Regulating Financial Services: How Severe are the Dangers?

The Financial Services Act has been variously criticised for obstructing competition and increasing operating costs for the producers of financial services in Britain. Robert R. Davis, Commissioner at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in Washington DC, argues that there are 'public-goods' considerations to justify the imposition of the Act, and that its internal guarantees will check the growth of regulation. Len Ross, Principal Lecturer in Economics at the Polytechnic of Central London, maintains his earlier charge that the Act will do immense damage to British trade in financial services.     

Accounting for personal disposition and organizational context: connecting role ambiguity,public service motivation,and whistle-blowing in federal agencies

Abstract

Organizational psychologists and HRM scholars have long argued that prosocial organizational behaviors enhance organizational performance. However, prosocial behaviors are motivated by both self-interested and altruistic intent. Moreover, some have recognized that the factors that encourage shifts between egoistically and altruistically motivated prosocial behaviors may result from inherent tensions between individual disposition and situational contexts. As such, this study draws from literature examining prosocial behavior to evaluate whether work situations with clear task expectations dampen the extent to which prosocial personal dispositions diminish egoistically motivated prosocial behavior. Findings from a series of structural equation models reveal that altruistic dispositional traits diminish egoistic motives for engaging in one specific prosocial behavior, whistle-blowing. However, findings also reveal that work situations characterized by clear task expectations dampen the negative effect of altruistic dispositions on egoistically motivated whistle-blowing. Our findings imply that managers can adjust organizational contexts to capitalize on the enhanced benefits resulting from altruistically motivated prosocial behaviors.     

Is Competition Engaging? Examining the Interactive Effects of Goal Orientation and Competitive Work Environment on Engagement

Contemporary work environments are growing increasingly competitive. However, some employees may “fit” with such environments better than others. This study examined how the relationship between employees’ goal orientations (learning, proving, and avoidance) and engagement is influenced by the competitive environment of their workplace. By investigating the interactive effect of goal orientation and competitive work environment, this research expands our understanding of factors leading to engagement. We tested our model using a sample of 345 working adults from a variety of organizations across several different industries. Results indicate that learning goal orientation was positively related to engagement while avoidance goal orientation was negatively related to engagement. Competitive work environment (CWE) interacted with learning orientation and proving orientation to predict engagement. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results for human resource management. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Economic Integration,Monopoly Power and Productivity Growth without Scale Effects

This paper considers how monopoly power affects the relationship between economic integration and economic growth that is not biased by a scale effect. In a two‐country model of trade, productivity growth is generated by firm‐level investment in process innovation, and the location of economic activity is determined by relative market size, trade costs and imperfect knowledge diffusion. Equilibrium features the partial concentration of manufacturing and the full concentration of innovation in the larger country. Increased economic integration raises the concentration of manufacturing in the larger country, and when monopoly power is strong, leads to decreased product variety, accelerated productivity growth and greater national welfare. With weak monopoly power, however, it raises product variety and dampens productivity growth, but may benefit or hurt welfare.     

ETF Competition and Market Quality

This paper examines competition between exchange traded funds (ETFs) that hold nearly identical portfolios of securities. We provide evidence that incumbent‐fund liquidity is negatively affected when a new ETF is added to an asset class. The degradation in liquidity is even more severe whenever both funds follow the same benchmark. We also document a decline in primary‐market activity for the incumbent ETFs after the arrival of new competitors. Furthermore, increasing the number of funds in an asset class does not put downward pressure on fund management fees. Thus, the deterioration in market quality may not be offset by decreasing costs of fund ownership.     

Conspiracies and Secret Discounts in Laboratory Markets

This paper uses laboratory methods to evaluate whether price-fixing conspiracies break down in the presence of opportunities to offer secret discounts. The primary treatment difference is whether or not buyer-specific discounts from the posted list price are permitted. In standard posted-offer markets, conspiring sellers almost uniformly find and maintain near-monopoly prices. But when the possibility of offering secret discounts is introd uced, sellers find sustaining collusive agreements much more difficult, and transactions prices tend to fall toward competitive levels. Secret discounts yield competitive outcomes less consistently, however, when sellers are provided ex post information about sales quantities