On the finite sample behavior of testing whether new is better than used of a specified age

Hollander, Park and Proschan (1986) proposed a test of new is better than used of a specified age. It is based on large sample normality of the test statistic. There is, however, no study in the literature on its actual size for small and moderate sample sizes. To shed some lights on this, the results of a Monte Carlo simulation study as well as two real data examples are reported and these indicate that the test can have a quite liberal size, especially for small to moderate sample sizes. In order to improve on this weakness, a modified test is proposed and studied. It is noticed that this modified test seems to over-correct the original test to an extent that it becomes unduly conservative sometimes. Hence we propose another modification that combines the original test and the modified test turns out to have its size quite close to the nominal level and is therefore preferable to both the original and modified tests.     

State competition in higher education: A race to the top,or a race to the bottom?

How does competition affect higher education? This paper explores this question for public and private universities. Theory indicates that competition can push higher education policy in one of two different directions. On the one hand, competition may increase spending. For states, this would occur if states treat higher education as developmental; for private universities this would occur if they view spending as a means to attract students and prestige. On the other hand, competition may decrease spending if states treat higher education spending as redistributive, and competition may decrease spending by private schools if lower spending enhances their ability to attract students with low tuition. To determine which of these perspectives is most valid, we examine higher education policy choices in the 1980s and 1990s. We find that states appear to act as if higher education funding is redistributive while private schools appear to compete more on the basis of tuition than spending. These results demonstrate the important effects competition and governance structure have on higher education.Received: August 2001, Accepted: May 2002, JEL Classification: I2, I22, H72, I3     

Forecasting exchange rates in transition economies: A comparison of multivariate time series models

This article compares the accuracy of vector autoregressive (VAR), restricted vector autoregressive (RVAR), Bayesian vector autoregressive (BVAR), vector error correction (VEC) and Bayesian vector error correction (BVEC) models in forecasting the exchange rates for five Central and Eastern European currencies (Czech Koruna, Hungarian Forint, Polish Zloty, Slovak Koruna and Slovenian Tolar) against the Euro and the US dollar. Among the specifications composing this battery of multivariate time series models, those with the smallest prediction error still fail to reject the test of equality of forecasting accuracy against the random walk model in short-term predictions, with the exception of the Slovenian Tolar/Euro exchange rate.First version received: October 2002/Final version received: September 2003The authors are grateful to two anonymous referees and the participants in the workshop Monetary and Exchange Rate Strategies Related to the Current European Unions Enlargement Processes, held in Leuven in September 2000, for very helpful comments.     

Long-run matching relationship in the Japanese labor market

This paper investigates the long-run relationship among new hiring, unemployment (job seekers), and unfilled vacancies in Japan, using an annual panel data on 47 prefectures for 1972-1999. We find that these three variables are I(1) processes, and are cointegrated in our panel data. Further, we estimate the panel cointegration equation derived from a Cobb-Douglas matching function by the heterogeneous fully modified OLS and heterogeneous dynamic OLS. The estimation results reveal that conventional within estimates could have non-negligible biases.First version received: November 2002/Final version received: October 2003All correspondence to Shigeki Kano. The authors are grateful to the associate editor and two anonymous referees of this journal for helpful comments. Doctor Stephen J. Turnbull (University of Tsukuba) is also acknowledged for correcting English errors in this paper. Remaining errors are due to the authors. The data set and GAUSS programming code used in this paperare available upon request.     

The link between inflation and inflation uncertainty: Evidence from G7 countries

In this paper we adopt the Markov-switching heteroscedasticity model to analyse the inflation series for G7 countries and examine the interaction between inflation rate and its uncertainty over both the short- and long-run. It is found that the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty depends on whether the shock is permanent or transitory. The relationship also differs from country to country. High uncertainty about long-run inflation is associated with a significant positive shift in inflation for Canada, Germany, and Japan. High uncertainty about short-run inflation is associated with a significant positive shift in inflation for Germany and USA, and a significant negative shift in inflation for Canada. The modelling approach employed in this paper is empirically supported by various diagnostics including the Vuong test. We also derive the two components of the variance of inflation forecast for a particular forecast horizon. It is found that the inflation uncertainty increases at all horizons in the middle of 1970s and return to the low level in the middle of 1980s.First version received: June 2001/Final version received: October 2003We would like to thank three anonymous referees for many helpful comments and suggestions.     

