Quand les analystes ajustent‐ils leurs évaluations en fonction du biais des annonces de résultats prévisionnels ? Conséquences de la feuille de route des entreprises en ce qui a trait à la publication de résultats prévisionnels et enjeux motivant les analystes

Les études précédentes indiquent que les analystes n’ajustent pas totalement leurs évaluations en fonction du biais général à la baisse des annonces de résultats prévisionnels faites par les directions d’entreprises. Les auteurs rapportent les résultats de deux expériences visant à déterminer comment la feuille de route des entreprises en ce qui a trait à la publication de résultats prévisionnels et les enjeux motivant les analystes expliquent de concert la mesure dans laquelle ces derniers ajustent leurs évaluations en fonction du biais des annonces de résultats prévisionnels. Ces résultats d’expérience semblent indiquer que les analystes pour qui l’enjeu est celui de l’exactitude ajustent leurs évaluations selon la feuille de route de la direction en ce qui a trait à la publication de résultats prévisionnels biaisés à la baisse lorsque le biais est relativement modeste (un cent), mais que les analystes pour qui l’enjeu est celui de leur relation avec la direction s’en abstiennent. Au surplus, la différence dans l’ajustement est plus importante lorsque la feuille de route de l’entreprise en matière de biais est irrégulière que lorsqu’elle est régulière. Aussi, lorsque le biais des annonces de résultats prévisionnels est plus important que moins (deux cents par rapport à un cent), les analystes pour qui l’enjeu est celui de la relation avec la direction procèdent à un ajustement partiel, paraissant ainsi rechercher un équilibre entre exactitude et volonté de plaire à la direction. Ces constatations ont des répercussions pour les investisseurs, les autorités de réglementation et l’interprétation des études précédentes.     

Relationship Incentives and the Optimistic/Pessimistic Pattern in Analysts' Forecasts

We examine whether analysts' incentives to maintain good relationships with management contribute to the optimistic/pessimistic within‐period time trend in analysts' forecasts. In our experiments, 81 experienced sell‐side analysts from two brokerage firms predict earnings based on historical information and management guidance. Analysts' forecasts exhibit an optimistic/pessimistic pattern across the two timing conditions (early and late in the quarter), and the effect is significantly stronger when the analysts have a good relationship with management than when their only incentive is to be accurate. Debriefing results indicate that analysts are aware of this pattern of forecasts, and believe that this benefits their future relationships with management and with brokerage clients. The analysts most frequently cite favored conference call participation and information access when describing benefits from maintaining good relationships with management. Our results suggest the following: The optimistic/pessimistic pattern in forecasts is in part a conscious response to relationship incentives, information access is perceived to be a major benefit of management relationships, and recent regulatory changes may have lessened but have not eliminated this conflict of interest source.     

Can We Prove a Bank Guilty of Creating Systemic Risk? A Minority Report

Because increasing a bank's capital requirement to improve the stability of the financial system imposes costs upon the bank, a regulator should ideally be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that banks classified as systemically risky really do create systemic risk before subjecting them to this capital punishment. Evaluating the performance of two leading systemic risk models, we show that estimation error alone prevents the reliable identification of the most systemically risky banks. We conclude that it will be a considerable challenge to develop a riskometer that is sound and reliable enough to provide an adequate foundation for macroprudential policy.     

Financing Innovation and Growth: Cash Flow, External Equity, and the 1990s R&D Boom

The financing of R&D provides a potentially important channel to link finance and economic growth, but there is no direct evidence that financial effects are large enough to impact aggregate R&D. U.S. firms finance R&D from volatile sources: cash flow and stock issues. We estimate dynamic R&D models for high-tech firms and find significant effects of cash flow and external equity for young, but not mature, firms. The financial coefficients for young firms are large enough that finance supply shifts can explain most of the dramatic 1990s R&D boom, which implies a significant connection between finance, innovation, and growth.     

TIME UNDER AUTOCRATIC RULE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

We investigate how the length of time a country's regime was autocratic between 1920 and 2000 is correlated with economic growth and per capita income. We find that the longer a country was within an autocracy, the lower is the country's economic performance, even after controlling for other factors. We also find the length of time a country is not autocratic is positively related to growth and income. We claim this evidence is consistent with the thesis that one reason why some countries have had difficulty adjusting to life after autocracy is that the human and social capital necessary to make markets “work” eroded under autocratic regimes and take time to develop afterward. (JEL O17, O43, P0)     

FARMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN ECOSYSTEM SERVICE PROVISION: DOES TRUST MATTER?

Ecosystem service provision in agriculture may require cooperation between farmers. Trust fosters cooperation in many economic and social interactions and is important to the success of traditional agricultural cooperatives. Little is known about how trust affects farmers’ willingness to cooperate to provide an ecosystem service, what types of trust are most important, and under what conditions trust may matter. In this study, we present results of a survey of Missouri crop farmers exploring the role trust plays in farmers’ stated willingness to cooperate to control pests. We find that most farmers say they are willing to cooperate, and most farmers are willing to trust others. However, we find little evidence that trust positively influences farmers’ willingness to cooperate to control pests. Instead, we find that trust may only matter under certain conditions, such as when participants’ farms are dissimilar, and that other determinants, such as the perceived benefit of cooperation and environmental concern, are more important than trust to farmers who are contemplating cooperation to control pests.     

An Economic Analysis of Interest Rate Swaps

Interest rate swaps, a financial innovation in recent years, are based upon the principle of comparative advantage. An interest rate swap is a useful tool for active liability management and for hedging against interest rate risk. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple economic analysis of interest rate swaps. Alternative uses of and the appropriate valuation procedure for interest rate swaps are described.