SUNK COSTS OF CAPITAL AND THE FORM OF ENTERPRISE: INVESTOR‐OWNED FIRMS AND WORKER‐OWNED FIRMS*

ABSTRACT ** : This paper examines implications of sunk costs of capital for efficient forms of enterprise. It is assumed that firm owners and outside traders are asymmetrically informed of venture risks, and that there are sunk costs associated with investment in physical and human capital. We then make an efficiency comparison between investor‐owned and worker‐owned firms. We find that the firm is efficient when it is owned by the input supplier (the investor or worker) who incurs large sunk costs. This is because such an input supplier can credibly signal to the other input supplier that he in fact has a safe project. An empirical study based on the Japanese manufacturing industry seems to support the theoretical result.     

On the effect of mean-nonstationarity in dynamic panel data models

In this paper, we investigate the effect of mean-nonstationarity on the first-difference generalized method of moments (FD-GMM) estimator in dynamic panel data models. We find that when data is mean-nonstationary and the variance of individual effects is significantly larger than that of disturbances, the FD-GMM estimator performs quite well. We demonstrate that this is because the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and instruments gets larger owing to the unremoved individual effects, i.e., instruments become strong. This implies that, under mean-nonstationarity, the FD-GMM estimator does not always suffer from the weak instruments problem even when data is persistent.     

Commodity Spread Option with Cointegration

We derive the valuation formula of a European call option on the spread of two cointegrated commodity futures prices, based on the Gibson–Schwartz with cointegration (GSC) model. We also analyze the American commodity spread option including the early exercise premium representation and an analytical approximation valuation formulae with cointegration. In the numerical analysis, we compare the spread option values calculated by the GSC model and the Gibson–Schwartz (GS) model that ignores cointegration. Consistent with the intuition that the cointegration prevents the prices from diverging, the GSC model prices the commodity spread option lower than the GS model which have longer maturity of more than 6 years. In other words, the GS model may overprice the commodity spread options for those with longer maturity without taking account of cointegration. Thus, incorporating cointegration is important for valuation and hedging of long-term commodity spread options such as large scale oil refining plant developments.     

ON THE EMERGENCE OF NON‐PROFIT FIRMS AS ALTERNATIVES TO THE GOVERNMENT*

It is well known that many non‐profit firms coexist with government firms in industries that provide collectively consumed goods and services, such as education, healthcare, social services, and art and culture. This paper explores the specific circumstances under which non‐profit firms can emerge as alternatives to the government. We show that a non‐profit firm emerges only when the residents’ median preference for a collective good is significantly low. This finding implies that, somewhat paradoxically, a non‐profit firm emerges to replace the government and provide a collective good only when the majority of residents consider the good non‐essential.     

Optimal degree of privatization and the environmental problem

We determine the optimal degree of privatization in a mixed duopoly when the environmental problem exists. With regard to the ownership of the private firms, we analyze two cases: (h) the private firm is owned by domestic private investors and (f) it is owned by foreign private investors. A comparison of the two cases presents the following results. Partial privatization is always desirable in (h), and the optimal degree of privatization is independent of the degree of environmental damage. However, in (f), whether partial privatization is desirable or not depends on the degree of environmental damage: there are cases where full privatization or full nationalization is optimal.     

Technology Transfer with Capital Constraints and Environmental Protections: Models and Applications to the Philippines

An efficient technology transfer from advanced to developing countries is explored by extending dynamic input-output optimization models. We include capital investments for the transferred technologies that affect the structural change and the welfare streams of consumption and the environmental state in the developing country. This technology transfer model is then linearized to solve larger problems. The linearized model was estimated and applied to assess the optimal technology transfer schedule from Japan to the Philippines.     

Introduction of New Technology with a Sound Transition of the Input-Output Structure

We examine the general equilibrium repercussions associated with the introduction of new technologies, using the generalized Leontief system that allows technological substitutions. We show that an untested introduction of cost-increasing technologies in any industry may result in creating a non-productive technological structure that does not satisfy the Hawkins-Simon condition, following the autonomous dynamic adjustment process with structural transitions in the economic system. Therefore, we propose a practicable control scheme of introducing cost-increasing technologies that strictly avoids the creation of non-productive structures in all periods of structural transition, using the available information on the ex ante technological structure.     

Can Allowing to Trade Permits Enhance Welfare in Mixed Oligopoly?

We compare the effects of tradable emission permits (TEP) and non-tradable emission permits (NTEP) in a mixed oligopoly, where public firms and private firms compete in a product market. If all technologies and initial endowments of emission permits are symmetric among public and private firms and if the emission constraint is exogenous and binding, social welfare is greater (resp. smaller) under TEP than under NTEP when the weight of social welfare in each public firm's objective function and the degree of convexity of the production cost function and that of the abatement cost function are small (resp. large).