The development of the Dutch national accounts as a tool for analysis and policy

Since the start of modern national accounting in the 1930s, the Netherlands has played a dominant role in the development of the national accounts. This paper discusses the origins and development of the Dutch national accounts. This includes the surprisingly slow start of political arithmetic in the Netherlands, the views of van Cleeff and Tinbergen on planning and national accounting, the role of Derksen and Oomens as fathers of the Dutch national accounts, the Dutch School of National Accounting, the interaction with national statistics and the role of the international guidelines and the European Union. The paper also takes a look into the future. The major challenges are to bridge the gap with data users and to increase relevance by, e.g. extended accounts, long-term time series on government finance and modules on education, health care and social security.     

The moral significance of gestures

The concept of the gesture is explored in relationship with its moral significance rather than, for example, its aesthetic significance. It is argued that the concept can be used in order to make clear how morality relates to the body. This is not to suggest that gestures can be neatly defined. On the contrary, they always seem to be ambivalent and somewhat nebular. However, it will be shown that some of their significance might well be related to popular concepts such as ‘transparency’, ‘authenticity’, ‘integrity’ and ‘responsibility’. In order to make this clear, the role of some particular gestures in politics and organizational life, most notably ‘apology’ and ‘trust’, will be discussed throughout the paper.     

Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition

We extend the war of attrition and all-pay auction analysis of Krishna and Morgan (1997) to a stochastic competition setting. We determine the existence of equilibrium bidding strategies and discuss the potential shape of these strategies. Results for the war of attrition contrast with the characterization of the bidding equilibrium strategies in the first-price all-pay auction as well as the winner-pay auctions. Furthermore we investigate the expected revenue comparisons among the war of attrition, the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auctions and discuss the linkage principle as well. Our findings are applicable to future works on contests and charity auctions.     

Contrarian Investment Strategies in a European Context

In this paper we study value strategies for four European countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). We find an outperformance for all four value variables which are investigated: the earnings-to-price (E/P) ratio, the cash-flow-to-price (CF/P) ratio, the book-to-market (B/M) ratio and the dividend yield. This outperformance is especially remarkable for the CF/P ratio, which amounts to 20.8% between the top and bottom quintiles in a univariate model. In a regression analysis, in which all four value variables as well as a correction for the size effect are taken into account, we find a difference of 11.8% for the CF/P ratio. We demonstrate that this result cannot be explained by risk differences alone. Our findings confirm the outperformance of value strategies as found earlier by Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) for Japan and the United States respectively.     

Investment and financing decisions of private and public firms

We examine differences in the allocation of cash flow between Western European private and public firms. Public firms have a higher investment‐cash flow sensitivity than comparable private firms. This difference is not attributable to more severe financing constraints of public firms. Instead, because differences in investment‐cash flow sensitivities are only observed for the unexpected portion of firms’ cash flow, the empirical evidence supports an agency‐based explanation. Similar patterns are observable for the expected and unexpected portion of firms’ shareholder distributions. Our results are driven by firms from countries with low ownership concentration and more liquid stock markets, where shareholders have lower incentives to monitor. The results are also more pronounced for public firms with low industry Tobin's q and high free cash flow, which are more prone to suffer from agency problems.