International Financial Cooperation and the Number of Adherents: The Basel Committee and Capital Regulation

Theoretical analyses of international cooperation point to cooperation being optimized with a small number of participants. History is consistent with this view. However an anomaly is the international capital standards created by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Basel I has over 100 adherents, and approximately that number of countries have been identified in a survey as candidates for Basel II. The author demonstrates that this is not an anomaly. First, Basel I was a product of a duopoly and then an oligopoly prior to approval by the BCBS. Secondly, self-interest and other factors explain why more than 100 countries have agreed to accept these standards. JEL Classification Numbers: E58, F33, G15, G28     

Spatial determinants of Japanese FDI in China

Research on foreign direct investment in China has spawned an increasingly large literature. Whilst regional cleavages with respect to the distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) are acknowledged, empirical research on the spatial determinants of FDI in China has been limited. Furthermore, research on the spatial determinants of home country FDI in China has thus far been neglected due to difficulties in accessing the appropriate data. The objective of this paper is to examine the spatial determinants of Japanese direct investment in China by using an econometric model. To that purpose, a dataset is created from the Toyo Keizai directory on the overseas activities of Japanese companies. The results show that tertiary education, inland waterways, as well as coastal location are positive and significant determinants of Japanese investment in China.     

Earnings on the Information Technology Roller Coaster: Insight from Matched Employer-Employee Data

This article uses matched employer-employee data for the State of Georgia to examine workers' earnings experience through the information technology (IT) sector's employment boom of the mid-1990s and bust in the early 2000s. The results show that even after controlling for pre-boom individual characteristics, transitioning out of the IT sector to a non-IT industry generally resulted in a large wage penalty. However, IT service workers who transitioned to a non-IT industry still fared better than workers who took a non-IT employment path. For IT manufacturing workers, there is no benefit to having been touched by technology, likely because of the nontransferability of manufacturing experience to other industries.     

钉住一篮子货币如何运转?

2005年11月3日,美国国际经济研究所高级研究员,著名国际经济政策问题专家,华盛顿共识提出者约翰·威廉姆森(John Williamson)在中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所做题为"钉住货币篮子的制度如何运行(How does the basket peg work)"的讲演.     

China＇s Economy in 2005： At a New Turning Point and Need to Fix Its Development Problems

I. High Growth, Higher Stakes China’s economy in 2005 experienced another year of surging growth, with its total GDP(based on recent revision) expanding at 9.9 percent to reach 18.23 tn yuan (US$2.26 tn).1 Growth in 2005 was slightly lower than the 10.1 percent in 2004; but it was nonetheless very high. Sustained high growth is accompanied by potential high risks, and it inevitably raises the issue of future sustainability of high growth. Although the Chinese economic policy-makers in 200…     

United States concessions in the Kennedy Round and short-run labor adjustment costs

This paper reports on an econometric analysis of the exemptions awarded to United States industries from the across-the-board 50 percent tariff cut imposed in the Kennedy Round. It is shown that as much as 50 percent of the inter-industry variation in reductions in nominal tariff and non-tariff rates may be accounted for by variables that proxy labor adjustment costs. In particular, certain industrial characteristics are significantly related to the Kennedy Round reductions: declining industries, and industries with a high proportion of unskilled or old workers, are associated with low reductions.     

Market Interaction and Pro-Social Behavior: An Experimental Study

When actions generate negative externalities for third parties, incentives exist to pass these “morally costly” decisions to others. In laboratory experiments, we investigate how market interaction affects allocations when the right to divide a sum of money between oneself and a passive recipient is commoditized. Allocation to recipients is reduced by more than half when determined by subjects who purchase or keep the right to make the division as compared to a control where subjects are directly assigned the right. Sellers report accurate beliefs about recipient allocations and do not report feeling less responsible the more often they sell the allocation right. The market allocates the right to make divisions more frequently to buyers who allocate more to recipients, but sellers who allocate less to recipients tend to sell less often. Selection cannot solely explain the results, suggesting market interaction itself may directly impact behavior.