THE NEED TO REFORM THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM

The biggest financial disaster in modern history struck the savings and loan industry during the 1980s. This paper argues that the unifying cause of this debacle was the way in which the federal deposit insurance system is structured. The fundamental cause was not fraud and deregulation, as is commonly argued. The government not only permitted reportedly insolvent institutions to continue to operate, it permitted many such institutions to grow by offering relatively high rates on their deposits. Unfortunately, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 may not prevent a similar situation from ever recurring. Therefore, one must understand exactly what happened, what the FIRREA does and does not do, and the proposals for reforming the entire structure of the federal deposit insurance system.     

When a Gain Comes at a Price: Pay Attitudes after Changing Tier Status

This study compares attitudes toward pay and work of employees who changed from the high tier to the low tier after transferring jobs from low-to high-paying departments with those who similarly transferred but did not change tiers. The former had lower Pay Satisfaction than the latter, but they did not differ in Job Satisfaction and Union and Employer Commitment. The findings suggest that the change-tier employees' loss of high-tier status was a likely reason for their pay dissatisfaction.     

Rediscounting under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard

Freeman (1999) proposes a model in which discount window lending and open‐market operations have different effects. This is important because in most of the literature these policies are indistinguishable. However, Freeman's argument that the central bank should absorb losses associated with default to provide risk sharing stands in stark contrast to the concern that central banks should limit their exposure to credit risk. We extend Freeman's model by introducing moral hazard. With moral hazard, the central bank should avoid absorbing losses and Freeman's argument breaks down. However, we show that policies resembling discount window lending and open‐market operations can still be distinguished in this new framework. The optimal policy is for the central bank to make a restricted number of creditors compete for funds. By restricting the number of agents, the central bank can limit the moral hazard problem. By making them compete with each other, the central bank can exploit market information that reveals the state of the economy.     

The Impact of Employee Stock Option Adoption and Incidence on Productivity: Evidence from U.S. Panel Data

This paper examines the productivity effect of broad‐based and executive stock option programs in adoption year and five subsequent years. The findings include a positive impact on productivity, which is maintained over a five‐year period after adoption for executive plans but diminishes immediately for broad‐based plans. We interpret these findings as evidence of stock option usage being of benefit to organizations. However, to sustain the impact of broad‐based plans options, grants may need to be made with the same frequency as executive option grants.     

ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL GOLD STANDARD IN PROPAGATING THE GREAT DEPRESSION

I do not claim in this paper that the international gold standard was a principal cause of the Great Depression. Instead, I explore the events that allowed the world to slip deeper into depression despite the gold standard. The volatility of international short-term capital flows surely contributed greatly to the Depression. I argue that this volatility was exacerbated—rather than ameliorated—by the international gold standard. The reason is that despite governments' legal assurances that they are committed to a gold standard, speculators never perceive the terms of gold parity as immutable. This statement holds with increasing force when one observes the precarious status of government debts and international finance during the 1920s. This reality renders a gold standard vulnerable to precisely the type of volatility in international capital markets that made the 1931 downturn more severe.     

Banks' Strategic Responses to Supervisory Coverage: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

U.S. bank supervisors conduct frequent and comprehensive loan-level exams of the syndicated loan market. These exams are costly as adverse exam loan ratings may increase supervisory scrutiny and reduce bank capital. Relying on an unexpected change in supervisory coverage in 1998, we estimate that the cost of bank credit for borrowers excluded from supervision decreases by approximately 18%. We show that large lenders use the coverage change to exclude deals from supervision, especially riskier deals. Strikingly, small lenders shift their lending to increase supervisory coverage, suggesting the potential importance of supervision in reducing information asymmetries within lending syndicates.     

Information Aggregation Bias and Samuelson's Dictum

Under the assumption of incomplete information, idiosyncratic shocks may not dissipate in the aggregate. An econometrician who incorrectly imposes complete information and applies the law of large numbers may be susceptible to information aggregation bias. Tests of aggregate economic theory will be misspecified even though tests of the same theory at the microlevel deliver the correct inference. A testable implication of information aggregation bias is “Samuelson's Dictum” or the idea that stock prices can simultaneously display “microefficiency” and “macroinefficiency;” an idea accredited to Paul Samuelson. Using firm-level data from the Center for Research in Security Prices, we present empirical evidence consistent with Samuelson's dictum. Specifically, we conduct two standard tests of the linear present value model of stock prices: a regression of future dividend changes on the dividend-price ratio and a test for excess volatility. We show that the dividend price ratio forecasts the future growth in dividends much more accurately at the firm level as predicted by the present value model, and that excess volatility can be rejected for most firms. When the same firms are aggregated into equal-weighted or cap-weighted portfolios, the estimated coefficients typically deviate from the present value model and “excess” volatility is observed; this is especially true for aggregates (e.g., S&P 500) that are used in most asset pricing studies. To investigate the source of our empirical findings, we propose a theory of aggregation bias based on incomplete information and segmented markets. Traders specializing in individual stocks conflate idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks to dividends. To an econometrician using aggregate data, these assumptions generate a rejection of the present value model even though individual traders are efficiently using their available information.