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72.
We examine the theoretical interrelations between equilibrium (in)determinacy and economic growth in a one‐sector representative‐agent model of endogenous growth with progressive taxation of income and productive flow of public spending. We analytically show that, if the demand‐side effect of government purchases is weaker, the economy exhibits an indeterminate balanced‐growth equilibrium and belief‐driven growth fluctuations when the tax schedule is sufficiently progressive or regressive. If the supply‐side effect of public expenditures is weaker, indeterminacy and sunspots arise under progressive income taxation. In sharp contrast to traditional Keynesian‐type stabilization policies, our analysis finds that raising the tax progressivity may destabilize an endogenously growing economy with fluctuations driven by agents’ self‐fulfilling expectations. 相似文献
73.
A new mean‐risk hedge ratio based on the concept of generalized semivariance (GSV) is proposed. The proposed mean‐GSV (M‐GSV) hedge ratio is consistent with the GSV‐based risk–return model developed by Fishburn (1977), Bawa (1975, 1978), and Harlow and Rao (1989). The M‐GSV hedge ratio can also be considered an extension of the GSV‐minimizing hedge ratio considered by De Jong, De Roon, and Veld (1997) and Lien and Tse (1998, 2000). The M‐GSV hedge ratio is estimated for Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 futures and compared to six other widely used hedge ratios. Because all the hedge ratios considered are known to converge to the minimum‐variance (Johnson) hedge ratio under joint normality and martingale conditions, tests for normality and martingale conditions are carried out. The empirical results indicate that the joint normality and martingale hypotheses do not hold for the S&P 500 futures. The M‐GSV hedge ratio varies less than the GSV hedge ratio for low and relevant levels of risk aversion. Furthermore, the M‐GSV hedge ratio converges to a value different from the values of the other hedge ratios for higher values of risk aversion. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 21: 581–598, 2001 相似文献
74.
This note reinforces the results in a paper by Sen (International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 11, 1993, pp. 123–37). It is shown that his assumption that the incentive schemes in a two‐period model are the same for the two periods is not necessary for the results: only the long‐term nature of contracts with managers matters. 相似文献
75.
MICHEL MOUGEOT FLORENCE NAEGELEN BENJAMIN PELLOUX JEAN‐LOUIS RULLIÈRE 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2011,13(5):829-856
The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU‐ETS) has chosen to adopt an auctioning procedure to initially allocate CO2 emission permits. Free allocation of permits will become an exception for the third phase (2013–2020) and most firms will have to buy all their permits on the market or via auctions. The ability of bidders to collude is a key concern about the design of the auction format. To counter collusion, the auction can be open to bidders without compliance obligations (speculators). This paper aims at studying experimentally speculation as a collusion‐breaking device in two different auction mechanisms: the uniform‐price sealed‐bid auction and the ascending clock auction. Our results suggest that a uniform sealed‐bid auction open to speculators should be chosen from a revenue maximization point of view. In this mechanism, compliance agents adopt an aggressive strategy toward speculators. This strategy significantly increases the seller's revenue, compared to the more collusive clock auction. In the latter, on the contrary, bidders accommodate speculators, letting them buy permits in the auction and buying their necessary permits on the secondary market. However, as opening the auction to speculators deteriorates efficiency, the regulator faces a trade‐off between these two objectives. 相似文献
76.
This paper analyzes the optimal partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering policies in a model with electoral competitions in policy positions and transfer promises. Party leaders have both office‐ and policy‐motivations. With complete freedom in redistricting, partisan gerrymandering policy generates the most one‐sidedly biased district profile, while bipartisan gerrymandering generates the most polarized district profile. In contrast, with limited freedom in gerrymandering, both partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering tend to prescribe the same policy. 相似文献
77.
abstract An action pattern model was developed and applied to the examination of inter‐firm cooperative processes. The model considered cooperation as a continuous cycle of actions and reactions between cooperating partners. The building blocks of the model include cooperative equilibrium, disruptive events, action types and action patterns. Three action pattern variables were proposed to describe the interactions. It was hypothesized that action patterns are contingent on partner relationships and the transaction cost characteristics of a partnership. The hypotheses were tested on a sample of 263 partnerships in the construction industry in Hong Kong. The quantitative study was supplemented by four in‐depth case studies. The results show that: (1) trust was an important antecedent of action patterns; and (2) transaction cost variables moderate the relationships between partner relationships and action patterns. These findings suggest that future research should give more attention to the interaction of partners during cooperation. 相似文献
78.
79.
The paper analyzes the options open to monopoly firms that sell Internet services. We consider two groups of customers that are different in their reservation prices. The monopoly uses price discrimination between customers by producing two versions of the product at positive price for high‐quality product and a free version at zero price for lower‐quality product. The monopoly can sell advertising space to increase its revenue but risks losing customers who are annoyed by advertising. Network externalities increase the incentive to increase output; thus we find cases where the profit maximization is consistent with maximum social welfare. 相似文献
80.