Vertical Disintegration: A Dynamic Markovian Approach

In a model where a monopolistic downstream firm (assembler) negotiates simultaneously with each of its intermediate‐input suppliers the prices of the complementary components which enter its product, we analyze the process by which the assembler separates from its suppliers as a Markov Perfect equilibrium. Due to a negative strategic effect (the prices and profits of independent suppliers decrease when their number increases), the assembler’s marginal return from keeping an upstream subsidiary is lower than the market value of an independent supplier. Separation is immediate when the downstream firm’s initial number of upstream subsidiaries is below a critical level. It is progressive in the reverse case and eventually leads to a mixed strategy whereby the assembler keeps all the remaining subsidiaries with some probability, and sells all them off in one go with the complementary probability.     

An extension of the multi-output state-contingent production model

This paper presents new developments on the state-contingent theory of production under uncertainty with stochastic prices. Our main purpose is to generalize the usual finite discrete state-contingent production model to infinite dimensional, possibly uncountable spaces which look like a more realistic framework. Usual duality results are established in this general context, shedding some light on the links between risk-neutral probabilities and shadow prices. A direct generalized production risk premium is defined and is shown to be independent of the inputs level when the technology is output translation homothetic. In such a case, the technology exhibits constant absolute riskiness. We thank Bob Chambers for his helpful comments.     

The possibilities and limits of telework in a bureaucratic environment: lessons from the public sector

By modifying the spatial and temporal framework of work, telework involves a reorganisation of the conduct of work that affects the employment relationship in different ways. In this paper, we focus on control issues. Based on the empirical study of two experiences led in the public sector, we illustrate the necessity to redefine the rules of control and to recast managerial practices and role.     

A view of the European Union as an evolving country portfolio

We apply portfolio theory to assess the consequences in terms of risk sharing of the evolution of the industry mix of European Union countries between 1986 and 1997, and of the changes in the membership configurations of both economic and monetary unions. We compute a measure of risk-return performance for EU countries, by considering countries as collections of industries, and observe that risk-return performance improved in most countries. We find that the EU9 is marginally more efficient than the other historical EU groupings and that the Euro Zone might slightly benefit from the inclusion of the United Kingdom.     

Equal opportunity and poverty reduction: How should aid be allocated?

This paper analyzes a model of aid allocation equalizing the opportunity between recipient countries to reach a common poverty reduction goal. We propose a fair and efficient aid allocation based on a multicriteria principle. The model considers structural handicaps in recipient countries in terms of lack of human capital and economic vulnerability, their initial poverty, and the natural gap between the growth rate required to reach a development goal and the observed one. We show that our proposed aid allocation favors poor and vulnerable countries with our multicriteria principle. It substantially differs from the observed allocation. Analyses also shed light on the impact of the donors' aversion to the low natural growth gap in recipient countries on the optimal aid allocation and the marginal efficiency of aid.