The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders

We consider standard auction models when bidders’ identities are not-or are only partially-observed by the econometrician. We first adapt the definition of identifiability to a framework with anonymous bids and explore the extent to which anonymity reduces the possibility of identifying private value auction models. Second, in the asymmetric independent private value model which is nonparametrically identified, we generalize Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong’s estimation procedure [Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions, Econometrica 68 (2000) 525-574] and consider the asymptotic properties of our multi-step kernel-based estimator. Monte Carlo simulations illustrate the practical relevance of our estimation procedure in small data sets.     

Assessing horizontal mergers under uncertain efficiency gains

The analysis of horizontal mergers hinges on a tradeoff between unilateral effects and efficiency gains. We examine the role of uncertainty in this tradeoff. In theory, the attitude towards uncertainty depends on the curvature of the social objective function. On the one hand, adjustment effects, both on the consumers' and firms' sides, tend to make consumers' surplus and firms' profits convex. On the other hand, pass-through effects may act in the opposite direction. We show that convexity prevails in a number of situations, including the most general linear demand model. Implications for empirical merger analysis are exposed.     

The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle

The analysis of second price auctions with externalities is utterly modified if the seller is unable to commit not to participate in the mechanism. For the General Symmetric Model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [P. Milgrom, R. Weber, A theory of auctions and competitive bidding, Econometrica 50 (1982) 1089-1122] we characterize the full set of separating equilibria that are symmetric among buyers and with a strategic seller being able to bid in the same way as any buyer through a so-called shill bidding activity. The revenue ranking between first and second price auctions is different from the one arising in Milgrom and Weber: the benefits from the highlighted ‘Linkage Principle’ are counterbalanced by the ‘Shill Bidding Effect.’     

Nowcasting global economic growth: A factor‐augmented mixed‐frequency approach

Assessing accurately global economic conditions is a great challenge for economists. The International Monetary Fund proposes within its periodic World Economic Outlook report a measure of the global GDP annual growth, that is generally considered as the benchmark nowcast by macroeconomists. In this paper, we put forward an alternative approach to provide monthly nowcasts of the annual global growth rate. Our approach builds on a Factor‐Augmented MIxed DAta Sampling (FA‐MIDAS) model that enables: (i) to account for a large monthly database including various countries and sectors of the global economy and (ii) to nowcast a low‐frequency macroeconomic variable using higher frequency information. Pseudo‐real‐time results over the period 2010–16 show that this approach provides reliable and timely nowcasts of the world GDP annual growth on a monthly basis.     

The curse of knowledge: having access to customer information can reduce monopoly profits

We show that a monopolist's profit is higher if he refrains from collecting coarse information on his customers, sticking to constant uniform pricing rather than recognizing customers' segments through their purchase history. In the Markov perfect equilibrium with coarse information collection, after each commitment period, a new introductory price is offered to attract new customers, creating a new market segment for price discrimination. Eventually, the whole market is covered. Shortening the commitment period results in lower profits. These results sharply differ from the ones obtained when the firm can uncover the exact willingness-to-pay of each previous customer.     

Equilibrium Tariff Schedules In Commercial Policy Games Under Uncertainty

Abstract A partial two country equilibrium model is built in which two different exogenous random shocks may occur. the governments simultaneously choose tariff functions relating their specific tariff to the level of an observable variable (volume of trade or international price). In the case of a “volume of trade shock” the Nash equilibria of this game are more protectionist the larger the possible trade swings and autarky is always an equilibrium outcome. In the case of a “terms of trade shock”, constant tariffs, at their Nash equilibrium in specific tariff levels are the only sensible equilibrium outcome.     

Production Period and Cycles: Several Interpretations in a Neo-Austrian Economic Perspective

The aim of this contribution is to study the notion of the period of production by taking into consideration the time-consuming nature of capital. Long delays between investment expenditures and receipts of profits from capital are indeed a remarkable property of the Austrian theory of capital. The study of the great essays of the neo-Austrian capital theory modeling allows us to postulate that there are at least two large contributing groups depending upon whether the production period is endogenous or exogenous. Our work consists in showing the well-founded methodology of the first current by suggesting a neo-Austrian inerpretation of the non-steady state behavior of the standard macroeconomic model. We show that the origin of economic cycles is the potential conflict between the producer's plan of investment through the period of production and the inter-temporal choices of the consumers.     

Official central bank interventions and exchange rate volatility: Evidence from a regime-switching analysis

In this paper, we investigate the effect of central bank interventions on the weekly returns and volatility of the DEM/USD and YEN/USD exchange rate returns. In contrast with previous analyses, we allow for regime-dependent specifications and investigate whether official interventions can explain the observed volatility regime switches. It is found that, depending on the prevailing volatility level, coordinated central bank interventions can lead to either a stabilizing or a destabilizing effect. Our results lead us to challenge the usual view that such interventions always imply increases in volatility.     

Multifrequency jump-diffusions: An equilibrium approach

This paper proposes that equilibrium valuation is a powerful method to generate endogenous jumps in asset prices. We specify an economy with continuous consumption and dividend paths, in which endogenous price jumps originate from the market impact of regime-switches in the drifts and volatilities of fundamentals. We parsimoniously incorporate regimes of heterogeneous durations and verify that the persistence of a shock endogenously increases the magnitude of the induced price jump. As the number of frequencies driving fundamentals goes to infinity, the price process converges to a novel stochastic process, which we call a multifractal jump-diffusion.