Charitable asymmetric bidders

Recent papers show that the all‐pay auction is better at raising money for charity than the first‐price auction with symmetric bidders under incomplete information. Yet, this result is lost with sufficiently asymmetric bidders under complete information. In this paper, we consider a framework on charity auctions with asymmetric bidders under some incomplete information. We find that the all‐pay auction still raises more money than the first‐price auction. Thus, the all‐pay auction should be seriously considered when one wants to organize a charity auction.     

REASONS FOR PREFERRING NET TO GROSS FIGURES OF INCOME AND PRODUCT (AND VICE VERSA)

For the first time, a systematic discussion is presented of the choice between gross and net national accounting figures of value added, product and income for alternative purposes. Some traditional arguments for preferring gross to net figures are challenged and several historical reasons are given for the present popularity of gross figures. The quantitative importance of the issue (“what does it matter in practice?”) is also assessed.     

IMPACTS OF ECONOMIC REFORM ON RURAL-URBAN WELFARE: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM FRAMEWORK

This paper demonstrates how economic reform undertaken in a developing country will impact not only macroeconomic variables but also income distribution between different household groups, particularly between rural and urban households. Unlike the well-known link to macroeconomic variables, the path connecting economic reform with income of rural-urban households is more equivocal and thus demands an inquisition. The CGE model constructed in this study is designed to serve such a purpose. When applied to the Indonesian case, both the static and dynamic simulations indicate that the post-reform progress in the country's macroeconomic condition is likely accompanied by worsening—albeit slightly—household income distribution between income groups. The non agricultural sector appears to be the major beneficiary of the reform. From the dynamic simulation, a worsening distribution is also found between rural and urban areas. However, results of both simulations also show that improved poverty conditions are likely achieved following the reform.     

INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA IN DECENTRALIZATION

The economics of decentralization implies that it generates efficiency improvement (higher growth) due to local government's ability to respond to the needs of local communities. However, this is not always the case. While policies do matter, this paper argues that institutional factors hold the key to the problem. The interactions among these factors and the characteristics of leaders in the region determine the outcome of decentralization. By capturing these important properties, multiple equilibria can be generated, avowing the ambiguous effects of local capture . On this basis, a typology of local leaders is developed. To the extent that welfare-enhancing activities are often related to regional growth, the role of an incentive system in determining the local leaders' behavior is also analyzed. In essence, a lack of incentive mechanisms for local leaders to promote growth and the absence of a stick-and-carrot system explain why post-decentralization growth performance has been generally disappointing.     

Cooperation in collective action*

The ability to cooperate in collective action problems – such as those relating to the use of common property resources or the provision of local public goods – is a key determinant of economic performance. In this paper we discuss two aspects of collective action problems in developing countries. First, which institutions discourage opportunistic behaviour and promote cooperation? Second, what are the characteristics of the individuals involved that determine the degree to which they cooperate? We first review the evidence from field studies, laboratory experiments, and cross community studies. We then present new results from an individual level panel dataset of rural workers.