Conflicts of interest,information provision,and competition in the financial services industry

In some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer's needs. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures, specialized banking and one-stop banking.     

Beyond Regulation: Towards a Cultural Political Economy of Complexity and Emergence

Drawing on and contributing to materialist state theory, the regulation approach and institutional economics for more than three decades, Bob Jessop can certainly be considered one of the foremost Marxist political economists of our time. Recently, he has taken on board the cultural turn in social analysis by developing a highly original cultural political economy of the knowledge-based economy. As a contribution to the further development of a cultural political economy that is sensitive to the cultural dimensions of social life while retaining an emphasis on capital accumulation and state regulation, this article directs attention to the limits of Jessop's approach and suggests possible amendments to the theory. In particular, the article highlights the need to move beyond a concern with regulation towards a cultural political economy of complexity and emergence.     

Transaction utility effects when quality is uncertain

The existing literature finds that price discrepancy, which represents the difference between expected and observed price, helps explain brand choice and purchase intention. This effect is often attributed to transaction utility, that is, the incremental utility associated with the surprise of observing a price lower or higher than expected. This research considers the possibility, however, that transaction utility is a less important determinant of choice when quality is uncertain. We propose and find that acquisition utility (perceived value for the money) tends to dominate the explanation of purchase intention, but transaction utility is significant only when consumers are more certain about quality. Our discussion considers the relative role of transaction utility in explaining consumer decision making and how the informative and allocative roles of price might be distinguished. He received his Ph.D. in marketing from Ohio State University and his B.S. from Ohio State University. His research interests include information economics and pricing. Previously, he taught at the University of South Carolina. He has published in theJournal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing, andJournal of Retailing, among others. He received his Ph.D. at the University of South Carolina, his M.B.A. from the University of Georgia, and a B.S. degree from Clemson University. Previously, he taught at the University of Alabama. His research interests include consumer perceptions of value and interpersonal influences. He has published in theJournal of Consumer Research and theJournal of Marketing Research, among others. He received his Ph.D. in marketing from the University of South Carolina and has a Bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of Delhi. His research interests include price bundling, price effects on perceived quality perceptions, and segmentation of business-to-business markets. He has published in theJournal of Business Research and theAdvances in Consumer Research series, published by the Association of Consumer Research. He previously taught on the faculty of Valdosta State University. She received a B.S. in statistics, a Ph.D. in marketing from the University of South Carolina, and a M.S. in statistics from Virginia Polytechnic Institute. She previously taught at Lehigh University. Her research interests include market segmentation, discrete data analysis, and pricing. She has published in theJournal of Marketing Research, as well as in theProceedings of the American Marketing Association and theAssociation for Consumer Research.     

Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents

A setting in which a single principal contracts with two agents who possess perfect private information about their own productivity is considered. With correlated productivities, each agent's private information also provides a signal about the other agent's productivity. In contrast to the setting in which there is only one agent, it is shown that such private information may be of no value to the agents. It is only if the agents are risk-averse that their private information may allow them to command rents. Moreover, when the agents are constrained only to reveal their private information truthfully as a Nash equilibrium, the Pareto optimal incentive scheme may induce the agents to adopt strategies other than truth-telling. This leads to the consideration of truth-telling equilibria that are not Pareto dominated in the subgame played by the agents. Among all such equilibria, the one preferred by the principal restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as a Nash response to truth.     

A Look Back at Modern Finance: Accomplishments and Limitations

In a conversation held in June 2016 between Nobel laureate Eugene Fama of the University of Chicago and Joel Stern, chairman and CEO of Stern Value Management, Professor Fama revisited some of the landmarks of “modern finance,” a movement that was launched in the early 1960s at Chicago and other leading business schools, and that gave rise to Efficient Markets Theory, the Modigliani‐Miller “irrelevance” propositions, and the Capital Asset Pricing Model. These concepts and models are still taught at prestigious business schools, whose graduates continue to make use of them in corporations and investment firms throughout the world. But while acknowledging the staying power of “modern finance,” Fama also notes that, even after a half‐century of research and refinements, most asset‐pricing models have failed empirically. Estimating something as apparently simple as the cost of capital remains fraught with difficulty. He dismisses betas for individual stocks as “garbage,” and even industry betas are said to be unstable, “too dynamic through time.” What's more, the wide range of estimates for the market risk premium—anywhere from 2% to 10%—casts doubt on their reliability and practical usefulness. And as if to reaffirm the fundamental insight of the M&M “irrelevance” propositions—namely, that what companies do with the right‐hand sides of their balance sheets “doesn't matter”—Fama observes that “we still have no real resolution on the key questions of debt and taxes, or dividends and taxes.” But if he has reservations about much of modern finance, Professor Fama is even more skeptical about subfields now in vogue such as behavioral finance, which he describes as “mostly just dredging for anomalies,” with no underlying theory and no testable predictions. Although he does not dispute that a number of well‐documented traits from cognitive psychology show up in individual behavior, Fama says that behavioral economists have thus far failed to come up with a testable theory that links cognitive psychology to market prices. And he continues to defend the concept of “efficient markets” with which his name has long been closely associated, while noting that empirically based asset pricing models such as his (with Ken French) “three‐factor” CAPM have produced much better results than the standard CAPM.     

Are property rights enough?Re‐evaluating a big‐bang claim1

We investigate the claim made by proponents of the big‐bang strategy that the establishment of property rights in an economy in transition creates its own demand for the enforcement of laws to protect those rights. Our model contains a government engaging in activities to accomplish objectives that depend on public support for the enforcement of the rule of law and agents who interpret the level of activities of the government as indications of the government's intent to enforce the rule of law. Agents, using the level of government activities as an input to their decisions, choose whether to support the government's objectives. We establish conditions under which the level of activities chosen by the government maximizes its benefits, and simultaneously induces the constituency to support enforcement of the rule of law. These conditions provide a basis for the argument for the implementation of the big‐bang policy. When these conditions do not hold, however, we show that the level of activities that maximizes the government's benefits may have only a minor impact on support for the enforcement of the rule of law. Two characteristics play an important role in these conditions: the initial level of crime and the types of activities the government chooses to undertake. We present examples showing that the initial level of crime has the more dramatic effect on subsequent support for the rule of law.     

RENT SEEKING AND SOCIAL INVESTMENT IN TASTE CHANGE*

We study the social allocation of resources to the alteration of preferences. Such taste changes are Pareto-preferred if, according to both the original and the new taste regime, the resource allocation resulting from the taste change constitutes an improvement. According to this criterion, a degree of altruism is in general Pareto-preferred, because it reduces socially wasteful activities, such as lobbying, bargaining and other rent seeking activities designed to increase one agent's expected share of the contested rent. We present a stylized model that captures the role of education in generating altruism and thus reducing the expenditure on rent seeking.