Policy matters. The long run effects of aggregate demand and mark-up shocks on the Italian unemployment rate

This paper estimates a VAR including labor productivity, real wage and unemployment rate, to identify the dynamic effects of technology, demand, and mark-up shocks, respectively, on the Italian labor market. Identification is achieved by imposing recursive restrictions on the matrix of long run multipliers. Our results show that both mark up and aggregate demand shocks permanently reduce the unemployment rate. Finally, technology shocks do not significantly affect the unemployment rate in the long run. These findings convey important policy implications: expansionary aggregate demand and deregulation policies reducing the mark up permanently decrease the Italian unemployment rate.Jel classification: C32, E32, J29This paper has been produced as part of a CEPR Research Network on New Approaches to the Study of Economic Fluctuations. We would like to thank Marcello DAmato, Mario Forni, Marco Lippi and Antonio Ribba for useful comments. We are also grateful to Bernd Sussmuth for pointing out to us several significant improvements to the paper.First version received: November 2001/Final version received: October 2002     

The telecoms boom and bust 1996-2003 and the role of financial markets

Financial crises are still as much a part of the modern, information-and-communication-technology-based (ICT) economy as they were of previous economies. Why are we apparently unable to learn lessons from the past and avoid what Charles Kindleberger (2000) has called manias, panics and crashes? Why is it that our sophisticated stock of information, made readily and relatively cheaply available to us by our investment in ICTs, and our abundant theories and models, have not allowed us to steer clear of these financial excesses? The aim of this paper is to highlight some of the processes and mechanisms that have played a significant role in causing the Telecoms Boom and Bust, 1996-2003. The question of whether anything can be done about these processes and mechanisms in order to try and modify such financial excesses in the future is taken up in the conclusion.JEL Classification: A12, D8, E3, G1, L63, L96, N2, O30The author would like to acknowledge, without implicating, the helpful discussion with Richard Burns, Fred Bleakley and others who commented on an earlier version of this paper at Institutional Investors European Institute meeting in Berlin in March 2003, and with Stan Metcalfe on other occasions. In addition, thanks are due to many friends in NTT and InfoCom who assisted my learning about the Telecoms Industry and its dynamics.     

Left-side Relatively Weak Increases in Risk and Their Comparative Statics

This paper proposes a new concept, a left-side relatively weak increase in risk (L-RWIR) order, that extends the definition of a relatively weak increase in risk (RWIR) order. We show that, for the class of linear payoffs, one can obtain an appealing comparative statics result for L-RWIR shifts imposing additional restrictions on risk preferences of a risk-averse decision maker.JEL classification: D81.revised version received October 10, 2003Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee for insightful comments and useful suggestions.     

Ambiguous Social Welfare Effects of Price Regulation Under Imperfect Competition

Conventional wisdom is that a binding price ceiling increases output and so increases social welfare if imposed on an imperfectly competitive market. However, this paper shows that a price ceiling can be harmful to social welfare even though it increases industry output and consumer surplus. This model can be applied to the pharmaceutical industry under price control in many countries, e.g., U.K., Canada, Germany and Japan.     

Endogenous Growth Cycles in Continuous Time

The endogenous dynamics of a closed constant returns multi-market economy are examined in which agents face downward sloping demand. The trigger for growth in this model is a technological change that warrants costly adjustment in input quantities by agents. In the resulting dynamic game, relative prices within markets remain constant. Consequently, all own price elasticities are constant. In markets characterized by lower cost of capital the unique outcome is collusion in which agents do not incur adjustment cost and there is no adoption of new technology. But in other markets a unique non-cooperative equilibrium exists in which agents do incur the cost of adopting the new technology. Only three specifications of adjustment costs are feasible. Output increases along an S-shaped time path with or without a non-explosive cyclical component.