. Whistle-blowing plays the important role of helping to fill the gaps in the regulatory system that is designed to check the abuse of organizational power. However, the practice of whistle-blowing is controversial and whistle-blowers often pay a high price for their actions. Firms can engage in a number of actions to encourage whistle-blowing. Creating a climate that encourages employees to report organizational wrong doing and that protects the whistle-blower is critical. To create such a climate the organization must build trust and cooperation by educating employees in the benefits of ethical and legal behavior.     

Taxation and household portfolio composition: US evidence from the 1980s and 1990s

This paper explores the relationship between household marginal income tax rates, the set of financial assets that households own, and the portfolio shares accounted for by each of these assets. It analyzes data from the 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998 Surveys of Consumer Finances and develops a new algorithm for imputing federal marginal tax rates to households in these surveys. The empirical findings suggest that marginal tax rates have important effects on asset allocation decisions. The probability that a household owns tax-advantaged assets, such as tax-exempt bonds or assets held in tax-deferred accounts, is positively related to its tax rate on ordinary income. In addition, the portfolio share invested in corporate stock, which is taxed less heavily than interest bearing assets, is increasing in the household’s ordinary income tax rate. Holdings of heavily taxed assets, such as interest-bearing accounts, decline as a share of wealth as a household’s marginal tax rate increases.     

How many voters are needed for paradoxes?

Summary. This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line, we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of voters needed for a profile for which the Condorcet winner is not strictly top ranked for all weighted positional procedures. Also we give a simple upper bound on the minimum number of voters needed for a set of prescribed voting outcomes. In contrast to situations wherein small numbers of voters are needed, we consider paradoxes requiring arbitrarily large numbers of voters as well as large numbers of alternatives. Finally we indicate connections with statistical rank based tests. Received: April 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001     

Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence from Franchising

This article provides evidence on the determinants of royaltiesand upfront fees in share contracts by examining how state franchisetermination laws affect franchise contracts. The results areconsistent with the joint hypothesis that the two-sided moralhazard model explains the terms in franchise contracts and thattermination laws increase the relative importance of franchisoreffort (due to the extra effort that is required to controlsystem quality). I find that franchise companies that are headquarteredin termination-law states charge significantly higher royaltyrates than companies headquartered in other states (around 1%higher). Correspondingly, the initial franchise fees are lowerfor companies headquartered in termination states. Overall,franchisees appear to pay a higher price for franchises in stateswith protection laws. Consistent with a basic tenet of law andeconomics, price adjustments appear to offset at least someof the transfers that would otherwise be implied by the laws.     

Ramsey pricing and competition: The consequences of myopic regulation

This paper addresses the welfare consequences of applying the Ramsey rule when the regulated firm is not a monopolist in all of its markets. The partially regulated optimum and the outcome of myopic regulation, the Short-Sighted Ramsey Equilibrium (SSRE), are examined in a differentiated duopoly model. In the optimum, the markup of competitive substitute goods is relatively high. In the SSRE, the regulator is likely to set the price of competitive substitute goods lower than optimal, and complementary goods higher than optimal. Strategic reactions by a competitor may reverse the result.I thank Kenneth Train, Michael Crew (the editor), seminar participants at the University of California, Berkeley, and an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.