Career Paths,Unemployment, and the Efficiency of the Labor Market: Should Youth Employment Be Subsidized?

This paper studies the implications of learning‐by‐doing on youth unemployment and market efficiency when workers benefiting from this kind of training experience search (while on the job) for a higher skill job. Firms with low‐skill jobs suffer from a poaching behavior by firms with high‐skill jobs, causing a shortage of low‐skill jobs and excessive youth unemployment. An optimal policy, consisting of taxing the output of high‐skill jobs and subsidizing the output of low‐skill jobs, restores market efficiency and reduces youth unemployment.     

A Comparison of χ2, RFA and IRT Based Procedures in the Detection of DIF

Bias research began at the end of the 1960s anddeveloped rapidly in the following decades for obvioussocial and political reasons, and due to the importantimpact that this issue has on the field ofpsychological and educational measurement. Since then,several methods have been proposed for the study anddetection of item bias or differential itemfunctioning (DIF). This paper presents a simulationstudy comparing the potential of some of these methodsfor detecting DIF: two IRT-based techniques (area measures), three ²-based procedures (MantelHaenszel, Logit Model and Logistic Regression) and theRestricted Factor Analysis method. The results showthat the technique that appears to do the best job isthe Mantel Haenszel statistic. Moreover, all detectiontechniques tend to overidentify DIF items, that is,some of the items labeled with DIF may in fact bewithout DIF. This tendency is slightly reversed in theLogistic Regression procedure.     

Agency,Firm Growth,and Managerial Turnover

We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when growth opportunities arrive stochastically and pursuing them requires a change in management. A trade‐off arises between the benefit of always having the “right” manager and the cost of incentive provision. The prospect of growth‐induced turnover limits the firm's ability to rely on deferred pay, resulting in more front‐loaded compensation. The optimal contract may insulate managers from the risk of growth‐induced dismissal after periods of good performance. The evidence for the United States broadly supports the model's predictions: Firms with better growth prospects experience higher CEO turnover and use more front‐loaded compensation.     

Collateral Spread and Financial Development

We show that institutions that promote financial development ease borrowing constraints by lowering the collateral spread and shifting the composition of acceptable collateral towards firm-specific assets. Collateral spread is defined as the difference in collateralization rates between high- and low-risk borrowers. The average collateral spread is large but declines rapidly with improvements in financial development driven by stronger institutions. We also show that the composition of collateralizable assets shifts towards non-specific assets (e.g., land) with borrower risk. However, the shift is considerably smaller in developed financial markets, enabling risky borrowers to use a larger variety of assets as collateral.     

Financial Regulation,Financial Globalization,and the Synchronization of Economic Activity

We analyze the impact of financial globalization on business cycle synchronization using a proprietary database on banks’ international exposure for industrialized countries during 1978 to 2006. Theory makes ambiguous predictions and identification has been elusive due to lack of bilateral time‐varying financial linkages data. In contrast to conventional wisdom and previous empirical studies, we identify a strong negative effect of banking integration on output synchronization, conditional on global shocks and country‐pair heterogeneity. Similarly, we show divergent economic activity due to higher integration using an exogenous de‐jure measure of integration based on financial regulations that harmonized EU markets.     

Optimal Monetary Policy in an Operational Medium‐Sized DSGE Model

We show how to construct optimal policy projections in Ramses, the Riksbank’s open‐economy medium‐sized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for forecasting and policy analysis. Bayesian estimation of the parameters of the model indicates that they are relatively invariant to alternative policy assumptions and supports our view that the model parameters may be regarded as unaffected by the monetary policy specification. We discuss how monetary policy, and in particular the choice of output gap measure, affects the transmission of shocks. Finally, we use the model to assess the recent Great Recession in the world economy and how its impact on the economic development in Sweden depends on the conduct of monetary policy. This provides an illustration on how Rames incoporates large international spillover effects.     

Symmetry and duality in Lévy markets

The aim of this paper is to introduce the notion of symmetry in a Lévy market. This notion appears as a particular case of a general known relation between prices of put and call options, of both the European and the American type, which is also reviewed in the paper, and that we call put–call duality. Symmetric Lévy markets have the distinctive feature of producing symmetric smile curves, in the log of strike/futures prices.

Put–call duality is obtained as a consequence of a change of the risk neutral probability measure through Girsanov's theorem, when considering the discounted and reinvested stock price as the numeraire. Symmetry is defined when a certain law before and after the change of measure through Girsanov's theorem coincides. A parameter characterizing the departure from symmetry is introduced, and a necessary and sufficient condition for symmetry to hold is obtained, in terms of the jump measure of the Lévy process, answering a question raised by Carr and Chesney (American put call symmetry, preprint, 1996 Carr, P and Chesney, M. 1996. American put call symmetry. preprint [Google Scholar]). Some empirical evidence is shown, supporting that, in general, markets are not symmetric.     

Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets?

Foreign firms terminate their Securities and Exchange Commission registration in the aftermath of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) because they no longer require outside funds to finance growth opportunities. Deregistering firms’ insiders benefit from greater discretion to consume private benefits without having to raise higher cost funds. Foreign firms with more agency problems have worse stock‐price reactions to the adoption of Rule 12h‐6 in 2007, which made deregistration easier, than those firms more adversely affected by the compliance costs of SOX. Stock‐price reactions to deregistration announcements are negative, but less so under Rule 12h‐6, and more so for firms that raise fewer funds externally.