Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Emerging International Business Practice

Speed, flexibility, negotiated control of outcomes, savings and absence of future enmity. Why lose all this in litigation when a new user-friendly alternative is on the increase? The author is Chief Executive of the Centre for Dispute Resolution (CEDR), 7 St. Katharine's Way, London E1 9LB, and Special Professor in ADR in the University of Birmingham, England.     

Problems of a code of conduct

UNCTAD’s Main Committee for Technology is to meet in November 1975 to discuss once again the subject of a Code of Conduct to be observed in transferring technical knowledge. What chances are there for such a Code to be adopted?     

Die Anleihe als zufälliger Prozeß

Zusammenfassung Die Rentabilität von Anleihen wird im allgemeinen näherungsweise berechnet, indem der durchschnittliche Gewinn bei Rückkauf eines Anleihestückes auf die mittlere Laufzeit umgelegt und dem Zinsenertrag zugeschlagen wird. Wird der Vorgang des Rückkaufes von Anleihestücken als zufälliger Prozeß betrachtet, dann kann durch die Annahme, jedes rückgekaufte Stück wird sofort durch ein Stück gleicher Ausstattung ersetzt, ein Erneuerungsprozeß eingeführt werden. Im folgenden wird gezeigt, welchen Sinn die übliche Näherungsformel für die Rentabilität bei der Betrachtung des Anleihevorganges als Erneuerungsprozeß gewinnt. Im weiteren gestattet die Darstellung als Erneuerungsprozeß tiefere Einblicke in die Struktur des Geschehens.     

SOME DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR EQUITY-BASED PAY

Almost everyone agrees that equity-based incentive compensation can play an important role in increasing shareholder value, but there is considerable disagreement as to what that role should be and how equity pay should be packaged. What's more, there has been a backlash against equity pay that has compensation committees, investors, and corporate watchdogs on full alert. The authors of this article provide some basic guidelines for equity pay that could help to restore confidence in this useful element of compensation–guidelines that encompass the type of equity instrument, the level of equity-based pay, the extent to which equity pay is performance based, and the structure of the equity package in terms of vesting, exercise, and expiry. They start by acknowledging that the role of equity pay is limited by the extent to which shareholder value can be affected by the manager in question. They recommend building steadily to a constant level of stock price exposure and then gradually reducing this level after retirement. For most companies, equity-based pay should be significant only for a handful of employees; performance based cash bonuses provide better "line-of-sight," especially for operating managers who are somewhat removed from corporate-wide decisions. And disclosure–both internal and external–is perhaps the most important aspect of equity-based pay plans.     

International Evidence on the Value of Corporate Diversification

The valuation effect of diversification is examined for large samples of firms in Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom for 1992 and 1994. We find no significant diversification discount in Germany, but a significant diversification discount of 10 percent in Japan and 15 percent in the U.K. Concentrated ownership in the hands of insiders enhances the valuation effect of diversification in Germany, but not in Japan or the U.K. For Japan, only firms with strong links to an industrial group have a diversification discount. These findings suggest that international differences in corporate governance affect the impact of diversification on shareholder wealth.