A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation

This paper generalizes the standard model of how taxes affect the labor-leisure choice by allowing individuals to change both their labor supply and avoidance effort in response to tax changes. Doing so reveals that the income and substitution effect of taxes depend on both preferences and the avoidance technology. Econometric analysis will not in general allow one to separately identify the two influences, unless one can specify observable determinants of the cost of avoidance. The effective marginal tax rate on working must be modified by the addition of an avoidance-facilitating effect, which measures how the cost of avoidance changes with higher income. This model provides a conceptual structure for evaluating to what extent, and in what situations, the opportunities for tax avoidance mitigate the real substitution response to taxation.     

Transaction utility effects when quality is uncertain

The existing literature finds that price discrepancy, which represents the difference between expected and observed price, helps explain brand choice and purchase intention. This effect is often attributed to transaction utility, that is, the incremental utility associated with the surprise of observing a price lower or higher than expected. This research considers the possibility, however, that transaction utility is a less important determinant of choice when quality is uncertain. We propose and find that acquisition utility (perceived value for the money) tends to dominate the explanation of purchase intention, but transaction utility is significant only when consumers are more certain about quality. Our discussion considers the relative role of transaction utility in explaining consumer decision making and how the informative and allocative roles of price might be distinguished. He received his Ph.D. in marketing from Ohio State University and his B.S. from Ohio State University. His research interests include information economics and pricing. Previously, he taught at the University of South Carolina. He has published in theJournal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing, andJournal of Retailing, among others. He received his Ph.D. at the University of South Carolina, his M.B.A. from the University of Georgia, and a B.S. degree from Clemson University. Previously, he taught at the University of Alabama. His research interests include consumer perceptions of value and interpersonal influences. He has published in theJournal of Consumer Research and theJournal of Marketing Research, among others. He received his Ph.D. in marketing from the University of South Carolina and has a Bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of Delhi. His research interests include price bundling, price effects on perceived quality perceptions, and segmentation of business-to-business markets. He has published in theJournal of Business Research and theAdvances in Consumer Research series, published by the Association of Consumer Research. He previously taught on the faculty of Valdosta State University. She received a B.S. in statistics, a Ph.D. in marketing from the University of South Carolina, and a M.S. in statistics from Virginia Polytechnic Institute. She previously taught at Lehigh University. Her research interests include market segmentation, discrete data analysis, and pricing. She has published in theJournal of Marketing Research, as well as in theProceedings of the American Marketing Association and theAssociation for Consumer Research.     

Conflicts of interest,information provision,and competition in the financial services industry

In some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer's needs. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures, specialized banking and one-stop banking.     

It's so hard to be fair

When employees believe they are being treated fairly-when they feel heard, when they understand how and why important decisions are made, and when they believe they are respected-their companies will benefit. Research shows that practicing process fairness reduces legal costs from wrongful-termination suits, lowers employee turnover, helps generate support for new strategic initiatives, and fosters a culture that promotes innovation. What's more, it costs little financially to implement Yet few companies practice it consistently. Joel Brockner examines this paradox, exploring psychological and other reasons that cause managers to resist embracing process fairness. The fact that it's relatively inexpensive to implement, for instance, may be why some numbers-oriented executives undervalue it. Many managers believe that they practice process fairness, but 360-degree feedback tells another story. Some corporate policies actually undermine it--such as when the legal department won't let managers fully explain decisions for fear that disclosure could expose the firm to lawsuits. And, frequently, managers simply follow the all-too-human tendency to avoid uncomfortable situations. But the good news is that organizations can take concrete steps to promote greater process fairness. Many studies have shown that training programs make a big difference, and the author describes the most effective format. In addition, warning your managers that they may experience negative emotions when practicing fair process will help prepare them to cope with those feelings. Finally, role modeling fair process on the executive level will help spread the practice throughout the organization. The fact is, process fairness is the responsibility of all executives, at all levels and in all functions; it cannot be delegated to HR. The sooner managers realize that and work to make it a company norm, the better off the organization will be.     

Commercializing Open Science: Deep Space Communications as the Lead Market for Shannon Theory, 1960–73

Recent research on the commercialization of scientific discoveries has emphasized the use of formal intellectual property rights (notably patents) as a mechanism for aligning the academic and entrepreneurial incentives for commercialization. Without such explicit intellectual property rights and licensing, how is such open science commercialized? This paper examines the commercialization of Claude Shannon's theory of communications, developed at and freely disseminated by Bell Telephone Laboratories. It analyses the first 25 years of Shannon theory, the role of MIT in developing and extending that theory, and the importance of deep space communications as the initial market for commercialization. It contrasts the early paths of two MIT‐related spinoffs that pursued this opportunity, including key technical and business trajectories driven by information theory. Based on this evidence, the paper provides observations about commercializing open science, particularly for engineering‐related fields.