Cross-country evidence on the value of corporate industrial and international diversification

We provide evidence on the value of industrial and international diversification for more than 3000 firms from Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. Consistent with prior studies, we find that industrial diversification reduces firm value in the U.K. and the U.S. Furthermore, similar to the recent findings of Denis et al. [J. Finance 57 (2002)], we find that U.S. multinationals trade at a discount relative to firms operating only in the domestic market. This result is robust to different benchmarks used to measure the value of diversification. By contrast, we find that international diversification has no effect on the value of firms headquartered in either Germany or the U.K.     

The theme park experience: An analysis of pleasure, arousal and satisfaction

This article analyses how visitor emotions in a theme park environment influence satisfaction and behavioural intentions. Emotions consist of two independent dimensions, i.e. pleasure and arousal. Two competing models were tested. The first model is derived from the environmental psychology research stream as developed by (An Approach to Environmental Psychology, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1974), where the visitor's arousal generates pleasure and, in turn, approach/avoidance behaviour. This emotion-cognition model is supported by Zajonc and Markus (1984). The second model to be tested is based on Lazarus’ (Emotion and Adaptation, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991) cognitive theory of emotions. In this latter model, emotions are elicited by visitors’ disconfirmation of the theme park. Using confirmatory factor analysis, it was supported that the cognitive theory of emotions better explains the effect of pleasure on satisfaction and loyalty. Additionally, consumers’ willingness to pay more for the service is more likely to be induced by disconfirmation than by satisfaction alone. Managerial implications concerning the cognitive–affective sequence of satisfaction are discussed.     

Information Revelation, Lock-In, and Bank Loan Commitments

This paper considers the extent to which loan commitments mitigate the problems of information monopolies that arise when the firm contracts with a private lender. Loan commitments in conjunction with short-term debt often provide the firm with superior investment incentives by influencing both the states in which bargaining occurs as well as the outcomes from bargaining. Commitment contracts are particularly valuable when there is a high likelihood that information about the firm will be publicly revealed ex post. We also identify circumstances under which the firm foregoes commitment financing, relying on short-term debt instead. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers G21, G32, D82.     

Social marketing: thoughts from an empathetic outsider

ABSTRACT

Social marketing holds great hope for promoting well-being and social good. Yet, as a ‘master’s tools’ strategy it must be deployed carefully and critically to ensure campaigns are not co-opted by the individualising and issue shaping forces of mainstream marketing. Moreover, social marketing strategies should go beyond promoting better and healthier choices for individuals, and be deployed to encourage critical thinking, political engagement and social action.     

Regional Wage Gaps,Education and Informality in an Emerging Country: The Case of Colombia

This paper uses Colombian micro-data to analyze the role of education and informality in regional wage differentials. The hypothesis is that apart from differences in the endowment of human capital, regional heterogeneity in the incidence of informality is another important source of regional wage inequality in emerging countries. This is confirmed by the evidence from Colombia, which also reveals remarkable spatial heterogeneity in the wage return to individuals’ characteristics. Regional heterogeneity in returns to education is especially intense in the upper part of the wage distribution. In turn, heterogeneity in the informal pay penalty is more relevant at the bottom.     

Proposing new variables for the identification of strategic groups in franchising

The identification of strategic groups in the Spanish franchising area is the main aim of this study. The authors have added some new strategic variables (not used before) to the study and have classified franchisors between sectors and distribution strategy. The results reveal the existence of four perfectly differentiated strategic groups (types of franchisors). One of the major implications of this study is that the variables that build a strategic group vary depending on the respective sector the network operates in and its distribution strategy. This fact indicates that including sector and distribution strategy is absolutely necessary to achieve good classifications of franchisor types.     

War and peace: Third-party intervention in conflict

This paper develops a simple sequential-move game to characterize the endogeneity of third-party intervention in conflict. We show how a third party's “intervention technology” interacts with the canonical “conflict technologies” of two rival parties in affecting the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. From the perspective of deterrence strategy, we find that it is more costly for a third party to support an ally to deter a challenger from attacking (i.e., to maintain peace or acquiescence), as compared to the alternative case when the third party supports the ally to gain a disputed territory by attacking (i.e., to create war), ceteris paribus. However, an optimally intervening third party can be either “peace-making”, “peace-breaking”, or neither depending on the characteristics of the conflict and the stakes the third party holds with each of the rival parties.     

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most common cost type. This conformity effect may be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.      

How Politicians Make Decisions: A Political Choice Experiment

The present paper reports on a political choice experiment with elected real-world politicians. A questionnaire on political and public issues is used to examine whether prospect theory predicts the responses of experts from the field better than rational choice theory. The results indicate that framing effects do not disappear with expertise.      

Are low-price promises collusion guarantees? An experimental test of price matching policies

In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Matching Guarantees (PMG) to raise prices above the competitive levels. PMG are introduced both as a market rule (the selling price is always the lowest posted price) and as a business strategy (subjects decide whether or not to offer them). Our results show that PMG lead to a clear collusive outcome as markets quickly and fully converge to the collusive prediction if PMG are imposed as a market rule. Whenever subjects are allowed to decide whether to adopt PMG or not we observe that almost all subjects decide to adopt them and prices get very close to the collusive ones.