Dynamic scoring: Alternative financing schemes

Neoclassical growth models predict that reductions in capital or labor income tax rates are expansionary when lump-sum transfers are used to balance the government budget. This paper explores the consequences of bond-financed tax reductions that bring forth a range of possible offsetting policies, including future government consumption, capital tax rates, or labor tax rates. Through the resulting intertemporal distortions, current tax cuts can be expansionary or contractionary. The paper also finds that more aggressive responses of offsetting policies to debt engender less debt accumulation and less costly tax cuts.     

Mergers to Monopoly

Horizontal mergers between firms that have different costs are examined. Owners can transfer technology to an acquired firm and decide whether to consolidate or operate their firms as separate entities in the product market. Thus mergers can exhibit both efficiencies and a market-power effect. The prices of target firms are determined via a bargaining game. An equilibrium sequence of mergers entails the largest firm targeting the next largest rival firm. Initially, this sequence of mergers with technology transfers involves no consolidations and improves welfare. Ultimately, the acquisitions lead to consolidation and may decrease total welfare.     

Generalized piecewise linear histograms

We extend the concept of piecewise linear histogram introduced recently by Beirlant, Berlinet and Györfi. The disadvantage of that histogram is that in many models it takes on negative values with probability close to 1. We show that for a wide set of models, the extended class of estimates contains a bona fide density with probability tending to 1 as the sample size n increases to infinity. The mean integrated absolute error in the extended class of estimators decreases with the same rate n^–2/5 as in the original narrower class.     

Preference adjustment and opportunities for agreement: Decision modeling to assess negotiating flexibility at UNCED

This paper develops a conceptual framework and applies it to analyze the dynamics of national interests in prenegotiation. The study's goals are to develop a systematic approach for analyzing prenegotiation processes and provide results that will have practical utility for negotiators. Specifically, the approach is applied to the prenegotiation process of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), examining the financial resources issue, in particular. Decision analytic models were built to account for three key negotiation actors, and sensitivity analyses were performed to evaluate the incremental modifications to issue preferences required to achieve mutually acceptable compromises. Conclusions are drawn that indicate the extent of flexibility required of key negotiation actors to take advantage of the opportunities for agreement in the financial resources issue area. The conceptual framework and methodological approach explored in this paper can provide practical assistance as a planning tool for negotiators, helping them to diagnose the situation and plan strategies for future environmental and other multilateral negotiations. The approach can suggest specific opportunities for compromise and the degree and type of flexibility needed to achieve a convergence of interests on the issue.     

The role of investment banks in acquisitions

We compare acquisitions completed with and without investmentbank advice over the 1981 to 1982 period. We find that the choiceto use an investment bank depends on the complexity of the transaction,the type of transaction (takeovers versus acquisitions of assets),the acquiror's prior acquisition experience, and the degreeof diversification of the target firm. Although acquisitionannouncement returns are lower for firms using investment banks,this difference can be explained by differences in transactioncharacteristics. These results suggest that transaction costsare the main determinant of investment banking choice, followedby contracting costs and asymmetric information costs.