Diversity in trade union membership: a typology based on the study of a Spanish trade union

While existing literature on the changing nature of trade union membership concentrates on unidimensional differences between members, this article proposes a multidimensional typology, which considers demographic characteristics as well as labour market position and length of union membership. Our results allow the identification of different member profiles; these are significantly associated to differences in employment conditions, work participation, job satisfaction and union activism. In the last section of the article, we discuss the practical implications that these different member profiles may have for union policy and organisation.     

Voluntary Export Restraints and Resource Allocation in Exporting Countries

This article analyzes the resource implications of voluntaryexport restraints (VERs) for exporting countries. A simple analyticalmethod is used to demonstrate that, by reducing the marginalrevenue of its factors of production, a VER causes an industryin the exporting country to contract, and that the efficiencylosses from a VER depend on the ease with which sales can bediverted from the restricted toward the unrestricted markets.The method is applied to test the effects of the U.S. OrderlyMarketing Agreement (OMA) for producers of leather footwearin the Republic of Korea during the period 1977–81. Weestimate that the marginal revenue product of factors employedin leather footwear declined by as much as 9 percent becauseof the OMA, an estimate that is corroborated by inspection oftime series on output, employment, and wages of the Korean footwearsector. This implies that there was pressure on the Korean footwearindustry to contract as a result of the OMA.     

Relationship between the Mean and the Constant in a Box–Jenkins Time Series Model

In some publications the mean is identified with the constant of a Box–Jenkins time series model. In this paper the relation between both terms is demonstrated. Furthermore, by means of an example, the errors which may be made if one does not use each term adequately are shown.     

Estate taxes, consumption externalities, and altruism

We study how the introduction of consumption externalities affects the optimality of the dynamic equilibrium in an economy displaying dynastic altruism. When the bequest motive is inoperative consumption externalities affect the intertemporal margin between young and old consumption and thus modify the intertemporal path of aggregate consumption and capital. The optimal tax policy that solves this intertemporal suboptimality consists of a tax on capital income and a pay-as-you-go social security system. The latter solves the excess of capital accumulation due to the inoperativeness of the bequest motive and the former solves the suboptimal allocation of consumption due to consumption externalities. When the bequest motive is operative consumption externalities only cause an intratemporal misallocation of consumption but do not affect the optimality of the capital stock level. This suboptimal allocation of consumption implies in turn that the path of bequest deviates also from optimality. The optimal tax policy in this case consists of an estate tax and a capital income tax.     

Auctioning divisible goods

Summary. We derive equilibrium bidding strategies in divisible good auctions for asymmetrically informed risk neutral and risk averse bidders when there is random noncompetitive demand. The equilibrium bid schedules contain both strategic considerations and explicit allowances for the winner's curse. When the bidders' information is symmetric, the strategic aspects of bidding imply that there always exist equilibria of a uniform-price auction with lower expected revenue than provided by a discriminatory auction. When bidders are risk averse, there may exist equilibria of the uniform-price auction that provide higher expected revenue than a discriminatory auction. Received: November 4, 1999; revised version: March 9, 2001     

Do Voting Rights Affect Institutional Investment Decisions? Evidence from Dual‐Class Firms

We examine whether, and to what extent, shareholder voting rights affect institutional investment decisions. We find that institutional ownership in dual‐class firms is significantly lower than it is in single‐class firms after controlling for other determinants of institutional investment. Although institutions of all types hold fewer shares of dual‐class firms, this avoidance is more pronounced for long‐term investors with strong fiduciary responsibilities than for short‐term investors with weak fiduciary duties. Following the unification of dual‐class shares into a single class, institutional investors increase their shareholdings in the unifying firm. Overall, our results suggest that voting rights are an important determinant of institutional investment decisions.     

Why OECD Countries Should Reform Rules of Origin

With preferential trade agreements on the rise worldwide rulesof origin—which are necessary to prevent trade deflection—areattracting increasing attention. At the same time, preferenceerosion for Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) recipientsis increasing resistance to further multilateral negotiations.Drawing on different approaches, this article shows that thecurrent system of rules of origin that is used by the EuropeanUnion and the United States in preferential trade agreements(including the GSP) and that is similar to systems used by otherOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countriesshould be drastically simplified if developed economies reallywant to help developing economies integrate into the world tradingsystem. In addition to diverting resources for administrativetasks, current rules of origin carry significant compliancecosts. More fundamentally, it is becoming increasingly clearthat they are often been designed to force developing economiesto buy inefficient intermediate products from developed economiesto "pay for" preferential access for the final product. Theevidence also suggests that a significant share of the rentsassociated with market access (net of rules of origin compliancecosts) is captured by developed economies. Finally, the restrictivenessof rules of origin is found to be beyond the levels that wouldbe justified to prevent trade deflection, suggesting a captureby special interest groups. The article outlines some alternativepaths to reforms. JEL codes: F13, F15     

Forward-premium puzzle: is it time to abandon the usual regression?

The forward premium puzzle is usually evidenced by the rejection of the null hypothesis in the uncovered interest parity (UIP) regression. Because this parity need only hold in a risk-neutral world, a risk adjustment term is missing from the equation if speculation in foreign exchange markets is risky. We deal with this issue following the literature which assumes that discounted returns on foreign government bonds are log-normal, so we can linearize the Euler pricing equations (in level) and obtain a modified UIP system for which the risk adjustment term is obtained by applying to the pricing kernel-based relations a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity-in-mean model. However, here we innovate by adopting a methodology which differs from all these related works. We construct and use a stochastic discount factor that does not depend on a specific model, by residing in the space of returns which we extract from the data by simply imposing the orthogonality restrictions represented by the Euler equations. So, we devise a purely statistical pricing kernel that performs well in in-sample level equations. Somewhat disappointingly, the risk premium inclusion in the conventional regression changes neither the significance nor the magnitude of the forecasting power of the forward premium for most currencies we study. The contrasting performance of the tests in level and in logs suggests that linearization may be to blame.