A Transaction Cost Primer on Farm Organization

Agricultural economists, with their knowledge of farming, are well positioned to take advantage of the fertile ground of economic organization. The transaction cost paradigm is particularly useful in addressing such questions and is outlined in this paper. The overriding theme in the transaction cost approach is that patterns of ownership and contracts are chosen to mitigate transaction costs, which result from attempts to establish and maintain property rights. In agriculture, transaction costs are heavily influenced by Mother Nature. Nature's uncertainty, via weather and pests, leads to moral hazard and seasonal forces impose constraints on production cycles that are not often found in the production of most other commodities. Applications in land contracts, asset control, and business organization are discussed.     

Developing countries' strategic opportunities

The rapid transition from the industrial age to the knowledge age may require developing nations to reassess their strategies toward the attraction of foreign investment. Highly focused technology villages based on the creation of industry-specific technology infrastructures blended with educated and trained nationals may be the best alternative for benefiting from the global economic changes. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

The Impact of Industry Structure and Penalty Policies on Incentives for Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement

This paper examines the optimal fine for violations of environmental regulations, taking into account financial constraints facing regulated firms and the hierarchical structure of regulatory enforcement. Contrary to the existing literature, which suggests that maximal fines are sub-optimal, we find that the optimal fine is either the maximum amount the firm can afford to pay or zero (i.e., no regulation). The impact of a change in industry structure on the optimal fine, firm compliance and regulatory resource strategies is considered. We identify conditions under which the equilibrium level of regulatory resources decreases with an increase in the number of firms in the industry.