C. Van Tuyckom, & K. J?reskog, “Going for gold! Welfare characteristics and Olympic success: an application of the structural equation approach.” Quality & Quantity (in press)

Winning medals at the Olympic Games has become an objective that countries worldwide want to achieve. In line with research devoted to the predictors of success, the present article examines the connection between certain welfare characteristics (political, social, and economic development) and the probability of success in the 1984 and 2004 Olympics. We expected to find that structural macro conditions still predict Olympic success. Using welfare indicators as formative instead of reflective indicators (Bollen, Qual Quant 183: 77–85, 1984, p. 65), the results of our Structural Equation Model reveal that both economic and social development had an effect in 1984, as well as in 2004. Political development was only significant in 1984. As for the control variables, population size was significant in both 1984 and 2004. Sporting tradition and geographical conditions had no effect at all. The model fit is very good with a chi-square of 6.62 with 5 degrees of freedom (p =  0.25).     

Efficiency and Ownership Structure: The Case of Poland

We examine the effects of foreign entry on productive efficiency during the Polish investment liberalisation. The performance of foreign acquisitions is compared to foreign firms entering the market through greenfield entry, as well as domestic acquisitions of privatised firms, domestic greenfields and remaining state‐owned (non‐privatised) firms during the period 1995–2000. We find that foreign privatised firms have realised larger productivity gains than all types of domestic firms and that this is not due to higher price‐cost margins, which is consistent with the idea that foreign firms bring in firm‐specific knowledge. Foreign greenfields have the highest average labour productivity, while foreign privatisations show the largest productivity increase.     

Revitalizing Inner‐City Neighborhoods in the United States

Books reviewed in this article: Ronald F. Ferguson and William T. Dickens ,(eds.) Urban problems andcommunity development Michael R. Greenberg, Restoring America's neighborhoods: how local people make a difference W. Dennis Keating and Norman Krumholz, (eds.) Rebuilding urban neighborhoods: achievements, opportunities and limits John Kromer, Neighborhood recovery: reinvestment policy for the new hometown William Peterman, Neighborhood planning and community‐based development: the potential and limits of grassroots action     

Product Quality,Cost Asymmetry and the Welfare Loss of Oligopoly

When competition is tough, firms which do not implement the least expensive technology are forced to exit, or the low cost firms are able to increase their market share. Persistent cost or profit differences require some form of restricted entry, specific intangible assets or oligopolistic co-ordination. If technology or skills is easy to transfer but it is not transferred because of collusion, we have to add a cost side effect ('the staircase')stemming from the non-proliferation of the best technology- to the well-known demand side loss ('the triangle'). This paper presents a model with vertical product differentiation and develops a method which disentangles cost differences coming from vertical product differences and those coming from other sources. Data for the paper industry in the EU, in the US and in Japan indicate that cost differences are large. If at least some part of them comes from oligopolistic co-ordination, then the welfare loss of oligopoly is much larger than the usually measured demand side welfare loss.     

Justice and Fairness in the Dictator Game

This article uses a laboratory experiment to examine the question of whether justice and fairness are different motivational forces in the dictator game. “Justice” and “fairness” are often used interchangeably because their meanings and usages are so closely linked, despite their distinct connotations. Using four different treatments, our experimental design investigates the subtle differences between the two social concepts to explicate generosity in the dictator game. The results indicate that justice, not fairness, legitimizes property rights in the dictator game.     

THE TRANSITION TO A SINGLE INSURANCE MARKET IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Abstract: The European single insurance market incorporates the member stales of the European Union (EU). The legal framework for the market was enacted on June 30, 1994. The framework provides, above all, for a closely integrated supervisory (regulatory) system, a single license for the whole market and single home country control. Currently, some significant obstacles are slowing the realization of the European single insurance market, while several important economic policy and public interest questions remain to be answered.     

Equilibrium with arbitrary market structure

Summary. Fifty years ago Arrow [1] introduced contingent commodities and Debreu [4] observed that this reinterpretation of a commodity was enough to apply the existing general equilibrium theory to uncertainty and time. This interpretation of general equilibrium theory is the Arrow-Debreu model. The complete market predicted by this theory is clearly unrealistic, and Radner [10] formulated and proved existence of equilibrium in a multiperiod model with incomplete markets.In this paper the Radner result is extended. Radner assumed a specific structure of markets, independence of preferences, indifference of preferences, and total and transitive preferences. All of these assumptions are dropped here. We - like Radner - keep assumptions implying compactness.Received: 17 April 2003, Revised: 26 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D52, D40.     

ARE FOREIGN FIRMS MORE TECHNOLOGICALLY INTENSIVE? UK ESTABLISHMENT EVIDENCE FROM THE ARD

This paper employs establishment level data from the annual respondents database to consider technological differences between establishments operating in the UK. We adopt very precise measures of technology, arguably much more detailed than have hitherto been employed to address the key question of whether use of technology differs by nationality. After numerous controls we find that typically North American establishments have a higher probability of being more technologically intensive than their UK counterparts. This result also stands up in panel analysis.