How Large are the Welfare Gains from Technological Innovation Induced by Environmental Policies?

This paper examines whether the welfare gains from technological innovation that reduces future abatement costs are larger or smaller than the Pigouvian welfare gains from optimal pollution control. The relative welfare gains from innovation depend on three key factors—the initially optimal level of abatement, the speed at which innovation reduces future abatement costs, and the discount rate. We calculate the welfare gains from innovation under a variety of different scenarios. Mostly they are less than the Pigouvian welfare gains. To be greater, innovation must reduce abatement costs substantially and quickly and the initially optimal abatement level must be fairly modest.     

On the distance between cross-impact models: A set of metric measures for cross-impact analysis

This paper attempts to add to the Leibnizian or mathematical side of Technological Forecasting. Given two distinct cross impact models, the paper shows that there exists a set of appropriate metric measures such that the distance between any two cross impact models can be determined. That is, it is possible to say how close or how far apart two or more cross impact models are to one another. It is argued that the ability to make such determinations is vital to the formal and mathematical development and growth of Technological Forecasting.     

Jevons's Theory of Political Economy and the ‘Marginalist Revolution’ *

Very many statements have been made about the (non-)existence and characterisation of the ‘marginal revolution’ but it is urged here that detailed study of the relevant texts is far more valuable than the making of grand statements about such matters. In particular, a close reading of Jevons's Theory of Political Economyis proposed as an antidote to over-easy generalisation. Jevons by no means rejected all elements of classical theory. He did not propose a catallatic revolution; he attributed such an emphasis to earlier authors and himself stressed the role of production. It is shown that Jevons was very aware of the necessarily general equilibrium nature of his theory but that he was simply not able to cope with it satisfactorily; it is suggested that this explains, at least in part, his fluctuating and apparently inconsistent statements relating utility and labour to value. Jevons certainly attempted to sketch a complete marginal productivity theory of distribution, even if he was far from successful in providing one.     

The Scholarship of Teaching Economics

The authors report on the results of a telephone survey of 1,001 employees of seven large corporations conducted for the Business Roundtable as part of its public policy program. A set of 20 questions keyed to the Voluntary National Content Standards in Economics was embedded in the survey. A measure of economic literacy was constructed from the survey results. Greater economic literacy was associated with more overall education, more college economics coursework, high incomes, and being male. An examination of individual test questions revealed that previous college economics had substantial effects on employees' current economic literacy.     

Property rights and information flows: a simulation approach

With the growth of the information economy, the proportion of knowledge-intensive goods to total goods is constantly increasing. Lessig (The future of ideas: the fate of the commons in a connected world. Vintage, New York 2001) has argued that IPRs have now become too favourable to existing producers and that their ‘winner-take-all’ characteristics are constraining the creators of tomorrow. In this paper we look at how variations in IPRs regimes might affect the creation and social cost of new knowledge in economic systems. Drawing on a conceptual framework, the Information Space or I-Space to explore how the uncontrollable diffusibility of knowledge relates to its degree of structure, we deploy an agent-based modelling approach to explore the issue of IPRs. We take the ability to control the diffusibility of knowledge as a proxy measure for an ability to establish property rights in such knowledge. Second, we take the rate of obsolescence of knowledge as a proxy measure for the degree of turbulence induced by different regimes of technical change. Then we simulate the quantity and cost to society of new knowledge under different property right regimes.