Medical Malpractice Liability and Physician Migration

This paper uses national data on individual physicians and two control groups to provide evidence on the extent to which each of five medical malpractice reforms impacts the decision to move one's medical practice to another state. We find robust evidence that states that have implemented noneconomic damage caps experience less out-migration of physicians than states that do not have these reforms. In addition, we find some evidence that joint and several liability reforms and patient compensation funds also impact the migration decisions of physicians.     

International Financial Cooperation and the Number of Adherents: The Basel Committee and Capital Regulation

Theoretical analyses of international cooperation point to cooperation being optimized with a small number of participants. History is consistent with this view. However an anomaly is the international capital standards created by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Basel I has over 100 adherents, and approximately that number of countries have been identified in a survey as candidates for Basel II. The author demonstrates that this is not an anomaly. First, Basel I was a product of a duopoly and then an oligopoly prior to approval by the BCBS. Secondly, self-interest and other factors explain why more than 100 countries have agreed to accept these standards. JEL Classification Numbers: E58, F33, G15, G28     

Efficiency in Pari-Mutuel Betting Markets across Wagering Pools in the Simulcast Era

Simulcast wagering, where bets from across the country are taken at tracks, off-track betting facilities, casinos, by phone or online and incorporated into the same mutuel pool, has contributed to a large increase in betting volume on American horse races since the mid-1990s. This article investigates betting-market efficiency in the simulcast era focusing on whether the interrelated betting markets comprised of win, place (finishing in the top two), and show (finishing in the top three) wagering are efficiently priced. We find that the increased accessibility and betting volume associated with simulcasting has reduced, but not eliminated, the inefficiencies seen in prior studies. Despite the inefficiencies in these markets, arbitrage is not profitable because market closing prices are unknown when bets are placed.     

钉住一篮子货币如何运转?

2005年11月3日,美国国际经济研究所高级研究员,著名国际经济政策问题专家,华盛顿共识提出者约翰·威廉姆森(John Williamson)在中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所做题为"钉住货币篮子的制度如何运行(How does the basket peg work)"的讲演.     

United States concessions in the Kennedy Round and short-run labor adjustment costs

This paper reports on an econometric analysis of the exemptions awarded to United States industries from the across-the-board 50 percent tariff cut imposed in the Kennedy Round. It is shown that as much as 50 percent of the inter-industry variation in reductions in nominal tariff and non-tariff rates may be accounted for by variables that proxy labor adjustment costs. In particular, certain industrial characteristics are significantly related to the Kennedy Round reductions: declining industries, and industries with a high proportion of unskilled or old workers, are associated with low reductions.     

Market Interaction and Pro-Social Behavior: An Experimental Study

When actions generate negative externalities for third parties, incentives exist to pass these “morally costly” decisions to others. In laboratory experiments, we investigate how market interaction affects allocations when the right to divide a sum of money between oneself and a passive recipient is commoditized. Allocation to recipients is reduced by more than half when determined by subjects who purchase or keep the right to make the division as compared to a control where subjects are directly assigned the right. Sellers report accurate beliefs about recipient allocations and do not report feeling less responsible the more often they sell the allocation right. The market allocates the right to make divisions more frequently to buyers who allocate more to recipients, but sellers who allocate less to recipients tend to sell less often. Selection cannot solely explain the results, suggesting market interaction itself may directly impact behavior.