皖江城市带承接产业转移示范区人才柔性流动机理分析

文章对人才柔性流动的相关理论进行阐述,在此基础上具体分析了皖江城市带承接产业转移示范区人才资源现状以及未来示范区建设过程中对人才资源的需求预测,并从人才柔性流动的必要性、可行性以及流动路径等方面对示范区人才柔性流动机理加以分析。     

On indeterminacy and growth under progressive taxation and productive government spending

We examine the theoretical interrelations between equilibrium (in)determinacy and economic growth in a one‐sector representative‐agent model of endogenous growth with progressive taxation of income and productive flow of public spending. We analytically show that, if the demand‐side effect of government purchases is weaker, the economy exhibits an indeterminate balanced‐growth equilibrium and belief‐driven growth fluctuations when the tax schedule is sufficiently progressive or regressive. If the supply‐side effect of public expenditures is weaker, indeterminacy and sunspots arise under progressive income taxation. In sharp contrast to traditional Keynesian‐type stabilization policies, our analysis finds that raising the tax progressivity may destabilize an endogenously growing economy with fluctuations driven by agents’ self‐fulfilling expectations.     

International Transfers from Rich to Poor Nations

A major shortcoming of the theoretical literature on international transfers is that it is not at all clear whether the welfare results obtained are consistent with transfers flowing from rich to poor nations. This is because economists hardly ever model the difference in wealth between the donor and recipient nations. This paper shows that, contrary to the literature, when international transfers are modeled explicitly to flow from rich to poor nations, donor-enriching recipient-impoverishing international transfers may not exist in a world which is accumulating capital.     

陕西文化产业投融资模式创新研究

文化产业,作为一种新兴的产业形态被赋予了产业转型升级的重大使命,具有非常广阔的发展前景。资金的融通是文化产业发展的有力保证,现阶段资本的缺乏成为陕西文化产业发展亟待解决的瓶颈问题。在分析陕西文化产业投融资发展现状的基础上,借鉴国外文化产业投融资的成功经验,提出深入挖掘投融资潜力,积极拓宽投融资渠道,建立功能完善、分工明确、运营规范的投融资体系,形成有陕西特色的文化产业投融资模式。     

Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Markets

The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU‐ETS) has chosen to adopt an auctioning procedure to initially allocate CO₂ emission permits. Free allocation of permits will become an exception for the third phase (2013–2020) and most firms will have to buy all their permits on the market or via auctions. The ability of bidders to collude is a key concern about the design of the auction format. To counter collusion, the auction can be open to bidders without compliance obligations (speculators). This paper aims at studying experimentally speculation as a collusion‐breaking device in two different auction mechanisms: the uniform‐price sealed‐bid auction and the ascending clock auction. Our results suggest that a uniform sealed‐bid auction open to speculators should be chosen from a revenue maximization point of view. In this mechanism, compliance agents adopt an aggressive strategy toward speculators. This strategy significantly increases the seller's revenue, compared to the more collusive clock auction. In the latter, on the contrary, bidders accommodate speculators, letting them buy permits in the auction and buying their necessary permits on the secondary market. However, as opening the auction to speculators deteriorates efficiency, the regulator faces a trade‐off between these two objectives.     

Should countries block foreign takeovers of R&D champions and promote greenfield entry?

Abstract In R&D intensive industries, governments promote greenfield foreign investments, while being sceptical towards foreign acquisitions of domestic high‐quality firms. We develop a theoretical model that shows that foreign acquisitions are conducive to high‐quality targets because of strategic effects on the sales price. However, foreign firms ‘cherry pick’ high‐quality targets to expand R&D rather than to downsize. Otherwise, rivals expand R&D, making the acquisition unprofitable. Thus, our model predicts that acquired affiliates invest more in R&D than greenfield affiliates. Using affiliate data, we find evidence that acquired affiliates have a higher level of sequential R&D intensity than greenfield affiliates.