Technology assessment and risk analysis

The evolution of technology assessment from cost-benefit calculus to a sophisticated form of policy analysis has gone through at least three and possibly four stages. These stages, characterized by the degree of comprehensiveness aspired by the natural affinity of risk analysis to technology assessment, are explored in some detail, and it is postulated that risk analysis might very well follow a similar evolutionary path.     

‘Managerialism’, ‘ownerism’ and risk

This paper proposes that managers, having the value of their human capital dependent on the performance of the firm they manage, and being unable to diversify away this risk, are expected to attempt to reduce their employment risk internally by project selection or by income smoothing, intended to stabilize the firm's income stream. An empirical investigation shows that manager-controlled firms exercise ‘income smoothing’ to a greater extent than owner-controlled firms, have relatively lower unsystematic risk and perhaps lower systematic risk.     

Information interpretation or information discovery: which role of analysts do investors value more?

This study provides evidence that a significant percentage of analyst forecast revisions are issued promptly after a broad set of corporate public disclosures and that investors perceive these prompt revisions as more valuable than nonprompt revisions. These results hold for all revisions, revisions outside of the earnings announcement window, or revisions in weeks preceding the earnings announcements and are also robust to various sensitivity tests. Investors particularly value analysts?? prompt interpretation of earnings announcements, Form 8-K filings, or certain qualitative news. To the extent that prompt revisions are more likely to reflect analysts?? information interpretation role, our results suggest that investors value more highly analysts?? ability to interpret public disclosures, especially less structured or non-financial disclosures, than their ability for information discovery.     

The intertemporal risk-Return relation,investor behavior,and technical trading profits: evidence from the G-7 countries

The intertemporal risk-return relation and investor behavior are both important pricing factors that jointly determine the expected market risk premium. Using the price adjustment process as a control variable, we find that the intertemporal risk-return relation is positive conditional on bad market news, but is non-positive conditional on good market news. This implies that good (bad) market news weakens (strengthens) the positive risk-return relation. The pattern in the distortion of the risk-return relation is consistent with short-term mispricing in which investors overvalue (undervalue) the stock market in reaction to good (bad) market news. We also show that ignoring the price adjustment process in the estimation of the risk-return relation leads to model misspecification and induces an upward (downward) bias in estimates of the relative risk aversion parameter conditional on good (bad) news. Our model of the asymmetric risk-return relation along with the price adjustment process is capable of generating the return dynamics that is attributable to technical trading profits. We suggest that the profitability of technical trading rules is not a violation of market efficiency, but a consequence of trading rules exploiting the asymmetric effect of price changes on the risk-return relation, along with the persistence property of price changes.     

OPTIONS TO THE REALM: A COST NEUTRAL PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE POLITICAL INCENTIVES

In this article, we draw on the literature on political property rights, political accountability, and strategic management and entrepreneurship to propose a cost neutral reform aimed at promoting long‐run economic prosperity. We propose replacing politicians' defined benefit pensions with a financial contract that is tied to economic performance. In particular, we propose a contract that pays out a lump sum to a politician 30 years after their election if real gross domestic product per capita is above some preset benchmark. Furthermore, we show that the contract can be priced such that it is cost neutral in terms of present value with a defined‐benefit pension. We argue that this contract provides a net benefit to society. (JEL D70, D72)