THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION SHOW THE NEED FOR DIRECT TAXATION? IT JUST AIN'T SO!

Historians and economists often refer to the United States experience under the Articles of Confederation as evidence against decentralised government finance. While it is true that the US government had difficulty raising money from the states during this period, we argue that these facts are a benefit of the system, not a flaw. A 'bottom-up' system of finance, such as the one that existed under the Articles of Confederation, is an important check on Leviathan and has implications for United Nations fund-raising efforts and development economics.     

Responsibility accounting and asymmetry of information

This paper uses the principal-agent model to show that a manager's optimal compensation should generally include non-controllable factors of production such as the firm's investment in capital. This implies that the managerial accounting distinction between profit and investment centres is artificial. Examples are shown in which the ROI or RI criteria could be optimal for compensating managers implying that the optimal compensation criterion is very much specific to the firm's production and risk parameters. Thus, the debate about which criterion is more appropriate is vacuous.     

Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities

This paper provides an analysis of a non‐cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network. We establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents. That is, we provide a non‐cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non‐cooperative surplus. The resulting division is related to the Myerson‐Shapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications. We demonstrate this by examining buyer‐seller networks and vertical foreclosure.     

Information interpretation or information discovery: which role of analysts do investors value more?

This study provides evidence that a significant percentage of analyst forecast revisions are issued promptly after a broad set of corporate public disclosures and that investors perceive these prompt revisions as more valuable than nonprompt revisions. These results hold for all revisions, revisions outside of the earnings announcement window, or revisions in weeks preceding the earnings announcements and are also robust to various sensitivity tests. Investors particularly value analysts?? prompt interpretation of earnings announcements, Form 8-K filings, or certain qualitative news. To the extent that prompt revisions are more likely to reflect analysts?? information interpretation role, our results suggest that investors value more highly analysts?? ability to interpret public disclosures, especially less structured or non-financial disclosures, than their ability for information discovery.     

Exit Deterrence

This paper is the first to provide a general context whereby potential entry can lead incumbent firms to permanently reduce the intensity of competition in a market. All previous results found that potential entry would lead to lower prices and greater competition. Examining markets where entry occurs by the acquisition of access rights from an existing incumbent, we demonstrate that, where competitive choices are strategic complements, a more efficient entrant may be unable to acquire those rights from a less efficient incumbent due to the unilateral accommodating behavior of the efficient incumbent. Similarly, such accommodating behavior may deter efficient investment by an incumbent. These results have implications as to how economists view potential entry and its benefits.     

The sustainability of economic transformation

The paper analyzes the feasibility of sustaining both macroeconomic stability and political support during economic transformation. Macroeconomic stability requires that state sector losses plus public infrastructure investment be financed by tax revenue plus any external assistance. Political sustainability depends on the income gains and losses experienced by three groups—state sector workers, private sector workers, and private savers/investors. The aggregate income gains from allowing heterogeneous workers to make occupational choices consistent with their comparative advantages can outweigh or significantly offset the short-run economic efficiency costs of maintaining political support for the transformation. Successful transformation may depend on external assistance, but this need will diminish over time.     

Aiding regional instability? The geopolitical paradox of Japanese development assistance to China

During the past decade, Japan established itself as the largest bilateral donor of development aid in the world, with more of it directed toward projects in China than any other recipient. Japan sees its aid flows to China as maintaining economic stability in East Asia, particularly as China's raw material and energy resources are articulated into regional markets. In this article, I argue that Japan's aid to China may unintentionally diminish Japan's and the East Asian region's long‐term security for two reasons. First, similar to other nations receiving such assistance, this aid may allow China to reallocate scarce capital to military modernisation. Such military modernisation may enable China to both better suppress internal dissent and carry out a more aggressive foreign policy. Second, this aid does not address the fundamental structural aspects of China's present instability. Long‐term structural instability has many sources, but the two discussed here are socio‐economic inequality (both interregional and intraregional), and sustainable production and environmental problems. Taken together these have important regional and geopolitical implications and repercussions. This article fills a gap in the existing literature on East Asian geopolitics. Namely, that by attending only to relatively short‐term corporate and perceived state interests of China and Japan, Japanese aid to China does little to ameliorate and potentially exacerbates long‐term structural social and environmental problems for China's vast majority living in rural hinterlands. The potential for internal turmoil springing from this uneven and unsustainable development inside China is the real basis for China's ‘threat’ to East Asian security. Thus what appears to make good development and geopolitical sense at first look, Japan's current aid regime with China, paradoxically may actually be the worst path to follow.