Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda

This paper examines the extent to which various regions, and the world as a whole, could gain from multilateral trade reform over the next decade. The World Bank's Linkage model of the global economy is employed to examine the impact first of current trade barriers and agricultural subsidies, and then of possible outcomes from the WTO's Doha Round. The results suggest moving to free global merchandise trade would boost real incomes in sub‐Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia (and in Cairns Group countries) proportionately more than in other developing countries or high‐income countries. Real returns to farmland and unskilled labour, and real net farm incomes, would rise substantially in those developing‐country regions, thereby helping to reduce poverty. A Doha partial liberalisation could take the world some way towards those desirable outcomes, but more so the more agricultural subsidies are disciplined and applied tariffs are cut, and the more not just high‐income but also developing countries choose to engage in the process of reform.     

Overcoming Short‐Termism: Mental Time Travel,Delayed Gratification and How Not to Discount the Future

Short‐termism has been identified as a characteristic of individuals, companies, stock markets, governance structures and policies, and has been linked to inadequate saving for retirement, reduced investment returns, greater market instability and destruction of long‐term value. As a construct, short‐termism is complex and multidimensional. Accordingly, this paper draws upon current theory and research from a range of fields including behavioural economics, psychology and the cognitive sciences to uncover both explanations of the phenomenon and implications for countering an overly short‐term focus. Possible strategies for achieving the latter are discussed.     

Deposit Insurance and Depositor Monitoring: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 insured deposits up to $5,000 and limited interest paid by commercial banks. This essay uses a treatment-and-control estimation strategy to determine how those reforms influenced depositors’ reactions to information about banks’ balance sheets by comparing preferred and regular depositors at New York state banks. Before deposit insurance, regular depositors reacted more to information about banks, while preferred depositors reacted less. After, this difference diminished and almost disappeared. This change indicates insurance reduced monitoring, although depositors’ continued response to some information indicates that large, uninsured depositors continued to monitor banks, as the legislation intended.