SPATIAL PERFECT COMPETITION: A UNIFORM DELIVERED PRICING MODEL

Abstract.  Spatial competition is often probed in terms of spatial oligopoly and/or monopolistic competition in the literature. This paper considers spatial competition as a form of perfect competition, in the sense that the firms are assumed to be price-takers located at the centre of a market area and practising uniform pricing. It shows that under scale economy competitive equilibria can occur, and may actually be observed in the form of international price differentials. Both a very high price and a very low price can yield conditions of competitive equilibrium in spatially or otherwise separate markets.     

Incentive efficient risk sharing in a settlement mechanism

The purpose of this paper is to address a question concerning risk management in continuing, multi-party, contractual, clearing and settlement arrangements through which large-value payments are typically made. We are particularly interested in the issues of incentive compatibility when a third party possesses a private information concerning the riskiness of transfers being made. If a third party possesses private information that would be of value in determining how best to settle a payment, how does the exposure of that party to the settlement risk affect the quality of information that the party chooses to provide? In this paper, we address this question by analyzing a specific class of parametric environments of a schematic, formal, model of a settlement arrangement or a payment network.     

Bank competition and monetary policy

There is an apparent theoretical discrepancy between the effects of monetary policy shocks on economies with differently competitive banking sectors. We employ cross-country data to investigate this hypothesis with two different approaches. First, using aggregate data we analyze the correlation between two indices: (i) a cumulative impulse response function providing an index of the effect of monetary policy shocks; and (ii) Panzar and Rosse's H-statistic as an index of the state of bank competition. Second, using disaggregated data we regress bank lending on the interaction of bank competition and monetary policy shocks. The first approach does not provide any evidence of a relationship between monetary policy shocks and bank competition. However, the second approach suggests that competition in the banking industry leads to smaller monetary policy effects on bank lending.     

A trend filtering method closely related to $$\ell _{1}$$ trend filtering

The filtering method developed by Kim et al. (SIAM Rev 51:339–360, 2009), \(\ell _{1}\) trend filtering, is attractive because it enables us to estimate a continuous piecewise linear trend. This paper introduces a new filtering method closely related to \(\ell _{1}\) trend filtering in order to contribute to the accumulation of knowledge on \(\ell _{1}\) trend filtering. We show that the piecewise linearity, which is the key feature of \(\ell _{1}\) trend filtering, is derived from the new filtering. For this reason, we refer to the filtering as ‘pure’ \(\ell _{1}\) trend filtering. We also demonstrate some other miscellaneous results concerning the new filtering.     

Cointegration and spatial price transmission among wheat and wheat-flour markets in Afghanistan

This article examines cointegration and spatial price transmission among Afghan wheat and flour markets as well as their linkages with those of supplier countries and global markets. Unit root tests, consistent momentum threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) models and vector error correction models (asymmetric and symmetric) are employed to achieve research objectives. The results suggest that provincial wheat and flour markets may have a long-run relationship with principal market of Kabul. Afghan wheat and flour markets may also be cointegrated with their respective global, Kazakh and Pakistani markets. While provincial wheat markets might adjust to divergence from their long-run equilibrium with Kabul wheat market, some of the provincial flour markets may not respond to deviation from their long-run equilibrium with Kabul flour market. The speed of adjustment towards the long-run Afghan–Pakistani and Afghan–Kazakh equilibrium may be faster for Afghan flour than wheat markets. The equilibrium adjustment coefficients are generally small and market imperfections may exist, however. A shock in Kabul wheat and flour markets may have long-lasting effect on the respective provincial markets whereas a shock in global wheat and Pakistani, and Kazakh wheat and flour markets might have transitory effect on the corresponding Afghan markets.     

Agency Contracts,Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options

Given that an owner lacks the ability to commit to his or her timing decisions under a manager's hidden action, we consider the optimal design of the contract and the owner's optimal timing decisions. Using a real options approach, we show that, compared with the full commitment case, a higher (lower)‐quality project is launched later than (at the same time as) the first‐best case, whereas the replacement of the manager is (is not necessarily) made later if the hidden‐action problem is severe enough (is not severe enough). Severance pay may serve to minimize the compensation for the manager's loss of corporate control.     

Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer

The purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism for supporting desired equilibrium actions in a one-principal, multi-agent model when the principal makes a renegotiation offer. We show that there exists a mechanism in which the principal's most preferred mixed strategy is always supported. Received: 30 May 1997 / Accepted: 10 October 1998