Agglomeration in an innovative and differentiated industry with heterogeneous knowledge spillovers

This paper introduces an agent-based simulation model to study the technological development, the economic performance of firms and the evolution of agglomerations in a differentiated industry. The analysis is based on the interaction and behavior of firms, which might share knowledge but at the same time are competitors on the goods markets. Firms do not only compete with quantities they can also introduce process and product innovations. The level of knowledge of a firm describes the capabilities to perform innovations. Knowledge can be accumulated by investing in R&D and by knowledge spillover, which depend on geographical and technological proximity. Simulation runs show that there is an incentive to agglomerate in young industries and that geographical proximity enhances innovation, especially the number of product innovations.      

“Itô's Lemma” and the Bellman Equation for Poisson Processes: An Applied View

Using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, we derive both a Keynes-Ramsey rule and a closed form solution for an optimal consumption-investment problem with labor income. The utility function is unbounded and uncertainty stems from a Poisson process. Our results can be derived because of the proofs presented in the accompanying paper by Sennewald (2006). Additional examples are given which highlight the correct use of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and the change-of-variables formula (sometimes referred to as ``Itô's Lemma'') under Poisson uncertainty.     

Social learning with private and common values

Summary. We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff to an individual depends on her action choice, the state of the world, and an idiosyncratic, privately observed preference shock. Under weak conditions, as the number of individuals increases, the sequence of choices always reveals the state of the world. This contrasts with the familiar result for pure common-value environments where the state is never learned, resulting in herds or informational cascades. The medium run dynamics to convergence can be very complex and non-monotone: posterior beliefs may be concentrated on a wrong state for a long time, shifting suddenly to the correct state.Received: 6 January 2005, Revised: 5 May 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D82.Jacob K. Goeree: Correspondence toFinancial support from the National Science Foundation NSF (SBR-0098400 and SES-0079301) and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Richard McKelvey posthumously for insights and conjectures about information aggregation that helped shape our thinking about the problem. We also acknowledge helpful comments from Kim Border, Tilman Börgers, Bogachen Celen, Luis Corchon, Matthew Jackson and seminar participants at University College London, the University of Arizona, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, the California Institute of Technology, the 2003 annual meeting of ESA in Pittsburgh, the 2003 Malaga Workshop on Social Choice and Welfare Economics, the 2003 SAET meetings in Rhodos, and the 2003 ESSET meetings in Gerzensee.     

Trees and decisions

Summary. The traditional model of sequential decision making, for instance, in extensive form games, is a tree. Most texts define a tree as a connected directed graph without loops and a distinguished node, called the root. But an abstract graph is not a domain for decision theory. Decision theory perceives of acts as functions from states to consequences. Sequential decisions, accordingly, get conceptualized by mappings from sets of states to sets of consequences. Thus, the question arises whether a natural definition of a tree can be given, where nodes are sets of states. We show that, indeed, trees can be defined as specific collections of sets. Without loss of generality the elements of these sets can be interpreted as representing plays. Therefore, the elements can serve as states and consequences at the same time.Received: 23 January 2003, Revised: 2 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D70. Correspondence to: Klaus RitzbergerWe are grateful to Larry Blume, Ariel Rubinstein, Jörgen Weibull, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at the universities of Vienna, Salamanca, and Heidelberg for helpful comments. Financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under project P15281 is also gratefully acknowledged.     

Technology management in the company of the future

This paper develops new conceptual ideas on the role of technology management in future companies. It draws consequences for their operatins, and it suggests new perspectives that arise from current trends in company development. It argues that technology management needs to address, in a differentiated manner, the problems which airse during the development process of companies and markets. Particular emphasis is placed on the demand of systems producers on technology management.     

Validity — the quest for reality in quantitative and qualitative research

It has been argued that fundamentally different methodological approaches have made for ‘two sociologies’. This view has obscured the fact that the problem of validity has to be tackled independently of any specific methodological premises because of the textuality of sociological data. This does not necessarily imply, however, a single, unified strategy for validity testing. In this paper, some basic theoretical presuppositions underlying the approach to validity testing in quantitative research will be contrasted with the strategies offered by Max Weber's methodological writings on the ideal type. It is argued that the use of ideal typical constructs in qualitative research (exemplified by patient's illness careers) allows systematic validity testing despite the important differences in the conceptualization of social reality which is used in quantitative research, thus serving the purpose of any empirical sociological research, that is, to gain valid insight into societies' concrete reality.     

Modelling cost complementarities in terms of joint production

Cost complementarities arise from synergies in the production of heterogeneous goods. It is shown that synergies can be accounted for in terms of shared public inputs (roughly) if and only if synergies decrease as the scope of production increases. This case of “substitutive” synergies is argued to be typical. The key technical tool is a novel interpretation of conjugate Moebius inversion in terms of higher-order differences.     

The Delphi method, impeachment and terrorism: Accuracies of short-range forecasts for volatile world events

Two experiments examined the effects of iterated polling and feedback on prediction accuracy for volatile world events using the Delphi paradigm. In both experiments, participants predicted rapidly changing geopolitical events. The first experiment occurred during the litigation surrounding the Clinton/Lewinsky affair in 1998. Results indicated that feedback improved individual and group accuracy for predictions of whether an event would occur. These types of predictions derived from group consensus were approximately 90% accurate, which was significantly higher than the average individual participant's accuracy. Neither polling nor feedback had much effect on time course predictions. The second experiment occurred during the American military action against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. In Experiment 2, participants were polled three times to determine if increasing the number of iterated polls would improve Delphi accuracy. The results showed that accuracy improved from the first to the second poll but not from the second to the third. The groups predicted whether these scenarios would occur with approximately 75% accuracy, which was significantly higher than the accuracy of any individual participant. Once again, the Delphi procedure did not enhance time course predictions in Experiment 2.     

Family allowances as welfare improvements

The present paper studies the equilibria of a simple overlapping generations model of pure exchange in which money is traded. There is a continuum of agents in each generation and population growth is endogenous via voluntary decisions on children. Any monetary steady state has to satisfy the golden rule that the interest rate equals the growth rate. Still such a monetary steady state may be inefficient. If raising children is not excessively profitable, then there exists a transfer scheme, in favor of those who raise children, which improves upon the steady state.