Renegotiation in Public–Private Partnerships: An Incentive Mechanism Approach

Game theory is an important analytical tool for measuring problems caused by behaviors that deviate from contractual ethics. However, the PPP literature still does little to explore this research topic. This paper analyzes and improves the equilibrium conditions of a renegotiation model of PPPs by introducing the asymmetry of information in the contract. To achieve this goal, the Mechanism Design Theory is used to demonstrate how the correct tracking of the investor directly influences the payoffs of the renegotiation. The study concludes that the lack of incentive constraints in the bidding document, as an ex ante condition, does not provide sufficient information on investor management capability. In this way, this information is only revealed in the renegotiation phase. Consequently, this contract failure results in high political costs to the government due to excessive subsidies.     

A Non-cooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems

We propose an elementary game form that allows to obtain the allocations proposed by any acceptable bankruptcy rule as the unique payoff vector of the corresponding Nash equilibria.     

Towards 5G: Techno-economic analysis of suitable use cases

NETNOMICS: Economic Research and Electronic Networking - The evolution of mobile networks towards the Fifth Generation (5G) introduces many concerns from the technical and economic points of view....     

Software Transparency

Software transparency is a new and important concern that software developers must deal with. As society moves towards increased automation, if citizens wish to exercise their right to know, the transparency of public services and processes acquires fundamental importance. Informed discourse is only possible if processes affecting the public are open to evaluation. Achieving software transparency to this level of openness faces several roadblocks. The paper reports on initial findings on exploring the obstacles for enabling software transparency.     

Measure for Measure: Exact F Tests and the Mixed Models Controversy

We consider exact F tests for the hypothesis of null random factor effect in the presence of interaction under the two factor mixed models involved in the mixed models controversy. We show that under the constrained parameter ( CP ) model, even in unbalanced data situations, MSB/MSE (in the usual ANOVA notation) follows an exact F distribution when the null hypothesis holds. We also obtain an exact F test for what is generally (and erroneously) assumed to be an equivalent hypothesis under the unconstrained parameter ( UP ) model. For unbalanced data, such a corresponding test statistic does not coincide with MSB/MSAB (the test statistic advocated for balanced data cases). We compute the power of the exact test under different imbalance patterns and show that although the loss of power increases with the degree of imbalance, it still remains reasonable from a practical point of view.